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In totalitarian states of both the left and right, it is self-evident that
broadcasting serves as an instrument of the ruling elite; so too in a
democratic society must it be evident that broadcasting will be the
object of struggle among the powers that be.
- Hans Bausch, Former Director, ADR Broadcasting, Germany1
I. Introduction - Converging Media, Diverging Values:
European and United States' Approaches to Electronic
Media
While the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
proclaims that government shall make "no law" infringing the
freedom of speech, the German constitution - known as the Basic
Law or Grundgesetz - "guarantees" that freedom. 2 While the First
Amendment focuses on the speaker, the Basic Law's speech and
communication guarantees encompass speaker and listener,
1. HANS BAUSCH, RUNDFUNKPOLITIKNACH1945 525 (1980) ("So selbstverstdindlich
es ist, dafg in totalitdiren Staaten linker und rechter Prdigung der Rundfunk Instrument der
Herrschenden im Staat ist, so selbstverstdindlich ist er in einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft
auch Objekt der Auseinandersetzung der pluralistischen Krdften.").
2. Compare U.S. Const. amend. I, with Grundgesetz ftir die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law] art. 5(1), May 23, 1949, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBI]
[Federal Law Gazette], as amended (F.R.G.), available in English at
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf and http://www.iuscomp
.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm (all URL websites in this article last visited on
November 14, 2009). See DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 404-15 (2d ed., 1997):
The Basic Law... entered into force on May 23, 1949. It was called a 'basic
law' (Grundgesetz) because the Parliamentary Council did not want to
bestow the dignified term 'constitution' (Verfassung) on a document drafted
to govern a part of Germany for a transitional period that would only last
until national reunification . . . . When that day finally did arrive, on
October 3, 1990, German unity was achieved within the framework of the
Basic Law. The decision to retain the Basic Law as an all-German
constitution ... was not unanticipated. Over the course of the preceding
forty years, the Basic Law had come to assume the character of a document
framed to last in perpetuity.
Id. at 30.
The application of the speech freedoms in Article 5(1) of the Basic Law to
broadcasting is described in Christopher Witteman, West German Television Law: An
Argument for Media as an Instrument of Self-Government, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L.
REV. 145 (1983); see also KOMMERS supra, at 404-15.
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broadcaster and viewer.3 While similar on their face, the two
constitutions arrive at quite different results.
I first wrote about this subject twenty-five years ago, in a Note
entitled West German Television Law - an Argument for Media as an
Instrument of Self-Government,4 in which I described the first three
post-war broadcasting decisions of the German Constitutional
Court. These decisions claimed television and radio for the project
of democratic self-governance, and described a theory and practice
of "public service broadcasting."
This article will focus on a series of further decisions of the
Constitutional Court over the last twenty-five years. In these
decisions, the Court has built a communications theory of general
applicability, one that can usefully be applied to contemporary
issues as varied as Internet neutrality, the societal role of public
television, and the digital divide. Collectively, these rulings provide
a theoretical framework rich in implications for a world where -
increasingly, and in different ways - information is power.5
"Broadcasting freedom" and the related constitutional norm of
"information freedom" are found in Article 5(1) of the Basic Law. 6
3. Witteman, supra note 2, at 172, 191-93; compare generally, e.g., SASCHA
SAJUNTZ, DER REZIPIENTENBEZOGENE SCHUTZ MASSENMEDIALER KOMMUNIKATION [THE
RECIPIENT-ORIENTED PROTECTION OF MASS MEDIA COMMUNICATION] (2007).
4. Witteman, supra note 2.
5. A literal application of this maxim is found in William Gravell, Some
Observations along the Road to "National Information Power", 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 401 (1999) (discussing information as a strategic asset, "at a time when virtually
every aspect of life on Earth is hurtling headlong toward expression in
informational form"); see also John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at Al (describing attack on government information systems
preceding Russian invasion of Georgia); see also, in place of many, FCC En Banc
Hearing on Broadband Network Practices, Docket 07-52 (Stanford, April 17, 2008)
(testimony of Barbara van Schewick, addressing business opportunity costs of
information bottlenecks); cf. C.D. McLean, 1993 Call for Papers: Death and Rebirth of a
National Information Policy: Mhat We Had and hat We Need, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 743
(1993).
6. "Broadcasting freedom" is the translation here of Rundfunkfreiheit, the term
most often used by the German Constitutional Court to refer to the constitutional
guarantee of "freedom of reporting through broadcast" (Freiheit der Berichterstattung
durch Rundfunk) found in Article 5(1) of the German Basic Law. See infra note 7.
"Information freedom" is the translation of the commonly used term
Informationsfreiheit, used to refer to the constitutional guarantee of every person of
the right to "freely inform him/herself from generally accessible information
sources" (jeder hat das Recht ... sich aus allgemein zugfinglichen Quellen ungehindert zu
unterrichten), also as found in Article 5, par. 1. As discussed below (see sections
II(B), III(B)(2), and III(K)(2)), the German Court has not definitively described or
2010]
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The Court has developed these rights to create a special role for
television and radio in Germany's public and political life, similar to
that played by the BBC in England, but unique in its particulars.
7
The not uncontroversial genius of the German Court's jurisprudence
has been to craft a public broadcasting system that is neither state
nor private, insulated (to a significant degree) from both political
and marketplace pressures.
This "public service" view of the broadcast media is more
prevalent in Europe than in the United States:
Indeed, [it is] the United States [that] is unusual in its largely
unqualified commitment to markets in broadcasting, in its
reliance on advertising revenues for stations, and in its conception
of television as purely commercial. Other countries tend to see
television as a medium principally for education and information,
and to view its entertainment role as merely one among others. 8
What distinguishes the broadcasting jurisprudence of the
developed the relationship between information and broadcasting freedom, found
in sentences 1 and 2, respectively, of Article 5. See infra note 44 and accompanying
text for the complete translation of Article 5, par. 1.
All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted. Other
translations of complete or partial decisions of the German Constitutional Court
broadcasting decisions can be found in KOMMERS, supra note 2, at 404-415,and in the
German Constitutional Court's own sponsored translations, DECISIONS OF THE
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (1998). In addition, the University of Texas has
published English-language translations of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Decisions on its website, along with other helpful Article 5 cases, including
Liith, Blinkftier, Spiegel, and Leipzig Newspaper cases (most attributed to Nomos)
h ttp://www.u texas.edu/law/academics/cen ters/transnational/work new/german!
table.php?id=131. All decisions are available in the German original at http://www.
bverfg.de/entscheidungen.html.
These sources were sometimes consulted, and occasionally borrowed from,
in the translations found here. As translation is an inexact science, and certain
German expressions are susceptible to varying translations or are more telling in
the original, I have included an excerpt of the original German where it could
potentially add to the reader's comprehension. Similarly, I have translated the titles
of German sources where that might further the reader's understanding.
7. The Germans in fact take the BBC as a model. See WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-
RIEM, REGULATING MEDIA: THE LICENSING AND SUPERVISION OF BROADCASTING IN SIX
COUNTRIES at 4, 11, passim (1996). When he wrote this book, Professor Hoffmann-
Riem was on the faculty of the law department at the University of Hamburg, and
Justizsenator for the city of Hamburg; he recently retired as a Justice on the German
Constitutional Court.
8. CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 77, 267 n.61
(1993). For a wide-ranging discussion and comparison of the British, French,
Italian, and United States' approaches to broadcasting, see BARENDT, BROADCASTING
LAW, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1993).
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Constitutional Court is its depth and consistency over forty five
years since its first broadcasting decision, the "Magna Carta of
German television," issued in 1961. 9 The Court's approach has been
steadfast in the face of both technological change and criticism by
commercial interests. The closest American analog to the German
approach is the United States Supreme Court's formulation in Red
Lion v. FCC, upholding the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine. The
Court held that "[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here."10 The Fairness Doctrine, as
unworkable as it might have been in practice, was not declared
impracticable or ineffectual, but rather unconstitutional, by the very
agency charged with enforcing it.11
The German Constitutional Court, by contrast, persists in its
support of a diverse and at least partially non-commercial media
landscape, founded on a media architecture that insures diverse
public input to the media, as well as access to a broad range of
information and opinion through the media. The Constitutional
Court's broadcasting and information jurisprudence thus offers a
clear alternative to the United States' laissez faire market approach to
communications issues.
The German model has been discovered by a small coterie of
Americans who call for a new First Amendment thinking, focused
on the rights of the listener and information consumer as well as
those of the speaker. These scholars argue that an increased
diversity of information and programming, including non-
9. UWE WESEL, DER GANG NACH KARLSRUHE: DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT
IN DER GESCHICHTE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 121 passim (2004).
10. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Red Lion remains the most
explicit expression in United States constitutional jurisprudence of a First
Amendment right to receive information. In my 1983 article, I suggested that
something akin to German "broadcasting freedom" jurisprudence might help
reinvigorate the then moribund Red Lion line of cases. See Witteman, supra note 2,
at 190 passim. The opposite occurred: Red Lion fell into obscurity, while the Fairness
Doctrine was increasingly marginalized, and finally declared unconstitutional by
the FCC. See OWEN Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 58-74 (1996) (describing in detail
the rise of Red Lion and its subsequent fall into obscurity).
11. Syracuse Peace Council v. WTVH, 2 FCC.Rcd. 5043 (1987), aff'd sub nom
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Congress
subsequently passed legislation to re-establish the Fairness Doctrine, but President
Reagan vetoed it. The Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, S. 742, 100th Cong. (1987);
H.R.1934, 100th Cong. (1987); President Reagan's Veto of the Fairness in
Broadcasting Act, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 715 (June 19, 1987).
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commercial programming, is necessary for a twenty first Century
democracy. 12 There are skeptics on these shores as well, who reject
this approach as a dangerous "collectivist" fantasy 13 that puts too
much faith in the state as a benevolent "friend."14 And, indeed, the
two systems can be reduced to fundamentally opposing viewpoints
- the government "shalt not" approach of the First Amendment
("make no law") versus the "government shall" approach of the
German constitution ("freedom of broadcasting is guaranteed"),
sometimes described as the clash "between a libertarian and a
democratic theory of speech." 1
5
It is my contention that mass media communications issues in
this country are examined more often in a constitutional vacuum, as
matters of contract, property, or administrative law.' 6  Under
12. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 10, at 6; SUNNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 77-81 (discussing
the specifics of German media jurisprudence); John David Donaldson, "Television
Without Frontiers": the Continuing Tension Between Liberal Free Trade and European
Cultural Identity, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 90, 143 & nn.308-09 (1996) ("Europe to a
large degree still requires broadcasters to fulfill a public task obligation"); Stephen
A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 395-96 & n.50
(1993); Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and
Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 297 & nn.124-25 (2003).
13. See, e.g., Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform
of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 passim (1993); cf. John 0. McGinnis, The
Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U.CHI. L. REV. 49
(1996).
14. Uli Widmaier, German Broadcast Regulation: A Model for a New First
Amendment? 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 75, 128-41 passim (1998).
15. Fiss, supra note 10, at 3. A norm of "balanced diversity" can, the libertarians
posit, just as easily become a repressive norm; for instance the national unity norm
in the Weimar Constitution was invoked by the Nazis to quell dissent. Cf.
Widmaier, supra note 14, at 107-09. The democrats counter that the U.S. minimalist
or "proceduralist" approach enshrines a norm of its own, that of the unregulated
marketplace. Cf. Fiss, supra note 10, at 2 ("impact that private aggregations of
power have on our freedom"). The full development of this polarity is the subject
of another article; my primary purpose here is to provide an overview of the
German constitutional model and see what it might contain of use for our domestic
debate.
16. The First Amendment is, for example, mentioned only in a couple of
footnotes to the seminal article on network neutrality by Profs. Lemley and Lessig,
The End of End-to-End. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925,
954 nn.74 & 76, 955 n.79 (2001). Perhaps due to a First Amendment orthodoxy
focused on speakers and the prohibition of state (but not private) censorship,
Lemley and Lessig assert that they "don't see the case for open access as a first
amendment argument at all, but rather as an antitrust and regulatory issue." Id. at
955 n.79. Opponents of network neutrality also note the lack of a constitutional
framework. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion,
[Vol. 33:1
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German law, by contrast, these areas of law are strongly influenced
by constitutional priorities, particularly in the area of electronic
media as will be shown below.
II. Background
A. Beginning at the End: German Broadcasting and Electronic
Media Today
The end result of the Constitutional Court's communications
jurisprudence can be most clearly seen in a fully funded public
broadcasting system, co-existing with private broadcasters, in what
has been called a "dual" broadcasting system.1 7 Substantially all
Germans have access to at least four or five public television
stations, a similar or larger number of public radio stations, as well
as various foreign and international public and private television
and radio stations, delivered by broadcast, cable, satellite, and -
94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1851 n.13 (2006) ("Since network neutrality proponents defend
their proposals almost exclusively in terms of the economic benefits of innovation,
this Article discusses the issues solely in economic terms. I therefore set aside for
another day any discussion of noneconomic issues, such as network neutrality's
implications for democratic deliberation or the First Amendment.").
Similarly in the area of digital television, Prof. Yoo (an opponent of public
interest standards) sees the lack of a coherent First Amendment standard as chilling
progress:
Despite the ongoing deployment of digital television, little progress has
been made in determining whether and how digital broadcasting should
be regulated . . . Under the technology-specific approach to the First
Amendment, the constitutionality of digital television regulations cannot
finally be resolved until the courts address the constitutional standard that
will be applied to this medium. Until that occurs, lingering questions about
the proper scope of regulation threaten the reliance interests of
broadcasters, programmers, and viewers alike in ways that can forestall
the realization of the new technology's potential benefits.
Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First
Amendment, 91 GEO. L. REV. 245, 250-51 (2003).
Some see the lack of a constitutional dimension in such debates as a
systemic problem. See, e.g., Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German
Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 347 (1989) ("An important underlying
theme of American constitutional law is thus the withdrawal of the Constitution
from society - both in its restriction of constitutional limitations to actions of the
state and its exclusion of other types of constitutional provisions that might require
the government to act in society.").
17. See generally WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM, REGULIERUNG DER DUALEN
RUNDFUNKORDNUNG [REGULATION OF THE DUAL BROADCASTING SYSTEM] (2000).
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increasingly - the Internet.18
Public broadcasting is carried out by public-law agencies or
corporations, entities that are neither state nor private. 19 While the
18. Public broadcasting stations include (in most locations) a local affiliate of
the ARD [Arbeitsgemeinschaft Rundfunk Deutschlands] chain of stations, a local
affiliate of the ZDF [Zweites Deutsche Fernsehen or Second German Television], and a
regional broadcaster like Radio Berlin Brandenberg (formerly Sender Freies Berlin) or
Radio Bremen - as well as a fourth station, ARTE, a co-production of French and
German public television, a public Kinderkanal, and the Phoenix station. See,
respectively, www.ard.de, www.zdf.com (English introduction),
http://wwwl.ndr.de and http://www.br-online.de/ (examples of "Third
Program" from Northern Germany and Bavaria), and www.arte.tv/de. A detailed
overview of the German television landscape can be found in the April 24, 2007
European Commission decision in case E3/2005 on state aid to German public
broadcasters, on alleged state aid to German public television, otherwise beyond
the scope of this article. See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state-aid/
register/ii/doc/E-3-2005-WLWL-en-24.04.2007.pdf; see also Schulz/Held/Dreyer,
Regulation of Broadcasting and Internet Services in Germany - a brief overview 2d Ed.
2008), at n. 6-10 and accompanying text for a brief English language summary of
issues in German broadcasting, available at http://www.hans-bredow-
institut.de/webfm-send/124.
As used herein and unless indicated otherwise, "broadcasting" includes the
dissemination of both radio and television by over-the-air transmission, cable,
satellite, or broadband.
19. An analysis of the unique German organizational form known as the public-
law agency (rechtsfdihige Anstalt des dffentlichen Rechts) is a subject worthy of further
study, although beyond the scope of this article except for a brief discussion of the
middle ground between the state and the private sector which public broadcasting
agencies occupy. Like most legal systems, German law is roughly divided into
public law (dffentliches Recht) and private law (privates Recht). "Public law consists
of the rules controlling the relationship of public authority (the state and its
emanations) with each other, and between public authorities and individuals
(unless the public authority was acting as if it were a private body," whereas
"private law is concerned with relationships between individuals and private
bodies, and covers such areas as tort, contract, restitution and property and family
law." RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW 79-80
(2d ed. 2007). Public-law agencies or Anstalten like the German public-law
broadcasters are part of what is referred to as the "mediate state administration"
(mittelbare Staatsverwaltung) which is employed when the state wants to use
independent and stand-alone organizations to carry out public tasks. HARTMUT
MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 433 passim (4th ed. 1985). Because they
are independent and autonomous decisionmakers (see description of "internal
pluralism" at note 21, infra, and accompanying text), they stand apart from the
executive and administrative arms of the state (even while indirectly within the
umbrella of state authority); because they are public-law agencies, they are also
clearly not commercial. Other forms of German public-law entities are the public-
law corporation (dffentlich-rechtliche Kdrperschaften - one of the major German
public broadcasters, Deutschland Funk, is in fact a public-law corporation), and the
public-law foundation (6ffentliche Stiftung), which can also provide similar
insulation from state power. Id. at 460 passim, 473.
[Vol. 33:1
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legislator may rely on regulated market forces to provide diversity
in the private or commercial broadcasting sector,20 the Court has
favored structures for the public sector that implant diversity within
the public-law broadcasting agencies (dffen tlich-rechtliche
Rundfunkanstalten). Thus, in contrast to the external pluralism that a
functioning commercial marketplace would produce, public
broadcasting is governed by the principle of internal pluralism
(Binnenpluralismus), which takes the form of pluralistically-
constituted boards of directors for each of the public broadcasting
entities. It is a form unique to the Germans, and certainly a cardinal
distinction between the German and American approaches to public
broadcasting.21 Whereas appointments to the board of directors of
the United States' Public Broadcasting System are made by the
President and are, by most accounts, highly political, the German
Constitutional Court has ruled that public broadcasting governance
must be insulated from state influence (staatsfern) and must reflect
the diversity in society.22  To accomplish this goal, state
The Independent Media Agencies that regulate private broadcasters,
described in infra notes, at 25 & 27, are also forms of public-law agencies. See
ULRIKE BUMKE, DIE OFFENTLICHE AUFGABE DER LANDESMEDIENANSTALTEN 10-11 passim
(1995) ("polycentric distribution of competencies").
20. Although the constitutional mandate of broadcasting freedom encompasses
commercial broadcasters, diversity and fairness rules for the private sector remain
controversial and of limited efficacy. See section III(I) below. Still, the public
service obligations of private broadcasters are, at least on paper, substantially more
specific than the vaporous public trustee obligations still nominally applicable to
broadcasters in the United States. Compare e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(c)(1), 312(a)(7),
315(a) (2006); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the
Public Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101
(1997).
21. See, e.g., Peter Humphreys, The Goal of Pluralism and the Ownership Rules for
Private Broadcasting in Germany: Re-regulation or De-regulation? 16 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 527, 529 (1998) ("The accountability mechanisms for German public
broadcasting are rather unique .... Germany's public broadcasting institutions are
classic examples of distinctly non-state, non-market media."). On the contrast
between internal and external pluralism, see note 225, infra, and accompanying text.
22. See section III(D) below, describing the Constitutional Court's rulings
regarding the insulation of broadcasting from state influence. The internally
pluralistic governing boards for public broadcasters are an ingenious mechanism in
this regard, although they have been criticized on a number of counts, as too
politicized, not sufficiently pluralistic, etc. See, e.g., Widmaier, supra note 14, at 111-
15; Witteman, supra note 2, at 163-68; compare criticism of U.S. public broadcasting
governance in Phillips, Freedom by Design: Objective Analysis and the Constitutional
Status of Public Broadcasting, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 992 (2007) ("[Tihe system is
supposed to be independent, yet nearly half of the state public broadcasters are run
by the government, and the President appoints the leadership of the CPB. As a
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broadcasting laws generally require that the boards of directors of
German public broadcasting institutions be drawn from
representatives of specifically identified "socially relevant groups."23
Representatives come from a wide variety of groups - religious
organizations, labor and chamber of commerce organizations,
political parties, arts and film societies, and social organizations
running the gamut from women's groups to athletic clubs to
disabled rights' organizations. 24 Although German critics continue
to complain that these councils are inefficient and subject to undue
political influence, the fact remains that they provide a community-
based legitimacy apart from the state political apparatus.
As explained further below, State (rather than Federal)
legislators are charged with the implementation of the
Constitutional Court's rulings on the mission, scope, licensing,
governance, and financing of both public and private broadcasting
in Germany. The States coordinated their policies in a decades-long
process which eventually involved the Eastern as well as Western
parts of Germany, and resulted in the Inter-State Treaty on
Broadcasting in the United Germany, dated August 31, 1991. The
Inter-State Treaty is a constantly evolving document, periodically
updated by amending treaties (twelve to date), and comprised of
various Articles dealing with the different aspects of broadcast
regulation (collectively "Inter-State Treaty"). 25  The Inter-State
result, the possibility appears to remain that ruling political interests could exercise
significant influence .... ); cf. Monroe E. Price, Public Broadcasting and the Crisis of
Corporate Governance, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417 (1999).
23. Witteman, supra note 2, at 158-59; see also Ruck, Development of Broadcasting
Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 7 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 219,
225 (1992).
24. This innovative governance structure is described in more detail in
Witteman, supra note 2, at 161-63 (examining in detail the statutory provisions for
such broadcasting council functions, including specification of the different
"socially relevant groups" - unions, business associations, religious groups,
political parties, and social groups of parents, teachers, women, sports fans, artists,
and trade groups of various kinds - entitled to send representatives to the
council).
25. The German title of this document is Staatsvertrag iber den Rundfunk im
vereinten Deutschland vom 31 August 1991 [Inter-state Treaty of August 31, 1991
Concerning Broadcasting in United Germany], (hereinafter "Inter-State Treaty"). The
Inter-State Treaty contains a number of sub-parts or Articles, which (although not
often printed together) together build the entire Treaty. Although the entire Treaty
is sometimes referred to as Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (RStV), this name is sometimes
reserved for the first, and most important, Article containing the basic provisions
applicable to both public and private broadcasting. That Article is accompanied by
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Treaty contains provisions relating to the protection of minors,
broadcasters' access to major public events, a mission statement and
financing provisions for public broadcasting, licensing provisions
for private broadcasters, limits on advertising, diversity and balance
standards for commercial broadcasters, ownership and media
concentration limits, and audience share reporting.26 Enforcement
seven further Articles addressing: Media Services (Article II, revoked and moved
into a separate law in 2007); protection of youth (Article 3); contract provisions
relating to ARD and ZDF (the two de facto national public television networks -
Articles 4 and 5); Deutschland Radio, the national public radio service operated by
ARD and ZDF (Article 6); and the determination and collection of broadcasting fees
(Articles 7 and 8).
The Inter-State Treaty is regularly updated by
Rundfunkdnderungsstaatsvertrdge [Amending Treaties for Broadcasting], which
create a moving target for analysts and commentators. The Tenth Amending
Treaty, for example, was signed off by the various State Minister Presidents in
December 2007, passed into law in the individual German States in the succeeding
months, with an effective date of September 1, 2008; its primary accomplishment
was the creation by the separate States of a central licensing agency for private
broadcasters. The Eleventh Amending Treaty was signed by the Minister
Presidents in July 2008 and was scheduled to take effect January 1, 2009; it
primarily addresses broadcasting fee issues discussed below in section III(H)(2).
The Twelfth Amending Treaty was finalized by a vote of the Minister Presidents in
October 2008 and passed into law in March 2009; its primary subject matter is the
very contentious issue of the scope of public broadcasters' activities on the Internet,
as discussed in section III(K)(3)(b) below. The integrated Inter-State Treaty as of
June, 2009 is found at http://www.hans-bredow-institut.de/webfm-send/369.
The Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Amending Treaties are more difficult to find in
original text, although the Twelfth Amending Treaty was found (November 2009)
at http://www.swr.de/unternehmen/gremien/dreistufentest/-/id=4790902/
property=download/nid=4439636/1h3184s/index.
The coordination of broadcasting laws and policies in the several Linder,
and their fourteen Independent Media Authorities, evident in the Inter-State
Treaty, is accomplished, at least in part, by the Association of Independent Media
Authorities, and its Conference of Directors (Direktorenkonferenz der
Landesmedienanstalten). See www.alm.de and (in English) http://www.alm.de/
14.htnml. An English translation of the 2007 version of the Inter-State Treaty is
found at their website, http://www.alm.de/fileadmin/Englisch/9-RAEStV-
Englisch.pdf. The author has used this and other translation resources, although
translations are primarily his own, unless noted otherwise.
Each individual State adopts the Inter-State Treaty, as well as its own media
law. The Media Law for Hamburg/ Schleswig Holstein, for example, is found at the
website of the Independent Media Authority for that area, and regulates areas like
must-carry and retransmission (section III(I) below). See http://www.ma-
hsh.de/cms/upload/downloads/Rechtsvorschriften/1.1_MedienStV0908.pdf; see
also infra note 34 and accompanying text.
26. Id. Article 1 at §4 (transmission of major public events), §7 (advertising and
sponsoring rules and limitations), § 11 (public-law broadcasting mission), §§12-14
(public-law financing), §§ 15-18 (further limitations on advertising and sponsoring
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of these rules falls to the Independent Media Authorities, which are
public-law bodies independent of local and state governments,
constituted pluralistically like the governance structures of public
broadcasters.
27
The primary revenue source for German public television
comes from a user or "broadcast fee" (Rundfunkgebfihr) that every
owner of a television or radio must pay. The current broadcast fee
is a little less than 18 Euros per month, about 26 US dollars per
month.28 It is collected from users each month by an entity known
on public-law broadcasts), §§20-24, 37 (licensing of commercial or private-law
broadcasters), §25 (fairness obligations for commercial broadcasters), §26
(ownership limits), §27 (audience share reporting), §§ 31, 42 (third-party access to
commercial broadcasting), §§ 35-39 (oversight by States' Independent Media
Authorities), §§ 44-46 (further regulation of advertising for commercial
broadcasters), §§ 50-51 (allocation of transmission capacity), and §52 (must-carry).
Child-protection measures are found in Article 3.
27. See supra note 19; see also Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, at §§ 20, 35(1)
passim ("The responsible Independent Media Authority [Landesmedienanstalt]
oversees compliance with the provisions of this Treaty regarding plurality of
opinion both before and after licenses are issued to commercial broadcasters.").
The English-language translation of the Inter-State Treaty provided by the German
association of Landesmedienanstalten, supra note 25, translates Landesmedienanstalt as
State Media Authority, although - as the Constitutional Court has made clear on
several occasions - these are emphatically not state agencies, but rather public-law
law bodies. See, e.g., discussion in section III(I) and note 226, infra, citing 73
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (BVerfGE) 118, 165 (1986),
where the Court emphasizes that these bodies are public-law entities, and may be
controlled neither by the state nor by commercial forces, much like the internally
pluralistic broadcasting councils which oversee public television. Accordingly,
Landesmedienanstalt [literally State Media Agency] and the similarly situated
Landesrundfunkanstalt [State Broadcasting Agency] will be translated as
Independent Media Authority. The public-law form is necessary to insulate these
entities from State influence, as described in section III(D) below. The Media Law
for Hamburg/Scheswig-Holstein, supra note 25, at § 42, for example, provides for
an Independent Media Authority with a governing Media Council elected from
candidates nominated by "socially relevant groups"; compare provisions for the
broadcasting councils or boards of directors of public broadcasting entities,
described in supra note 21 & 23, and accompanying text.
28. See http://www.gez.de/gebuehren/gebuehrenuebersicht/index-ger.html
(as of October, 2009); see also Thomas Darnstadt & Dietmar Hipp, Dreif.ig Jahre
zurick, DER SPIEGEL 126-27 (Sept. 17, 2007). While the public and some private,
commercial programs are available over the air (RTL, for instance), viewers may
obtain these and a further array of private programs over the local cable system,
and in fact most choose that option or direct broadcasting programs. Thus, another
fee of 13-20E or higher is incurred. See http://www.kabeldeutschland.de/fernsehen
/digitales-fernsehen-fuer-kabelanschluss-nutzer.html. The constitutional aspects of the
broadcast fee have been extensively litigated, as described in section III(H) below.
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as the GEZ.29 The GEZ collected over 7 billion Euros in 2008, and
distributed it primarily to Germany's public broadcasting entities,
and (in much smaller part) to the Independent Media Authorities
which regulate commercial broadcasting. 30
A further factor distinguishing German from United States
broadcasting is the historical separation of conduit from content.
Such a separation was easy when the transmission facilities
(transmitters, backhaul transmission, and electronics) were owned
by the German Post Office. 31 In its First Broadcasting Decision, the
Constitutional Court made clear that the Bundespost ("Post") was to
provide only the necessary "sendetechnische Angelegenheiten" or
"technical broadcasting facilities," and only in service of
broadcasting's constitutional role as information disseminator.32
While transmission remained within the Federal jurisdiction over
telecommunications, 33 broadcasting was a "cultural phenomenon"
29. The formal name of the agency is the Gebfihreneinzugzentrale, literally Fee
Intake Central.
30. GEZ annual reports are available at http://www.gez.de/gebuehren
/gebuehreneinzug/indexger.html, showing revenue of approximately 7.3 billion
Euros in each of the last three years, which is then distributed primarily to ARD,
ZDF, and the regional public broadcasting stations
31. Article 73(7) of the Basic Law states "The Federal government shall have
exclusive power to legislate with respect to . . . postal and telecommunications
services." An exception to this rule, however, was allowed by the German
Constitutional Court in its first television decision, in which it held that the
principle of "federal friendly conduct" [bundesfreundlichen Verhaltens] prevented the
central government from taking back the technical broadcasting apparatus that was
in the hands of the individual public-law broadcasting companies after being
expropriated from the central government and given to them after the war). See 12
BVerfGE 205, 210, 239-40 (1962). Thus, today ARD has its own transmitters, but the
centralized public broadcaster ZDF, all the third-program public broadcasters, and
the private broadcasters all rely on broadcasting transmission facilities provided by
a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom or its private successors in interest.
32. 12 BVerfGE at 225, 227, 230 passim.
33. The German Telecommunications Law (Telekommunikationsgesetz, or TKG) is
enforced by the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), with jurisdiction
similar to a super public utilities commission. Unlike the Federal Communications
Commission, the German Network Agency has no jurisdiction over broadcasting
content. And unlike United States' Communications Act, the TKG applies equally
to telephone, cable, broadcast, and other forms of electronic transmission are all
considered part of the "telecommunications network" (eliminating certain
distinctions between "telecommunications services," "information services," and
cable transmission found in the Communications Act.). Compare TKG § 3(27)
("telecommunication network" includes "fixed and mobile telephony, cable,
broadcast, optical fiber, satellite networks, powerlines, and other devices capable of
transmitting electronic signals"); 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(7) (cable); (20) (information
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under the jurisdiction of the States.34 The situation changed when
the Post's telecommunication network, which included telephone,
cable, and terrestrial broadcast facilities, was largely privatized as
part of Post Reform II in 1994. Privatization consisted of the
government's sale of a 60% ownership share in the network to
Deutsche Telekom AG ("DTAG"). DTAG has in turn sold its
interest in the terrestrial broadcast facilities to a French firm, and its
interest in the cable transmission facilities to an assortment of
companies largely owned by investment firms.35
This trend inevitably caused conflict. Because of the
constitutional primacy of "broadcasting freedom," States continue
service), and (43) telecommunications). The new German Telecommunications Act
(Telekommunikationsgesetz or TKG) was passed into law in 2004. It succeeded a
previous version that had, like its American cousin, become law in 1996. Axel Spies
& Jan Wrede, The New German Telecommunications Act [of 1996], 4 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 1 (1998), available at http://www.mttlr.org/volfour/spies-art.html.
An English translation of the 1996 TKG (with amendments through 1998) is available
at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/TKG.htm but the law was largely
rewritten in 2004, and that version is not yet available in English. The full German
text of the 2004 TKG is available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/tkg-2004
/BJNR119000004.html. An authoritative commentary to the Telecommunication
Law is found in BERLINER KOMMENTAR ZUM TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSGESETZ (Franz
Jurgen Sacker, ed., 2006) [hereinafter BERLINER KOMMENTAR].
34. The Constitutional Court's First Decision on broadcasting set up a
Federal/State jurisdictional division:
The "post and telephone" [jurisdiction of the Federal government under
Basic Law Art. 73(7)] encompasses only the broadcast-technical side of
broadcasting, and excludes the so-called studio technology .... It must be
added that broadcasting is also a cultural phenomena. Inasmuch as
cultural affairs can be administered and regulated, they fall within the area
of the States, pursuant to the fundamental determination of the Basic Law.
12 BVerfGE at 225-27, 229 (citations omitted); see also ERNST HERRMANN, DIE
DEUTSCHE BUNDESPOST 48, 72 (1986), noting that as, of his writing, the Post supplied
over 200 broadcast facilities, and thousands of transformers (Fernsehumsetzer), as
well as satellite and cable transmission facilities, to what were then still primarily
public broadcasting institutions. Herrmann notes that these services were just
beginning to be offered to private broadcasters as well.
This dominion of the individual German States in cultural matters has been
referred as Kulturhoheit, or "cultural sovereignty." See Humphreys, supra note 21,
at 529. See also discussion in Section III(K)(3)(c) below, relating to Federal-State
jurisdictional clashes along this interface between telecommunications and
broadcasting. As discussed briefly in the next section, the assignment of
broadcasting jurisdiction to the individual German States was a policy originally
put in place by the Western Allies after World War II, as part of an anti-fascist, pro-
democratic strategy of localizing political power.
35. The Bundespost or Federal Post retained a roughly 40% share in these assets.
BERLINER KOMMENTAR, supra note 33, at 167-68, Einleitung III(B)(I), 250-54.
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to have at least theoretical say as to frequency allocation, must-carry
assignment of cable and satellite transmission capacity, and other
broadcast-related areas that tread on the Federal jurisdiction over
telecommunications. The legal status of the mass media is thus
increasingly unstable, and is not made any less so by the directives
of the European Commission which would allocate broadcasting
frequencies pursuant to market mechanisms, with little or no
consideration of the cultural and political importance of these
facilities, as described below. In many ways, this clash between the
cultural/political and the technical/commercial aspects of
communications exposes the same faultlines as the network
neutrality debate in the United States.36 The majority view in
Germany remains that cultural and political diversity trumps the
commercial interests of network owners (whether they be terrestrial
broadcast, cable, satellite, or broadband).37
B. History and Early Development of Broadcasting Freedom
The separation between conduit and content can be traced to
the belief of Allied occupation forces after 1945 that a decentralized
and localized media would best promote a democratic culture. This
approach was clearly a reaction to the abuses of broadcasting during
the Nazi era.38 Hitler's propaganda chief, Josef Goebbels, had
recognized early the propaganda value of the still nascent
broadcasting technology:
You [broadcasters] have in your possession the most modern
instrument in existence for influencing the masses. By means of
this instrument you are the creators of public opinion .... As the
piano is to the pianist, so the transmitter is to you, the instrument
on which you play as sovereign masters of public opinion.39
36. Cf., e.g., Yoo, supra note 16, at 1905, 1857 & n.45 passim, noting how the
conduit/content separation of common carrier regulation was rejected for
broadcast and cable television, and approving the result in NCTA v. Brand X, 545
U.S. 967 (2005), which rejected such a separation for broadband on the assumption
that market competition between networks would provide price and access
discipline.
37. 119 BVerfGE 181, at 215-17, passim (2007).
38. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text; see also Michael Libertus,
Essential Aspects Concerning the Regulation of the German Broadcasting System 4
(Rundfunk Insitut K61n, Working Paper No. 193, 2004), available at
http://www.rundfunk-institut.uni-koeln.de/institut/pdfs/19304.pdf.
39. Josef Goebbels, Speech to German radio management (Mar. 23, 1933), quoted
in DAVID WELCH, THE THIRD REICH - POLITICS AND PROPAGANDA 39, 184 (Routledge
20101
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
After the war, Americans joined their allies in insisting that the new
broadcasting bodies be decentralized and free of state influence: "It
is a basic policy of the U.S. Military Government that the control of
the means of public opinion such as press and broadcasting be
widely distributed, and free of government control." 40 What is more
remarkable in view of its own domestic policy, the United States'
Military Information Control Division ordained a non-commercial
broadcasting system for Germany, one that would be "neither
directly nor indirectly a stalking horse of the government, nor...
the tool of any particular groups or personalities." 41 This policy
2d Ed. 2002) (1993); see also GORDON CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945 at 573 (Oxford
University Press, Inc. 1978) (Goebbels "immediately sensed the potentialities of the
new medium and saw to it that Hitler's principal speeches were broadcast by all
stations."); KLAUS SCHEEL, KRIEG OBER ATHERWELLEN [WAR OVER THE AIRWAVES] 40
passim (1970) (East German history describing how Goebbels and his fellow Nazis
commandeered state radio to produce a live broadcast of the torchlight parade
celebrating Hitler's assumption of the office of Chancellor on January 30, 1933).
40. November 21, 1947, Order of the American Military Governor Lucius Clay,
reprinted in H. BAUSCH, supra note 1, at 34 (translated from the German). The
British were of a similar mind. BBC journalist Hugh Carlton Greene, who was
assigned to lead the Northwest German Broadcasting Co. in Hamburg, told his
German colleagues, when first he met with them in 1946:
This broadcasting company must never become a party broadcaster, or a
government broadcaster, or the mouthpiece of commercial interests. If I
could sum up the policy of this broadcaster in two words, they would be
dispassionate substantiveness and objectivity (Sachlichkeit und Objektivitdt)
in all areas.
Arnulf Kutsch, Unter britischer Kontrolle, Der Zonensender 1945-1948, in DER NDR
ZWISCHEN PROGRAMM UND POLITIK; BEITRAGE ZU SEINER GESCHICHTE 120 (Kohler, ed.
1991); see also Libertus, supra note 38 ("[I]t was the British BBC that served as a role
model, exemplifying impartial broadcasting .... In light of the fresh memories of
the abuse of broadcasting by the National Socialists, however, an effort was made
to ensure even greater independence from the state with institutional and legal
approaches than was the case with the BBC."); cf. 12 BVerfGE at 210 ("[T]he western
occupation forces pursued a policy of excluding all government influence on
broadcasting.").
Some German politicians made common cause with German postal
authorities after 1945, in an effort to return broadcasting to the jurisdiction of the
federal Deutsche Post, an effort that was defeated by the Allies insistence on a
decentralized broadcasting structure. See ALBRECHT HESSE, RUNDFUNKRECHT 9-10
(Verlag Franz Vahlen 3d ed. 2003). This decentralized arrangement was ratified by
the Constitutional Court's First [Broadcasting] Decision, which affirmed the role of
the individual German States in all things cultural, including broadcasting. 12
BVerfGE at 229.
41. Draft of the Americans' Information Control Division, "Broadcasting
freedom in Germany," (1946) quoted in ARNULF KUTSCH, Rundfunk unter alliierter
Besatzung, in MEDIENGESCHICHTE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTsCHLAND 78 (Bohlau
Verlag GmbH & Cie 1999); see infra note 63. Kutsch reports that this U.S. document
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may have grown out of the perception in American government
circles that large German cartels had marched in step with the Nazi
dictatorship.42
The Constitutional Court claimed the Allied legacy as
Germany's own in a series of decisions initially coming every ten
years, in 1961, 1971, and 1981. 43 The Court based its decisions
primarily on the "broadcasting freedom" clause in Article 5(1) of the
German constitution. While the United States' entire free speech
regimen is based on a short phrase in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution - "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," Article 5(1) of the
Basic Law gives the German Constitutional Court something more
with which to work:
Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his
also discussed the need for "all interest groups in society to have the chance to
articulate themselves in a mediated public sphere." Id.; see also BAUSCH,
RUNDFUNKPOLITIK NACH 1945, supra note 1, at 72; Hesse, supra note 40, at 10 (quoting
the post-war slogan "[b]roadcasting belongs to no one").
The irony is that, eleven years earlier, the United States had rejected a
similar non-commercial media system. See, e.g., ROBERT MCCHESNEY,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY - THE BATFLE FOR THE
CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING 1928-1935 177 if 188 if 197 (1993) (social and
legislative history of 1934 Communications Act, noting early public outcry about
the overtly commercial tone that radio had taken on, as well as candidate
Roosevelt's reticence to address this subject in the 1933 electoral campaign.
McChesney also describes proposed legislation which would have dedicated up to
25% of available spectrum to non-commercial broadcasters, and the defeat of this
proposal upon lobbying efforts of RCA, AT&T and the National Association of
Broadcasters).
42. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, Secretary of
State, articulated one view of this connection apropos international anti-trust
enforcement:
[A] number of foreign countries, particularly in continental Europe, do not
posses such a tradition against cartels. On the contrary, cartels have
received encouragement from these governments. Especially is this true
with respect to Germany. Moreover cartels were utilized by the Nazis as
governmental instrumentalities to achieve political ends.
Quoted in Joel Davidow, The Seeking of a World Competition Code: Quixotic Quest? in
COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS - LAW AND POLICY ON RESTRICTIVE
PRACTICES 362 (Robert Hellawell & Oscar Schacter ed., 1981).
43. PETER J. HUMPHREYS, MASS MEDIA AND MEDIA POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE 137
(1996) (describing a unique and "very special role" for constitutional law in
development of German broadcasting policy, partly because of the historic
Rechtstaat tradition ("state within which law plays a very special role"), and partly
because "the Nazi dictatorship had showed how necessary were constitutional
underpinnings of democratic pluralism in the media field").
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opinion by speech, writing and pictures, and freely to inform
himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press
and freedom of reporting by broadcast and film are guaranteed.
There shall be no censorship.44
The relative modernity and prolixity of the German
constitutional speech guarantees can be traced in part to the fact that
they were written not in the eighteenth century as the First
Amendment was, but at the beginning of the electronic age, with the
totalitarian abuse of broadcasting fresh in mind.45  If fascism
flourished where broadcasting was able to feed the masses a one-
sided and distorted view of the world, its democratic opposite
would in theory be secured by a diverse and balanced information
base. From its earliest broadcast decisions, the German Court has
embraced this democratic concept of speech, and (implicitly) its
colloquial corollary, "garbage in, garbage out," i.e., the
unremarkable deduction that the quality of democratic
decisionmaking depends on the quality of information possessed by
the public.
46
44. Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 5, par. 1 ("Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in
Wort, Schrift und Bild frei zu dufiern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein
zugdnglichen Quellen ungehindert zu unterrichten. Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der
Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film werden gewdhrleistet. Eine Zensur findet
nicht statt."). Paragraph 2 provides that these "rights shall find their limits in the
provisions of general laws," in the provisions for the protection of young persons
for example. Paragraph 3 provides for the related freedoms of art, scholarship,
research, and teaching.
45. The Basic Law was drafted by a group of leading judges and attorneys
meeting in 1948 at the Herrenchiemsee Conference in August 1948, and continued
meetings of a constitutional convention called the Parliamentary Council in Bonn in
September 1948, under the watchful eyes of at least three of the four Allies, United
States, France and England. See KOMMERS, supra note 2, at 7-9; see supra note 31.
Interpreting the Basic Law's concepts of broadcasting and information freedom, the
cooptation and misuse of broadcasting during the Nazi period could never have
been far from the mind of the Constitutional Court, although this connection has
been expressed only indirectly. See sections III(D and E) below.
46. 27 BVerfGE 71, 81 (1969) (Leizpziger Newspaper case) ("The Basic Law seeks
to guarantee that the individual is informed as comprehensively as possible"); see
also discussion of this case in sections III(C) and III(K)(2) below.
The common-sense notion that the quality of democratic decisionmaking
would be determined by the quality of information reaching the electorate would
seem to apply universally, whether or nor a country had experienced a fascist
interlude, yet the concept is not foregrounded in the U.S. media discussion. The
governing assumption in domestic media thinking seems to be that the commercial
marketplace will provide all the diversity and balance the public wants or needs.
See, e.g., FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981) (upholding FCC
decision that "public interest" standard was best served by market forces); for
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The Court understood from the outset that the commercial
marketplace operated by its own rules, and imposed its own filter
on reality.47 While it was obvious that the Court would have to rule
that German broadcasting be staatsfrei or "state-free," as it did in the
first television decision in 1961,48 in its second television decision in
1971 the Court went further, declaring that the dissemination of
information and opinion through broadcasting was so fundamental
to the democratic process that not only must it be kept free of state
control, it also could "not be left to the free play of [market]
forces." 4
9
Article 5, Paragraph 1 contains a number of constituent parts: a
free speech guarantee; a dissemination guarantee (extended to
writing and pictures); freedom of information; freedom of the press;
freedom of reporting by broadcast and film; and a prohibition of
censorship. The Court has referred collectively to these as
"communication freedoms." 50 "Freedom of reporting by broadcast,"
or broadcast freedom (Rundfunkfreiheit), is of course the focus of the
German Court's broadcasting jurisprudence. 51 Parallel to this, the
Court has developed its jurisprudence under the information
freedom (Informationsfreiheit) clause, which guarantees an
individual's right to inform herself from all "generally accessible
sources." 52
contrasting German view, see section III(E) below, regarding the market as censor.
47. See Witteman, supra note 2, at 151-60, 168-87; see also section III(E) below.
48. 12 BVerfGE at 263.
49. 31 BVerfGE314, 325 (1972); see also Witteman, supra note 2, at n. 64; 12
BVerfGE at 259 (broadcasting "of fundamental importance for the [the States']
entire public, political, and constitutional life").
50. 90 BVerfGE60, 88 (1994) ("The communication freedoms were originally
directed against state influence on the communication media.") ("Gegen die
Gfingelung der Kommunikationsmedien durch den Staat haben sich die
Kommunikationsgrundrechte urspriinglich gerichtet.").
51. See, e.g., RUCK, supra note 23, at 222ff
52. While broadcast freedom protects the public against state as well as private
interference in the journalistic process of broadcasting, the German Court has not
yet gone so far with regard to information freedom. On the one hand, this may be
merely a matter of semantic construction, whether the Court relies on the first
sentence of Article 5 paragraph I of the Basic Law ("everyone has the right") or the
second ("freedom of . . . broadcasting [is] guaranteed"). See Silke Ruck, Zur
Unterscheidung von Ausgestalgungs- und Schrankengesetzen im Bereich der
Rundfunkfreiheit, 117/1992 ARCHIV FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT (AOR) 543, 547-48
(distinguishing between subjective rights of sentence 1 and objective rights in
sentence 2); see also discussion below, at section III(C)(2), concerning subjective vs.
objective rights. Broadcasting freedom has been held to protect the process of the
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Broadcasting freedom is found in the second sentence of Article
5, Paragraph 1. It is primarily a guarantee that broadcasting as an
institution will function freely, not the right (found in sentence 1) of
an individual to speak freely.53 Broadcasting freedom incorporates
the constitutional protections for both broadcast speaker and
information-recipient under its umbrella; it is the point where
different constitutional positions meet, and possibly collide ... on
the one hand the claim based on information freedom of a right to
comprehensive and truthful information, on the other hand [the
claim based on] the freedom of expression of those who produce
the programming or speak in the broadcasts. 5
4
Broadcasting freedom thus protects a process more than a particular
individual.
There is of course a potential contradiction in the Constitutional
Court's holdings that Article 5 not only prevents the government
from censoring the media, but also requires that same government to
act to preserve a diversity of voices in the "marketplace of ideas."
How the German Court has handled this paradox is the subject of
several of the Decisions discussed below.5
5
"freedom of reporting by broadcast" where as information freedom is interpreted
as a narrower, individual right. On the other hand, it is a question of enormous
consequence whether the rationale of the Court's nine broadcasting decisions
(broadcasting as instrument of self-government) can be applied to a new medium
which is fast becoming the functional equivalent of broadcasting. Both the nature
of information freedom and its potential application to the Internet neutrality
question are discussed at some length below. See section 111(K), particularly
(1II)(K)(3)(d).
53. See, e.g., RUCK, supra note 23, at 222 ("The guarantee of freedom of
broadcasting has yet another, objective, component, which the Federal
Constitutional Court terms the 'public mandate' of broadcasting.").
54. 57 BVerfGE 295, 321 (1982) ("Namentlich treffen [bei Rundfunkfreiheitl
verschiedene Grundrechtspositionen zusammen, die in Kollision miteinander geraten
kdnnen, einerseits der aus der Informationsfreiheit folgende Anspruch auf umfassende und
wahrheitsgemdfie Information, andererseits die Freiheit der Meinungsiufierung derjenigen,
welche die Programme herstellen oder in den Sendungen zu Wort kommen."). See also
infra note 295.
55. This potential paradox or contradiction is seen most clearly in the




III. Recent Decisions of the Constitutional Court: the
Affirmation of Broadcasting and Information Freedom in
a Market Economy
A. Overview of Broadcast Decisions: 1986-2007
In the twenty-one years beginning in 1986 and running through
2007, a series of Constitutional Court Decisions reaffirmed the
principles of broadcasting and information freedom, even while the
dominant paradigm shifted from a public broadcasting monopoly to
a mixed or "dual" public/private system.56
As recounted in my earlier work, a number of factors in the
early 1980s including technological advances such as cable systems
and the dawning of satellite broadcasting, as well as the resulting
economic and political pressure for commercial broadcasting, had
created a judicial and political opening for commercial
broadcasters. 57 The individual German States enacted legislation
designed to ease the transition to a mixed marketplace. In 1986, the
Court's Fourth or "Lower Saxony" Decision upheld one of these
laws allowing commercial broadcasting, while reaffirming Article
5's mandate of independent media in the context of the new "dual"
broadcasting landscape. 58 For true believers in the public-service
broadcasting ideal, however, the Fourth Decision marked the
beginning of the end of public television as an intellectually
adventurous and politically challenging medium.5 9
56. All of the principal broadcasting Decisions described below were
unanimous; indeed, of the ten Decisions considered to be the primary canon of
broadcasting freedom, only the Second Decision in 1971 contained concurring (and
dissenting) opinions. 31 BVerfGE at 334 (concurring opinion of Justices Geller and
Rupp); id. at 337 (dissenting opinion of Justices Geiger, Rinck and Wand).
57. Witteman, supra note 2, at 182-87.
58. 73 BVerfGE 118 (1986).
59. See, for example, Hoffmann-Riem, Rundfunkrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht - ein
Paradigmawechsel in der Rundfunkverfassung [Broadcasting Law and Commercial Law -
a Change of Paradigms in the Constitution of Broadcasting], in 2 MEDIA PERSPEKTIVEN 57
(1988). In this 1988 article, Hoffmann-Riem expressed a weary resignation about
the fate of this concept of broadcasting:
At the dawn of the dual broadcasting system, the Third (or FRAG)
Decision confirmed a broadcasting concept based on the commonweal
(gemeinwohlorientierter Rundfunkkonzept) and at the same time flexibilized
the conditions for the realization of this concept: internal and external
pluralism were seen as almost equivalent broadcasting models, even if not
equally realizable. Even during this phase of ever finer nuance [Abfederung]
in response to national and international pressure for a commercial
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The Fifth or "Baden-Wiirtenberg" Decision found that a
prohibition on local and regional public broadcasting (designed to
protect commercial broadcasters) violated the basic principle of free
opinion-building (Grundprinzip der freien Meinungsbildung).60 The
Court also struck down limits on public law stations' provision of
dial-up services to their viewers and listeners, while upholding
limits on advertising by public law stations in the local and regional
market, a subject that would be revisited in the Seventh Decision.
In some ways, the Sixth or "WDR" Decision in 1991 is the
mirror opposite of the Fourth Decision. Whereas liberal legislators
had challenged the Lower Saxony Law at the center of the Fourth
Decision, the Sixth Decision was precipitated by a contingent of
conservative legislators who challenged the state broadcasting laws
of North-Rhine Westphalia, which governed the activities of West
German Broadcasting (West Deutscher Rundfunk or -DR).61 The
gravamen of this challenge was a claim that the broadcasting law at
issue disenfranchised conservative groups from participation in
WDR's broadcasting council. Again, the Constitutional Court
generally upheld the law,62 reading into it the conditions necessary
for its constitutional application. The Court noted that the
broadcasting council was not constitutionally required to represent
every "relevant social group," but a broad spectrum of groups
which in turn would represent the public as a whole.
63
The Seventh or "Hessen 3" Decision in 1992 was the first of a
run of four Decisions in which the Constitutional Court addressed
the financing of public service television. While the three
subsequent Decisions would address user fees paid by owners of
opening, that pressure continued to increase, and in the Lower Saxony
[Fourth] Decision the sluice gates were thrown open. The
commercialization of broadcasting was no longer to be stopped, one could
only try to channel the flood ....
Id. at 62.
60. 74 BVerfGE 297, 335 (1987).
61. See, e.g., ALBRECHT HESSE, Anmerkung [zum sechsten Rundfunkurteid], 46/1991
JURISTISCHE ZEITUNG [JZ] 357. Hesse describes the partisan aspect of these battles:
"While the CDU-led 'B-States' strive for the introduction of private broadcasting,
the media policy of the SPD 'A-States' seek to protect the public law broadcasting
system."
62. The Court did find some sections of the law directed to the distribution of
transmission capacity to be unconstitutional. 83 BVerfGE238, 322-24 (1991)
(transmission decisions not sufficiently insulated from state influence).
63. 83 BVerfGE at 333ff
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televisions, radios and (more recently) some computers, the primary
mode of financing for German public broadcasting, the Court's
Seventh Decision addressed advertising as a supplementary
revenue source, rejecting a public broadcaster's claim that limits on
its advertising would seriously weaken its ability to provide the
constitutionally required service.64
The Eighth or "Cable Penny" Decision in 1994 concerned a part
of the broadcasting fee known as the "cable penny," a small
surcharge designated for financing of a cable television pilot project.
Although it eventually found that the cable penny itself was not
unconstitutional, the Court held the entire process by which the
Bavarian legislature had set broadcasting fees to be constitutionally
infirm, and used the occasion to describe more precisely how a
constitutional (i.e., politically insulated) financing mechanism
would work.65 Above all, the fee-setting process had to be insulated
from politics, as described more particularly in section III(H) below.
It appears unlikely that German scholars will officially enshrine
the Constitutional Court's 2005 decision in another Bavarian
broadcasting fee dispute (the "second Bavarian Fee Decision") as the
"Ninth Broadcasting Decision," but it is firmly in the line of cases
developing the concept of broadcasting freedom. The Decision
addressed an attempt to require all cable subscribers to pay a
surcharge to support regional and local commercial programming
in concededly underserved markets. Essentially using a balancing
test, the Court concluded that the invasion of individual contract
freedom, protected by Article 2 of the Basic Law, posed by such a
forced surcharge was not justified by a sufficient public purpose or
enhancement of Article 5 broadcasting freedom. 66
The final Decision on which this Article will focus came on
September 11, 2007, when the Court again addressed a fee-related
issue. The September 2007 Decision (as I will refer to it here) came
in response to the complaints filed by various public broadcasting
entities challenging a decision of State legislators to reduce the
64. 87 BVerfGE 181, 205-06 (1992).
65. 90 BVerfGE at 105-06.
66. 114 BVerfGE 371, 383, 391-96 (2005). The surcharge revenue was directed
largely to private broadcasters without any corresponding attempt to secure
diversity or balance in their programming or governance, and without safeguards
against their possible acquisition of dominant opinion making power in the region
or locality. Id.
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broadcasting fee from what had been recommended by an experts'
commission,67 although the latent question was to what degree
public broadcasting's future activities in an Internet-centered
communications world would be funded.68 With little explicit
reference to online media, however, the Court found the fee
reduction unconstitutional because it was inadequately justified,
and essentially a political decision to curtail public broadcasters'
activities rather than the result of a dispassionate economic
analysis.69
In addition to the seven Decisions described above, there are
several other decisions that are sometimes included in the canon of
broadcasting freedom: (1) the Court's 1996 ruling in the Deutsche
Sportsfernsehen ("German Sports Television" or DSF) case, in which it
reiterated the legislature's duty to prevent "dominant opinion-
making power" in broadcasting;70  (2) the Court's 1998
Kurzberichterstattung ("Short Reporting") case, which established the
primacy of the public's information rights over exclusive contractual
rights to major sporting and other public events; 71 (3) a further 1998
67. 119 BVerfGE at 196-202. There were three separate constitutional
complaints: one made by all nine of the regional broadcasting entities composing
ARD, one brought by the Second German Television ("ZDF"), and one brought by
Deutschlandradio. Id.
68. The Internet is hardly mentioned in the Decision (see id. at 217, 219), but this
question lurks behind much of what the Court wrote, as described in Section
III(K)(1) below. The Constitutional Court did reference "competition among the
media," a proxy for the broader discussion: the Minister-Presidents Conference had
justified its downward departure from the recommended fee on grounds that: (a) a
"stressed economic situation.., brings with it great challenges and financial belt-
tightening for all parts of the population": (b) there were potential savings in the
operation of the public broadcasting entities; and (c) the "general development of
tasks within the dual broadcasting system, and in competition among all the
media" justified a lower fee (and, by extension, a lower profile for public
broadcasting). Id. at 193-95. The Minister-Presidents also approved legislation that
would require the experts' commissions of the future to consider the "total
economic situation, in particular the total financing of the public fisc [dffentlicher
Hand], as well as any future voluntary commitments" of the public broadcasters to
rein in costs.
69. Id. 160-84, 191-94 (finding the proffered rationale to be based on
inaccurate facts, inappropriate assumptions, and faulty logic). The Court did not,
however, overturn the Minister-presidents' decision to require the expert
commission to consider the country's "total economic situation," and related issues,
in the future. Id. 200-10.
70. 95 BVerfGE 163 (1996).
71. 97 BVerfGE 228 (1998). This is sometimes referred to as the "Tenth
Decision." See, e.g., http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rundfunkurteil#9._Rundfunk-Urteil:-
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decision in the extra radio case, in which the Court addressed the
limits of a private right to broadcast;72 and (4) a number of other
speech and press cases that develop important aspects of the
broadcasting/information freedom doctrine.73 In addition, some of
the Court's seminal press cases have had formative affect on its
broadcasting jurisprudence, and to that extent those too are
discussed in this writing.74
B. The Market Challenge to Broadcasting Freedom
German public broadcasting has been under attack since its
inception. The Constitutional Court's 1981 FRAG Decision did little
to dampen what was then a "drumbeat" of political and economic
pressure aimed at undercutting the "public service concept" on
which the German model was based.75 In fact, it was commonly
understood that the 1981 FRAG Decision gave the "green light" to
forces agitating for the privatization of substantial parts of the
German broadcasting landscape. 76
EG-Fernsehrichtlinie. This Wikipedia entry counts thirteen total broadcasting
decisions, including this "Short Reporting" case and the extra radio case, as well as a
2008 Decision addressing the participation of political parties in commercial
broadcasting entities. 121 BVerfGE 30 (2008) ("Thirteenth Decision").
72. 97 BVerfGE 298 (1998) (referred to in the Wikipedia entry, supra note 71, as
the "Eleventh Decision," with the September 2007 Decision characterized as
"Twelfth").
73. 90 BVerfGE 27 (1994) (Parabola Antenna Case); 91 BVerfGE 125
(1994)(Courtroom Television I (Honecker)); 103 BVerfGE 44 (2001) (Courtroom
Television II); 97 BVerfGE 125 (1998) (Caroline of Monaco Case 1); 101 BVerfGE 361
(1999) (Caroline Monaco Case II).
74. See, e.g., 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) (the Lth case) (discussed at length in section
III(C)(1) infra); 20 BVerfGE 162 (1966) (Spiegel Search Warrant); 25 BVerfGE 256
(1969) (Blinckffier) infra notes 89, 94 and accompanying text; 27 BVerfGE 71 (1969)
Leipzig Newspaper), see infra notes 298-300 and in sections III(K)(2)(b) and (c) below.
75. Commercial media outlets and conservative politicians have assailed the
decentralized German post-war public broadcasting system almost since its birth.
See, e.g., Witteman, supra note 2, at 170; see also supra note 40 (discussion at end of
note). German post-war broadcasting was created "with help of the Allies and with
reference to the public-service concept of European and particularly British
broadcasting," a system based on "independent, community-based, and trustee-
based broadcasting." Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 59, at 57 (lamenting the erosion
of public service concept after the Fourth Decision).
76. Humphreys, supra note 21, at 532. While the liberal SPD had resisted cable
television "pilot projects" because of their perceived potential to undermine public
broadcasting, when the conservative CDU came to power in 1982 it threw open the
doors to cable, availing itself of the fact that cable came under the
"telecommunications" rather than "broadcasting" rubric of the German
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Technological changes have led to further questions, even in the
context of the Court's most recent 2007 Decision, as to whether
public broadcasting remains necessary in a multi-channel world:
We have to ask ourselves whether the force-feeding
[Zwangsalimentierung] of public-law television can continue to be
justified. Communication technologies and media markets are
undergoing such fast-paced and in some respects revolutionary
changes. New technologies have brought an increasing
convergence of the electronic media, and as a consequence an
enlargement and differentiation of content as well as forms and
paths of transmission, as well as new types of program-related
services. 77
The European Union and even the German Cartel Office have
been instrumentalized to bring pressure on the public broadcasting
status quo.78 Public broadcast supporters feared that the focus was
moving from the information recipient to the broadcast speaker as
entrepreneur, from an objective constitutional norm to a subjective,
Constitution, and thus jurisdiction lay with the Bundespost at the federal level. Id.
at 531; Witteman, supra note 2, at 182-83. The new CDU Bundespost minister
Schwarz-Schilling was able to implement and orchestrate large-scale government
support for cable and satellite infrastructure. Witteman, supra note 2, at 183 n.308
(citing Bluithmann, Gaul, & Hoffmann, Im Kabel verfangen, DIE ZEIT, January 27,
1984, at 17 (cable network represents "expensive preparatory work for commercial
TV producers")). At the same time, the individual German States (particularly
those in CDU/CSU hands, although the SPD ruled States were not immune from
this phenomenon) were in a "race to the bottom" to enact laws which would allow
and attract private broadcasters to their States. Humphreys, supra note 21, at 531
(noting that "[tihe name-of-the-game for many Lander politicians - regardless of
political color - became how to attract private media investment to their regions.
From this point on, media policy in Germany became increasingly subsumed into
what economists call locational policy (the term is Standortpolitik)").
77. Kurt Fassbender, Das jingste Rundfunkgebiihrenurteil des BVerfG, 11 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NVwZ] 1265, 1267 (2007); for U.S. version of
this argument, see, e.g, Rachelle Chong, The 31 Flavors of the Net Neutrality Debate:
Beware the Trojan Horse, N.Y.L. SCH. ADVANCED COMM. L. & POL'Y CTR., 12 passim
(2007) ("head-to-head intermodal competition has resulted in the build-out and
improvement of networks").
78. Complaints filed by private broadcasters with the European Commission
alleging that public broadcasting fees constituted an illegal government subsidy
and market distortion (see, e.g., EC State Aid Decision, supra note 18 at 18-19, inter
alia), and European Community U plans for market-based auctions of broadcasting
frequencies. Hubertus Gersdorf, Rundfunkfrequenzpolitik zwischen Okonomisierung
und Vielfaltsicherung: Zur Reichweite des Rundfunkprivilegs [Broadcasting Frequency
Politics Between Economics and Preservation of Diversity: On the Reach of the
Broadcasting Privilege], 2 ZEITSC-HRFr FOR URHEBER UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 104,
105 (2007); see also further discussion in infra sections III(K)(3)(b), (c) and (d).
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individual right, and from speech as part of opinion-building to
speech as commercial enterprise. 79 Viewers were increasingly
viewed as consumers rather than citizens. 80  Commercial
broadcasters argued that broadcasting freedom as a constitutional
norm could be supplanted by the regulation of broadcasting as an
economic activity, i.e., by ex post facto antitrust enforcement and
related market-power regulation.81 These developments have been
characterized as a pan-European "paradigm shift," a loss of faith in
the public service television ideal, driven by technological
developments and internationalization of the media marketplace. 82
The Court's broadcasting jurisprudence has emerged as a sort
of counterpoint to these tendencies, although not completely
immune to shifts in the political and economic landscape. 83
79. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 59, at 57-58, 60, 63 n.6, and passim (citing HANS
H. KLEIN, DIE RUNDFUNKFREIHEIT (1978)); see also discussion in infra sections III(C)(2)
and (3) of objective vs. subjective rights.
80. HUMPHREYS, MASS MEDIA AND MEDIA POLICY, supra note 43, at 160 ("rivaling
of the public-service doctrine by notions of 'consumer sovereignty' - the viewer as
consumer rather than as citizen - and the primacy of the 'free market' . . . [and]
following on from this, a 'commodification' of broadcasting").
81. Hoffmann-Riem, Rundfunkrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht, supra note 59, at 57,
passim; see also a broader-based and English-language version of this essay,
Hoffmann-Riem, Law, Politics and the New Media: Trends in Broadcasting Regulation,
in THE POLITICS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION IN WESTERN EUROPE 125, 126ff
(Kenneth Dyson & Peter Humphreys, eds.,1986), noting a trend throughout Europe,
following the U.S. trajectory "from the trustee to the market model . .. from a
cultural towards an economic legitimation of the broadcasting system . . . [and]
from freedom of communication to freedom of broadcasting entrepreneurship."
Hoffmann-Riem sees further similarities between Germany and the United States in
this regard:
In just such a way, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
legitimized its policy of deregulation, which has taken place without any
change of the Communications Act and its requirements for the common
good (public interest, convenience, necessity). Recent West European
legislation too - for example, the new media laws of the Ldnder (states) in
the Federal Republic - emphasizes the commitments of the trustee model,
while assuming that they can also be adequately fulfilled in the market.
Id. at 128.
82. Id. at 126ff, see also Ruck, supra note 23, at 219 passim (seeing a "crumbling"
of the "public service concept" in the 1980s, i.e., loss of the "consensus that the
broadcasting mass media should above all serve to inform, educate and entertain
listeners and viewers"); Graham, Offentlich-rechtlicher Rundfunk in der Demokratie, 2
MEDIA PERSPEKTIVEN 95, 97 (2004) (noting the crisis of legitimization for public
service broadcasting generally, and specifically for the BBC).
83. See sections III(C) through 0) below; cf. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 59, at 62
(citing Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Rundfunkverfassung als Richterrecht [Broadcasting
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Meanwhile, German legal scholars have divided themselves
into opposing economic and political camps. The libertarians
emphasize the subjective, individual right of businesses to enter the
broadcasting market, and envision diversity through the "external"
plurality of the marketplace. 84 The "democrats," on the other hand,
stress the public role of broadcasting in building democratic
consensus, are wary of market failure, and are protective of the
rights of broadcasting recipients as well as broadcast speakers.
85
This battle has entered a new phase as German public
broadcasting institutions follow their public onto the Internet,
establish Internet websites, and make their programming available
for cell phone reception. Commercial broadcasters and publishers
have pushed back against this unwelcome competition, which they
believe has deprived them not only of "eyeballs" but of advertising
revenue.86 By late 2003, pressures were building to limit the role of
public broadcasting, as evidenced in a speech by a leading Social
Democrat Ministerpresident entitled "Risk More Competition -
Media Between Market and State," and then in a whitepaper issued
by this politician with two of his Christian Democrat colleagues
under the title "Broadcasting Structural Reform," calling for staff
cuts, program consolidation, and abandonment of public
broadcasters' plans to enter the digital broadcast market as
competitors on a regional level, inter alia.87
Constitution as Judges' Law], in DAS RINGEN UM DEN MEDIENSTAATSVERTRAG DER
LANDER 37 (Peter Glotz & Reinhold Kopp eds., 1987)) ("In that regard, the Federal
Constitutional Court has fought a heroic battle to preserve the orientation of
broadcasting around the common good, while at the same time making clear how
little autonomy judge-made law really has and how much judge-made law mirrors
economic and political power relationships.").
84. See, in place of many, e.g., Udo Fink, Wem dient die Rundfunkfreiheit? [Whom
Does Broadcasting Freedom Serve?] 19 DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG [DOV] 805
(1992); Degenhart, infra note 325.
85. See, in place of many e.g., WOLFGANG HECKER, 'MEDIENMACHT' UND
REZIPIENTENFREIHEIT ['MEDIA POWER' AND RECIPIENT FREEDOM] 26 passim (1987)
(contrasting "reasoning culture" and "consuming culture "); HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra
note 17, passim.
86. See discussion in infra section II(K)(3)(b).
87. 119 BVerfGE at 186 (citing the referenced speech and whitepaper); see also
Editorial, So sollen ARD und ZDF sparen [This is How ARD and ZDF Can Save],
HAMBURGER ABENDBLATr, Nov. 12, 2003; Hahn, Achtet die Gerichte, RHEINISCHER
MERKUR, Sept. 27, 2007.
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C. Defending Broadcast Freedom: Institutional Freedom, Objective
Law, and the "Radiating Effect" of Constitutional Rights on
Private Law Relationships
1. The Underlying Constitutional Concepts
In working through the issues relating to a "dual" broadcasting
system in which public service and private broadcasters coexist, the
Court has been guided by a trio of inter-related ideas about
constitutional rights that are relatively unknown in this country:
88
institutional freedom; objective law; and Drittwirkung or the
"radiating effect" of constitutional law on private-law
relationships.89 Together they provide the theoretical underpinning
for the special constitutional status accorded broadcasters in
Germany. They relate to rights or values not necessarily tied to a
specific individual, but which are inherent in the constitutional
order as a whole.90 As applied to speech, they protect the process of
communication rather than the individual speaker.
The constitutional protection afforded broadcasting under
Article 5 "does not exhaust itself in the defense against state
influence." 91 Beyond this defensive protection, the "basic right [of
broadcasting freedom] demands much more a positive [legal] order,
which guarantees the diversity of themes and opinions that play a
88. But see Quint, supra note 16, at 258-67; Donald Krommers, German
Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L. J. 837, 858 ff (1991); E.M. BARENDT,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, 60, 63, 111-12 (2d ed. 2005).
89. A good discussion of these principles is found in KOMMERS, supra note 2, at
362-69. "[W]hile basic rights apply directly to state action, they [also] apply
indirectly to substantive private law" - such as the Civil Code. Id. at 49; see also
Witteman, supra note 2, at 155-56 (further discussion of objective norms, as
developed in the Spiegel, Blinckfier, and Lath cases).
90. Different formulations of the objective law concept are found in the
Constitutional Court's decisions. As to broadcasting, see, e.g., Third Decision, 57
BVerfGE at 319-20 ("freedom of opinion [is] an objective principle of the total legal
order, whereby subjective- and objective-law elements condition and support each
other .... In this sense, broadcasting freedom is primarily the freedom of opinion-
building, [a] serving freedom in its subjective- and objective-law elements"
["Meinungsfreiheit als objektives Prinzip der Gesamtrechtsordnung, wobei subjektiv- und
objektivrechtliche Elemente einander bedingen und stfitzen"], citing the Luth decision, 7
BVerfGE 198, as discussed below); Fifth Decision, BVerfGE 74, 297 (323) (same,
quoting Third Decision); Sixth Decision, BVerfGE 83, 238 (321) ("organizational
forms, which no longer serve objective broadcasting freedom, but rather subjective
editorial freedom, cannot serve as a basis for the preference decisions [of the States'
independent media authorities]").
91. 87 BVerfGEat 197-98.
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role in society will be taken up and passed along." 92 The trio of
constitutional concepts discussed in this chapter shapes this positive
order.
The idea of institutional freedom was developed in press cases
and later applied to broadcasting; it protects not just the act of
speaking, but the process of communication. 93 It covers all aspects of
the operation of a publishing or broadcasting entity, both those that
occur before the act of broadcasting (news gathering, access to
sources), and those that occur after (or concurrent with) the speech
act (transmission and distribution).94
Objective law norms or values are integral and necessary to the
constitutional system as a whole, are independent in many respects
of any particular individual, and operate in the broadcasting context
as a guarantee that the institution of broadcasting will in fact freely
function. Objective norms create a duty on the part of the lawmaker
to protect those constitutional values and rights through legislation
and/or enforcement. 95 Contrast this with rights under the U.S.
92. 90 BVerfGE at 88 ("Das Grundrecht verlangt vielmehr eine positive Ordnung,
welche sicherstellt... "); see also 87 BVerfGE at 198.
93. See, e.g., 12 BVerfGE at 261 (with broadcasting, "the institutional freedom is
no less important than it is for the press. This is explicitly stated in Article 5, where
sentence 2 of paragraph 1 guarantees the 'freedom of reporting through
broadcasting and film' in the same sentence as the freedom of the press"); 31
BVerfGE at 326 ("Art. 5 1 S 2 of the Basic Law guarantees the institutional freedom
of broadcasting"); see also id. at 338 (dissenting opinion, concurring in nature of
institutional freedom: "the institutional freedom needs a carrier, that is a techically
and economically capable institution, to fulfill the [constitutional] guarantee .. in
the realm of the possible"; compare Witteman, supra note 2, at 155.
94. Spiegel Search Warrant case, 20 BVerfGE at 175-76 (institutional freedom of
the press implies obligations on the part of public officials to provide information:
"The autonomy of the press guaranteed by Article 5 reaches from the gathering of
information through the transmission of reports and editorials. Included in press
freedom, therefore, is a certain protection of the trust relationship between press
and private informants," as well as "free access to a career in the press, [and] the
duty of public officials to provide information"); Blinckfier case, 25 BVerfGE at 256
ff (private boycott declared to be violative of objective, institutional press freedom),
discussed in Witteman, supra note 2; First Decision, 12 BVerfGE at 225-27 (Federal
government required to make transmission capacity available); see also Fourth
Decision, 73 BVerfGE at 180 (Article 5 protects the "'free press' as institution, in
other words its existence and ability to function"); 20 BVerfGE at 176 (The Court in
Spiegel also suggested that the institutional freedom of the press could ground a
"duty of the state to ward off the dangers to a free press that might grow out of the
creation of opinion monopolies [Meinungsmonopolen]," a subject developed further
in section II(J) infra.
95. See, e.g., 7 BVerfGE at 205-08; 74 BVerfGE at 323 (both discussed below).
[Vol. 33:1
Constitutionalizing Communications
Constitution, which create no duty and typically only protect the
individual from the state.96
To some extent, the radiating effect of a constitutional right is
an aspect of objective law. Both are tenets of constitutional law that
go beyond traditional constitutional concerns with state-state or
state-individual relationships, and articulate substantive standards
which sometimes must be taken into account in the resolution of
individual disputes - whether sounding in property, tort or contract
law.97 Such a radiating effect is usually precluded in United States
by the doctrine of state action, which limits constitutional rights to
those situations where state action can be found, i.e., where the state
or some party clothed with state authority has acted or threatened to
act,98 and usually prohibits the reach of constitutional concerns into
relationships between and among private individuals.
Like institutional freedom, the concepts of objective values and
radiating effect come out of the Constitutional Court's early
jurisprudence in press and speech cases, particularly the seminal
Lath case where these related concepts were first articulated. In a
factual situation similar to New York Times v. Sullivan,99 the
Constitutional Court's Lath decision overruled a lower court finding
96. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973) (First
Amendment "is a restraint on government action, not that of private persons.").
This is not to say that rights requiring government to act are unknown under U.S.
law. Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 46-48 ("Negative Rights, Positive Rights"),
48 n.37 ("We can understand a positive right as one that requires for its existence
some act by government."). Prof. Sunstein argues that some speech and property
rights may, in fact, require the government to act, such as the "hostile crowd" cases
where police may be required to protect a speaker, or cases where government is
called on to enforce contract or property rights. Id. at nn. 36-40 and accompanying
text.
97. BARENDT, supra note 88, at 62 (" [constitutional] rights, in this case freedom of
expression, create a system of values which must influence all spheres of law and
shape the development of private law. Further, private law itself forms part of the
'general laws' which must be interpreted and applied in conformity with basic
constitutional rights.").
98. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court found "state action" in the state
court's threatened enforcement of a money judgment for libel. 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964) ("Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts
have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid
restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press ... ").
99. Both cases grew out of a perceived disparagement of an individual (alleged
defamation of an Alabama sheriff, a call to boycott an ex-Nazi, respectively), and an
attempt to recover damages for same. State action did not figure in Liith as it did in
New York Times (see preceding footnote), German objective law concepts having
rendered a finding of state action unnecessary.
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of liability, holding that a social and democratic "system of values"
was incorporated into the Basic Law, and "must apply as a
constitutional axiom throughout the whole system," i.e., in both
public and private law:100
... [T]he Basic Law is not a values neutral document [citations
omitted]. Its section on basic rights establishes an objective order
of values .... This value system, which centers on the dignity of
the human personality developing freely within the social
community, must be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional
decision affecting all spheres of law [public and private].
Legislation, public administration, and adjudication all receive
direction and impulse from this objective value system. Thus it
clearly also influences the development of private law. Every
provision of private law must be compatible with this system of
values, and every such provision must be interpreted in its
spirit.101
In this case, the constitutional claims effectively trumped the
Civil Code.102 Professor Kommers describes the Lith court's
approach this way:
The Constitution [Basic Law] incorporates the basic value
decisions of its founders, the most basic of which is their choice of
a free democratic basic order .... These basic values are objective
because they are said to have an independent reality under the
Constitution, imposing on all organs of government an
affirmative duty to see that they are realized in practice.
103
100. 7 BVerfGE at 205 (translation partly from KOMMERS, supra note 2, at 363, and
partly by the author).
101. 7 BVerfGE at 205. The Lath court went on to state that:
The influence of the constitutional values system affects particularly those
provisions of private law that contain mandatory rules of law and thus
form part of the ordre public - in the broad sense of the term - that is,
rules which for reasons of the general welfare are also binding on private
legal relationships and are removed from the dominion of private intent.
Id. at 206.
102. Kommers says of Lath, "The court ruled that while basic rights apply
directly to state action, they [also] apply indirectly to substantive private law."
KOMMERS, supra note 2, at 49 (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 47. Prof. Kommers describes how critics of the "objective values"
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court decry this "interpretive strategy" as "an
ingenious - some critics would say disingenuous - judicial methodology." Id. at
86 (citing CLARENCE MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN
INTEGRATIOn 159 (1971) (objective law theory "harbors the illusions of determinate
norms in the fact of unarticulated value premises and of judicial neutrality aloof
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The Constitutional Court has found that other sections of the
Basic Law also generate an objective law component, leading to a
government duty to act, including Section 12's right to freely choose
career, workplace and education, and Section l's right to human
dignity.10 4 The idea of objective law, however, finds particular
application in the area of free speech and public opinion-building.
The German Court quotes Justice Cardozo on this point:
The basic right of freedom of opinion is the most immediate
expression of the human personality in society and, as such, one
of the noblest of human rights .... It is absolutely basic to a
liberal-democratic constitutional order because it alone makes
possible the constant intellectual exchange and contest among
opinions that form the lifeblood of such an order; [indeed] it is
"the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom."
105
The Constitutional Court has transplanted this concept of an
objective order of values, and an objective law, into its broadcasting
cases:
Inasmuch as Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law guarantees
freedom of expression, freedom of publication, and freedom of
information as human rights, it at the same time safeguards a
process of communication. Article 5 grounds subjective rights; in
this regard it also enshrines [normiert] these communicative
freedoms as an objective principle in the total legal order,
whereby subjective and objective law elements penetrate and
protect each other.106
from the creative search for normative content.")); see also KOMMERS, supra note 2, at
47 ("From some jurisprudential perspectives this theory allows the court to engage
in open-ended decision making while appearing to be text-bound."); Fink, supra
note 84, at 811 ("the discernment of such values is only accessible to the personal
intuition and therefore not rationally re-producible .... One can see that in the case
of broadcasting freedom quite clearly, which in the jurisprudence of the
[Constitutional Court] is laid out pursuant to the personal ideas of the judges about
how broadcasting can be structured and guaranteed in a way useful to society and
the state."). Compare CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS
Do 79 (2001) ("What is operating here is a set of aspirations about democracy -
about deliberative democracy in fact - and a judgment about the need for
constitutional law to protect those aspirations.").
104. See, e.g., 33 BVerfGE 303 (1972) (Article 12 case on educational opportunity).
105. 7 BVerfGE at 208 (quoting (in English) Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
326-27 (1937) (emphasis added)), German-English translation from KOMMERS, supra
note 2, at 364-65.
106. Fifth Decision, 74 BVerfGE at 323; see also Third Decision, 57 BVerfGE at 319-
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2. Objective vs. Subjective Rights
The hard question here, one the Constitutional Court has not
answered definitively, is whether there is a private, subjective right
to open and run a broadcasting business. As a threshold matter, it
must be noted that even the statement of this question betrays an
American bias, conflating speech rights with what Germans refer to
as "entrepreneurial rights" - concepts usually, but not always, kept
separate in the German discourse.107
The Fourth Decision opened the door to the possibility of a
private right to speak by broadcast when it expressed concern that
imposing internally pluralistic governing boards on private
broadcasters might rob them of the "basic element of private-
autonomous shaping and decisionmaking, the actual substance of
the private-law form."108
20 (same), Sixth Decision, 83 BVerfGE295-96 (same), and similar language in extra
radio case discussed below, 97 BVerfGE at 298. The subjective/objective dichotomy
is also found in press cases such as the Spiegel Search Warrant case, 20 BVerfGE at
175:
[Freedom of the press] secures most immediately . . . a subjective
constitutional right for those persons and businesses active in the press
operation. ... [I]n certain contexts it gives these parties a privileged legal
position, so that the determination also has an objective-legal side. It
guarantees the institution of a "free press." The state is, independent of the
subjective rights [Berechtigungen] of any individual, required to consider
the postulate of press freedom throughout its area of authority, anywhere
the law touches the press.
107. See, e.g., 57 BVerfGE at 330 (presence and influence of "societally relevant
forces" in public broadcasting governance bodies important to "assure - in
accordance with the idea behind this model - that broadcasting will not be made
to serve only one particular direction or interest - above all, the entrepreneurial
interest of the broadcast carrier company - at the expense of those concerns
protected by freedom of broadcasting"); 73 BVerfGE at 187 (contrasting interests of
the broadcast entrepreneur or Rundfunkunternehmer with the requirements of
broadcasting freedom, in the context of frequency allocation); but see Hoffmann-
Riem, Rundfunkrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht, supra note 59, at 60 ("in the course of time,
however, the broadcasting communicator's freedom is understood ever more as the
broadcaster's entrepreneurial freedom").
108. 73 BVerfGE at 171. Here, the Court may have been thinking about the
dissenting minority in the Court's Second Decision, which suggested there was
some contradiction between the public broadcasting entity's function as a "carrier"
and its editorial autonomy. "It follows that the carrier for the realization of public
tasks is not actually the master of his own house, and still less the professionals
inside the institution." 31 BVerfGE at 338-39; see also Witteman, supra note 2, at 152.
On the other hand, public-law broadcasters are not that different than other public-
law agencies in lacking a "subjective" protection or standing under the Basic Law.
See, e.g., 75 BVerfGE 192, 193ff (1987) (public-law credit union has no constitutional
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The Court's Sixth broadcasting Decision, however, appeared to
push the door half-way shut on an individual right, stating that "as
a serving freedom, broadcasting freedom does not primarily
guarantee the interests of the broadcaster, but rather the interests of
free individual and public opinion building."109 The Sixth Decision
suggested that broadcasting freedom does not necessarily create an
individual cause of action for the public-law broadcasting councils
that run public service broadcasting institutions, but that these serve
as "trustees" for the general public (Allgemeinheit).u °0 Six years later,
however, the Court referred to the broadcasting entities themselves
as "carriers" of this constitutional right, but added that the
broadcasting freedom mandate went beyond the individual carrier
to a "legal order that guarantees that broadcasting performs its
constitutional duties.""'
At least one writer has seen a dichotomy between the subjective
rights of sentence 1 of Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law (right
to speak, to inform oneself), and the object rights or "shaping laws"
(Ausgestaltungsgesetze) found in sentence 2.112 This author notes a
counter-position, which sees the sentence 2 laws and rights as
merely the outgrowth of the subjective, defensive rights found in
sentence 1.113
standing); 78 BVerfGE 101, 102 ff (1988) (public-law broadcasting agency cannot
invoke equality clause of Basic Law); 83 BVerfGE at 312 (Sixth Broadcasting
Decision) (public-law broadcaster cannot subjectively invoke press-freedom clause
of Basic Law); see also Bethge, Grundrechtschu tz ffir Medienpolizei, 9 NEUE JURISTICHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 557 N.2, 558 (1995) (discussing the still unsettled question of
constitutional standing of the public-law Independent Media Authorities discussed
in section 111(l) below, and comparing them to other public-law entities, including
religious societies and universities).
109. 83 BVerfGE at 315.
110. Id. at 333 ("The creation of an oversight board [such as the broadcasting
council] ... should not be read to make this board itself the carrier [or beneficiary]
of broadcast freedom ...the socially composed control boards are much more
trustees for the public at large.").
111. 87 BverfGE at 197-98.
112. Ruck, supra note 52, at 54547 (contrasting these two types of constitutional
rights with "limiting laws" (Schrankengesetzen) found in Germany's civil codes, such
as laws relating to protection of minors), and at 546 (noting enormous investment
of time, money, and professional resources necessary to avail one's self of mass
media communication systems, thereby grounding the legislator's duty to shape
broadcasting so that it fulfills its serving function).
113. Id. at 555 ("as a consequence, all independent content is removed from
sentence 2"); compare Bethge, Der Grundrechtstatus privater Rundfunkaveranstalter
[The Constitutional Status of Private Broadcasting Producers], 1 NJW 1, 3 (1997)
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In 1998, the question of subjective versus objective rights
surfaced again in the extra radio case, which involved the relative
distribution of broadcasting freedom among the Bavarian State
Agency for New Media ("BLM") and extra radio, a private provider
of broadcast programming. [Eixtra radio complained that the BLM
had unconstitutionally interfered with its broadcasting freedom by:
(1) requiring extra radio to combine its partial program with another
partial program, Radio Euroherz, to create a "full program"; and (2)
then revoking extra radio's license when it was unable to reach
agreement with Radio Euroherz.1 4 The Bavarian Constitutional
Court rejected the complaint, finding that the public-law oversight
agency, the BLM, was the sole "carrier" of broadcasting freedom in
Bavaria, particularly in light of a Bavarian constitutional
amendment limiting private broadcasting.115
The Federal Constitutional Court reversed, finding that the
Bavarian Court had failed to consider whether the individual
producer (not necessarily the owner of extra radio) might have
enforceable rights under the Basic Law:
Broadcasting freedom is at its core programming freedom. It
guarantees that broadcasting [institutions] can decide, free from
external influence, how to carry out their journalistic tasks ....
This basic right therefore protects all natural and juridical persons
who produce broadcasting, whether in public-law or private-law
form, whether engaged in a commercial or public venture ....
The need for protection against such [external] influences on
program-shaping decisions exists there, where such influences are
most likely to be found.116
The Court went on to concede that it had not clarified in its
previous decisions "whether the objective law duty of the State also
(noting that the Court's treatment of broadcasting freedom as an objective,
"serving" freedom leads to the "de-individualization" (Entindividualisierung) of the
constitutional right).
114. 97 BVerfGE at 302.
115. Id. at 303. The Bavarians had adopted by popular vote in 1973 an
amendment to the Bavarian state constitution: "broadcasting will be carried out as a
matter of public responsibility, and in public-law carriage." Id. at 298-99 (quoting
Article 111a(2) of the Bavarian Constitution). Although the original referendum
intended a complete ban of private broadcasting, in its final version it allowed a
system anchored by a public-law Independent Media Authority (IMA), which
licenses private broadcasters. See supra note 27, regarding IMAs; see further
discussion of Bavarian referendum infra, note 222 and accompanying text.
116. Id. at 310.
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corresponds to a subjective-law position of the broadcast producer
or applicant."117 Without going so far as to bestow what an
American jurist would regard as standing or a private right of
action, the Court makes clear that individual producers as well as
the BLM can partake in Article 5's legal protection. The nuanced
interrelationship of rights is described in this passage from extra
radio:
The objective law duty of the legislator serves also to protect the
constitutional position of the broadcast producer operating within
the framework created by the legislature; the goal of such a
constitutional protection would be endangered if the affected
parties had no possibility of asserting that a violation of that duty
had occurred .... Just as a licensed broadcast producer can rely
on his legal status to invoke the protection of broadcasting
freedom ... so too can an applicant [for a broadcasting license]
assert that freedom as it relates to constitutionally protected
selection and licensing rules.
Although the BLM itself is insulated from the state and
pluralistically constituted, it faces the applicant as an instrument
of public power, and in that regard is itself constitutionally
bound. The fact that the BLM... itself could possibly enjoy the
protection of this constitutional right does not speak to the
contrary ... there is nothing unusual about the necessity of
balancing the rights of multiple carriers of one and the same
constitutional right.118
117. Id. at 313 ("In den genannten Entscheidungen sind diese Anforderungen allerdings
als objektivrechtliche Verpflichtungen des Rundfunkgesetzgebers entwickelt worden,
wdhrend kein AnlaJf bestand zu kldren, ob der objektivrechtlichen Pflicht des Staates auch
eine subjektivrechtliche Position der Rundfunkveranstalter oder -bewerber entspricht.").
118. Id. at 313-14. Because the underlying legal dispute had become moot over
time, the question of the precise scope of the producer's subjective broadcasting
rights, as well as any specific defects in BLM's procedure, were left unresolved by
the Constitutional Court's decision. Id. at 315 ff While some commentators have
suggested that "more was left open than decided" with this decision (Stettner, Das
bayerische alternative Rundfunkmodell nach dem 'extra-radio' Beschluss des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 2 KOMMUNIKATION & RECHT (K&R), 355, 362 (1999)), the
Constitutional Court may have chosen the better part of wisdom in correcting some
basic theoretical errors of the Bavarian court, without opening the door to
unfettered entrepreneurial rights. The Court appeared to be balancing - and
indeed used the word Ausgleich, translated here as balance, to describe its process
- the direct institutional interests of the BLM against the subjective interests of the
individual producer. Compare 57 BVerfGE at 321 (Third Decision, translated, supra
note 62 and accompanying text) (broadcasting as the point where "different
constitutional rights positions meet").
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A sort of interdependence of subjective rights and objective
norms emerges. The Court in Lfith pointed out that the Basic Law is
to be interpreted in terms of its overall structural unity, and that the
rights recognized in the Basic Law create an "objective order of
values.., that has its middle point in the human personality freely
developing itself within the social community."1 19
3. The Constitutional Duty of the Legislature
An "objective order of values" is meaningless if it is not
translated into action. The Constitutional Court has understood that
the guarantee of broadcasting freedom "requires a positive [legal]
order that secures the diversity of existing opinion in its fullest
possible breadth and completeness. ... How the legislature will
accomplish this task is - within these constitutional parameters -
its own decision." 120
Objective values impose a "positive obligation on the state" to
create the conditions under which the constitutional freedoms can
be meaningfully exercised." 121 For example, in the 1972 educational
training case cited above, the Court extrapolated from Section 12 of
the Basic Law, which protects the "right to freely choose career,
workplace, and educational or training path," a duty of the
government to provide sufficient educational and training
possibilities to make this choice real. "Without the factual
prerequisites [for career preparation], the freedom to make such
choices would be an empty promise [wertlos]."122 Other German
constitutional rights said to create duties because of their broad
119. 7 BVerfge at 205. See KOMMERS, supra, note 2, at 35-37 (Kommers identifies
some of the values embedded in the German post-war Basic Law: Parteienstaat
(popular sovereignty through political parties competing in free and equal
elections); Sozialstaat (commitment to provide social justice and basic needs of all
Germans); Rechtstaat (rule of law); and Streitbare Demokratie (which he translates as
"militant democracy")).
120. 74 BVerfGE at 324 (emphasis added); see also 87 BVerfGE at 198 (obligation
of the legislature to insure adequate financing for public law broadcasters); 90
BVerfGE at 88-90.
121. KOMMERS, supra, note 2, at 47 ("Every basic right in the Constitution - for
example, freedom of speech, press, religion, occupation - has a corresponding
value. A basic right is a negative right against the state, but this right also
represents a value, and as a value it imposes a positive obligation on the state to
ensure that it becomes an integral part of the legal order."). Thus, says Kommers,
"while basic rights apply directly to state action, they [also] apply indirectly to
substantive private law" such as interpretations of the Civil Code. Id.
122. 33 BVerfGE at 330-31.
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social implications are the freedom of research and teaching (Freiheit
von Forschung u. Lehre) found in paragraph 3 of Article 5, and the
rights of parents (Erziehungsrecht) found in Article 6 of the Basic Law
(which, like broadcasting, is characterized as a "serving" freedom,
and obligates the parent to act as trustee for the child).123
While institutional freedom and the radiating effect of
constitutional rights inform broadcasting freedom, 124 it is the
objective law's legislative mandate that makes broadcasting
freedom the effective lynchpin of the German public service
broadcasting system today.
Broadcasting fulfills an essential "transfer function," 125 and a
related, equally important "integration function," 126 in society. The
Court sees this "transfer function" in danger of "capture"
123. Fink, supra note 84, at 805, notes 4-5 and accompanying text, citing 59
BVerfG 360 (377).
124. Institutional freedom and particularly the radiating effect of constitutional
rights may have application to the network neutrality debate, discussed in section
III(K)(2)(c) below. Institutional freedom is also important to securing adequate
financing for public law television, also as discussed in section III(H) below.
125. 90 BVerfGE at 87. The use here of "transfer function," as well as the Court's
reference elsewhere to broadcasters as Trdiger, suggest reference to a common
carrier telecommunications platform. Trdger is, in fact, susceptible to two
interpretations, depending on context: either "legally responsible agency," or
"carrier" in what we would understand as a common carrier category. The
Constitutional Court uses Trdger in both senses, sometimes referring to an
infrastructure component ("carrier"), other times to the legal entity that carries the
programs ("agency"). See, e.g., 73 BVerfG at 145 (carriage: "preference for broadcast
applicants, which demonstrate a broad and diverse carriage"); Id. at 165 (carriage:
referring to broadcasting council as the organ of a "neutralized broadcast carrier")
("neutralisierten Trdgers der Veranstaltungen"); 83 BVerfG at 246-47 (agency: "The
state legislator saw broadcasting in private carriage [responsibility] as the
fulfillment of a public service."); Id. at 325-26 (agency: "The end-effect of this
attempt [to prevent dominant opinion-making power] is the division of the
broadcasting institution into two agencies, one a production cooperative
responsible for the journalistic side, and the other a corporate entity responsible for
the economic and technical side of the operation."). When discussing the legal
entity, it is usually in terms of whether that entity has standing to assert
broadcasting freedom. See, e.g., 83 BVerfGE at 315. ("broadcasting freedom does not
empower its holder [Trdger] to limitless uses").
126. The institutional freedom accorded the press and broadcasting rests on a
notion of these undertakings not just as economic enterprises, but also as social
spaces where various forms of public opinion building occur. These media
"transmit a certain picture of reality, . . . place certain themes on the agenda for
discussion, as part of an integration process whereby lifestyles, worldviews
[Lebenseinstellungen], values, and public conduct find a relationship to each other."
Caroline of Monaco II, 101 BVerfGE at 390, cited with approval in 103 BVerfG at 74.
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[Indienstnahme] by both state and private forces.127 The legislature
must therefore guarantee that program "selection, content and
shape" should occur as much as possible pursuant to journalistic
criteria (publizistische Kriterien), rather than political or commercial
criteria which might distort or "narrow" the communication of
information and opinion to the listener or viewer. 128 Such a
"positive order" entails provision of the "material, organizational,
and procedural" prerequisites for this constitutionally required
transfer function. 29 As described below, the devil is in the details.
D. State as Censor: Insulation of Both Public and Private
Broadcasters from State Influence
A threshold requirement of any system of free speech is
freedom from state censorship. As conceived under the
broadcasting freedom clause, free speech entails a much broader
freedom from state influence. The Constitutional Court has tasked
state legislators with insulating all broadcasting, be it public or
private, as much as possible from state influence, including the
influence of the very legislators to whom this task is addressed.
This becomes particularly tricky when the legislature deals with the
questions of financing, licensing and other discretionary decisions
related to broadcasting; one solution has been to move these
decisions out of the state governmental apparatus and into
autonomous, self-governing public institutions like the broadcasting
councils and Independent Media Authorities described above.
The Court's First Decision on broadcasting drew an initial line
127. 90 BVerfGE at 88 ("Indienstnahmen des Rundfunks drohen nicht nur von seiten
des Staates, sondern auch von gesellschaftlichen Maechten" ["capture of broadcasting is
a threat not only from the side of the state, but also from forces in society"]). Thus,
the Basic Law's guarantee of broadcasting freedom is essentially a guarantee that
"the diversity of themes and opinions that play a role in society are grasped and
transmitted by the broadcasting system." Id.
128. Id. at 87; see also id. at 89 (legislative duty to protect the essential journalistic
function from "extra-journalistic interests of third parties").
129. See Id. at 88 (citing 57 BVerfG at 320); 83 BVerfG at 296 ("materielle,
organisatorische, und prozedurale Regelungen"). While government supplies the
prerequisites, it does not directly fund public broadcasting, relying instead on
broadcasting fees paid by each owner of a radio or television set. Several judges on
the Constitutional Court have stated that government funding would create an
unconstitutional dependency relationship. See BVerfG 31, 229 (344) (Geiger, Rinck
and Wand, dissenting). And, while never explicitly adopted, this rationale




in the sand, ruling that broadcasting's constitutionally mandated
freedom from state influence was violated by Chancellor
Adenauer's plans for a national television network owned jointly by
the federal government, the several States, and others.1 30 Even if
state ownership was out, however, licensing issues remained
problematic. The Court's Fourth Decision struck down licensing
provisions applicable to private broadcasters because they gave the
state executive board too much discretion, and too much potential
influence over broadcast programming: "[S]tate authorities may not
have discretionary powers which ... could influence decisions
regarding the access of private parties to broadcasting media." 131 As
an alternative, the Court suggested an internally pluralistic public-
law body, similar to the broadcasting councils of public law stations,
with power to make licensing decisions.132 This has in fact become
the model for state licensing decisions, as described in section 111(l)
below.
The Eighth Decision marks the Court's fullest attempt to
wrestle with the paradox that the state that guarantees a "positive
order," and the legislature that shapes that order, are the very state
and legislature that have historically posed the greatest threat to
broadcasting freedom.133  The state, as well as legislators and
political parties, will be tempted to "instrumentalize" the
broadcasting function for their own purposes.
This [constitutional] protection relates not only to the manifest
dangers of immediate direction or censorship of broadcasting. It
also includes the more subtle means of indirect influence, with
which a state body can obtain influence on programming or
pressure those working in the broadcasting institutions. The state
has such means because it is precisely the state which, in the
130. 12 BVerfGE at 263; see also WESEL, supra note 9, at 121 f. ("[T]he next day's
newspapers reported: government television is unconstitutional.").
131. 73 BVerfGE at 183.
132. Id. at 187; see also discussion of Independent Media Authorities, supra note
27.
133. 90 BVerfGE at 88 ("As necessary as the state is as guarantor of a
comprehensively understood broadcast freedom, the representatives of the state are
susceptible to using broadcast freedom for their own interests."). Although
organized under private law, political parties are considered so close to the state
decision-making process as to justify further constitutional safeguards. The
Constitutional Court has ruled that their ownership or participation in commercial
broadcasting entities may be prohibited to the extent it would allow the political
parties to determine broadcast shape or content. 121 BVerfGE at 51-67 (a 2008
ruling which is the Court's latest broadcast-related Decision as of this writing).
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interest of the constitutional values in Article 5, paragraph 1 of the
Basic Law, organizes, licenses, provides transmission capacity,
oversees, and in some sense finances broadcasting. The inevitable
resulting opportunities to influence the journalistic activities of
broadcasters must therefore be excluded as much as possible.
For this reason, the Constitutional Court has held that the state
agencies can have no discretion in the licensing of private
broadcasters. . . . Such discretion can itself act as a means of
pressure and create a "self-censorship" of the broadcast entity.
134
The Court held that protecting the "constitutional communication
rights" from infringement by the state remains "even today the most
important application" of those rights.
135
In light of its finding that broadcasting freedom is essentially
"program freedom," i.e., a protection of the journalistic enterprise
from external forces, the Court found that even in its oversight
functions ("organizing, licensing, provision of transmission
facilities, oversight, and financing") the state needs to be kept at a
distance from both private and public programmers, a principal it
had referred to in earlier decisions as Staatsferne or "distance from
the state." 136 Keeping the state and the politicians who run it at this
safe distance has proven particularly bedeviling when it comes to
financing public broadcasting, as demonstrated in the Court's more
recent broadcasting Decisions, four of which are almost wholly
concerned with this problem (see section III(H) below).
E. Market as Censor: Criticism of the Marketplace, and Insulation
of Public Broadcasters from Market Influence
It is the German Constitutional Court's consistently expressed
belief that the market by itself, and by definition, cannot provide for
a democratic media that sets its communications jurisprudence
apart from that of the United States. In its Fourth Decision, the
Constitutional Court put the case this way:
Private programming is not adequate to the task of providing
comprehensive information in full measure to the public ... it
does not communicate information across the full breadth of
134. 90 BVerfGE at 88-89.
135. Id at 88, 87-89.
136. Id. at 88-89; see also 73 BVerfGE at 190 ("Decisive [for Article 5




opinions and cultural currents in society. 137
The Court has looked beyond spectrum scarcity to a more
generalized observation about the flattening affect of advertising on
program content:138
Independent of [the scarcity rationale], one cannot expect from
private broadcasters a broad array of programming, because the
private broadcaster is dependent on income from business
advertising. Such advertising income increases only when the
private program reaches sufficiently high viewership.
Broadcasters thus stand before the economic necessity of
providing the most broadly attractive programs, designed to
maximize listener and viewer numbers, and to do so at the lowest
possible costs.
13 9
Given the advertiser-driven model of commercial television, the
Court finds that programs intended for small audiences may not be
commercially viable, although they are important to the ecology of
public opinion:
Programs that are of interest for a small number of viewers and
that often - as for instance in the case of difficult cultural
broadcasts - require a large cost expenditure, will as a rule
retreat or be fully missing [from a private broadcasting
landscape], although they are necessary to the complete array of
information without which opinion building in a constitutional
sense is impossible.1
40
Despite the hint of elitism ("difficult cultural broadcasts"), this
passage underlines the Court's oft-stated belief that the marketplace
is incapable of supplying those serious, difficult, and/or critical
works which, although perhaps without mass appeal, are
unquestionably important to the process of public opinion building.
This value judgment, one of the mainstays of German broadcasting
jurisprudence, has engendered sharp criticism both in Germany,
and in this country.141
137. 73 BverfGE at 155; see also Witteman, supra note 2, at 174-75 (quoting 57
BVerfGE at 322-23).
138. See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (frequency scarcity as rationale
for broadcast regulation). In 1986, the Court elaborated on the "extraordinary high
cost of television programming," and the resulting "small number of broadcasters"
active in Germany. 73 BVerfGE at 154-55.
139. 73 BverfGE at 155.
140. Id. at 155-56.
141. Thomas Oppermann, Rundfunkgebuehr - Rundfunkordnung -
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Ironically, even the conservative political parties in Germany
agree with the underlying empirical observation. In arguing against
a species of fairness obligations which the North Rhine Westphalia
law imposed on private broadcasters (obligations to cover
"controversial themes of general significance," and present a broad
diversity of opinion), the Christian Democratic Union/Christian
Social Union ("CDU/CSU") and the Free Democratic Party ("FDP")
argued that it was commercially impossible to provide full and
objective news coverage in an advertising-driven broadcasting
environment, and that private broadcasters should therefore be
relieved of diversity and fairness obligations:
Private broadcasters, because of their dependence on financing
through advertising are, in fact, not in a position to fulfill these
requirements. To the contrary, they must concentrate much more
on entertainment broadcasts attractive to the masses in order to
survive. 142
The Court agreed with petitioners in its Sixth Decision, but
drew a different conclusion: while the public interest obligations of
commercial broadcasters could be lightened as long as there was a
compensating non-commercial "pillar" in the broadcasting system
(i.e., as long as there was a functioning public broadcast system),
commercial broadcasters could not entirely be excused from such
obligations.143
The Court's later Decisions returned repeatedly to the theme of
market failure. In its Seventh Decision in the Hessian Broadcasting
case, the Court found that private, advertising-driven broadcasters
had shown themselves to be incapable of delivering the
constitutionally mandated diversity "in full measure." 144 In its
Rundfunkideologie, Zum Rundfunkgebuehrenurteil des BverfG vom 22.2.1994, 1994 JZ
499, 500-01 (["The serving-institutional version of broadcast freedom] is based ...
on a far from doubtless primacy of sentence 2 over the "Ur-freedoms" of sentence
1."); Widmaier, supra note 14, at 77, 107, 151 (German "values focus" constitutes an
"elitist fallacy" and amounts to "governmentally created ethics of human
interaction.").
142. 83 BVerfGE at 279 (discussing complainants' argument).
143. Id. at 316.
144. 87 BVerfGE at 199 (citing a 1991 publication of the Independent Media
Authority for North Rhine-Westphalia, Produktionsquoten privater Fernsehprogramme
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Production Quotas of Private Television programming
in the Federal Republic of Germany]. This study analyzed actual program content of
the private broadcasters over a two-week period, determining that between 70-96%
of their programming was primarily entertainment with little or no information
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Eighth or Cable Penny Decision, the Court rejected the contention
that people who want private programming only should not have to
pay a fee to support public broadcasting. It found that the
present deficits of private broadcasting in its breadth of content
and thematic diversity can only be acceptable as long as public
law broadcasting remains to a full extent functional. It is therefore
justified to impose the broadcasting fee without regard to a
listener/viewer's pattern of use.145
A primarily fee-based system "allows the public broadcaster to be
independent from ratings and advertising obligations in offering a
program to the public that corresponds to the constitutional
demands of a diversity of content and opinion"; the only
prerequisite for imposition of the fee is that the user have a device
capable of receiving a signal.146
The second Bavarian Fee Decision developed the Court's
critique of the marketplace, citing further empirical research on how
the pursuit of market-share limits broadcast programming. 147
"Program-limiting and diversity-reducing pressures observable in
privately financed broadcasting" are particularly pernicious "when
there is a smaller number of likely viewers due to the type of
programming or the small size of the broadcast area." 148 The second
Bavarian Fee Decision held that even in a future digital world with
greatly expanded transmission capacity there could be no assurance
that minority or regional programming would be economically
viable. 149
The Court's September 2007 Decision continued in this vein,
measuring the market's shortcomings against the ideal of
broadcasting where "journalistic goals stand in the foreground,"
and "broadcast programming captures the diversity of information,
experience, values and behaviors in society." 150 The Court cited
studies in media economics to support its view that "broadcasting
value; and that very few of the private broadcasters actually developed their own
programming (as opposed to, say, purchasing U.S. product). Produktionsquoten, at
38, 49, 52, passim.)
145. 90 BverfGE at 90-91.
146. Id.
147. 114 BVerfGE at 388.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 119 BverfGE at 215-16.
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has... in comparison to other goods, special economic
characteristics," and its finding that a completely market-driven
system "threatens the goal of substantive diversity which is
especially important for a functioning democracy."151 The Decision
described advertising-financed broadcasting as inevitably leading to
a search for the largest possible audience, with a host of negative
results: "standardization" of product; "erosion of public television's
identity"; "one-sided reporting"; and the possibility that
broadcasting would be "co-opted for extra-journalistic purposes, be
they of a political or economic nature." 152
The pressures of economic competition and the ever-more
difficult editorial effort to obtain the attention of the viewer often
lead for example to reality-distorting presentations, the preference
for the sensational, and the tendency to take from the reported
subject only the peculiar, the scandalous.
15 3
The Court suggests that the problems with advertising as a
revenue base for the information industry are exacerbated by the
increasing concentration in commercial broadcasting:
Other entities, such as investment funds with significant
participation by international finance-investors, have become
increasingly active in the broadcast area. Telecommunications
companies are becoming active as the operators of the platforms
for broadcast programming. The process of horizontal and
151. Id. (citing JURGEN HEINRICH, MEDIENOKONOMIE 24 ff (Vol. 2, 1999));
WOLFGANG SCHULZ ET AL., PERSPEKTIVEN DER GEWAHRLEISTUNG FREIER OFFENTLICHER
KOMMUNIKATION 107ff (2002). Heinrich references Ronald Coase's 1974 essay, The
Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 384
(1974), but suggests that the two marketplaces are not co-extensive, or even
substantially similar. Traditional economic categories such as use-value and trade-
value do not fully capture the value of an idea or a media production in creating a
public sphere, contributing to diversity of opinion, and (hopefully) enabling a
search for truth and shared social values. HEINRICH, supra, at 46. Heinrich also
suggests that viewer sovereignty is undermined by the fact that advertisers are
more important customers for the broadcasting enterprise than are viewers, and it
is the advertisers - rather than viewers or journalists - who determine the
breadth and targets of any given programming. Id. at 44. Schulz, Held and Kops,
on the other hand, start with the "methodological individualism" of Hayek's ROAD
TO SERFDOM, and the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith, and focus more on market
failure in the traditional sense, due to the scale of modern broadcasting or
communications services, and the resulting ownership concentration in those
markets. SCHULZ ET. AL., supra, at 107, 114-15 ("the model of atomized competition
assumes many individual offerors and offerees..
152. 119 BverfGE at 215-16, 219-20.
153. Id. at 215-16.
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vertical integration in the media markets marches on. The
production and transmission of broadcast programming is often
just a link in a multi-media production and marketing chain.
1 4
Given these perceived defects in the commercial broadcasting
marketplace, the Constitutional Court returns to the quid pro quo
posited in its earlier decisions: The failure of private markets to
provide the full "diversity of information, experience, values and
behaviors in society" is only acceptable when the legislature
provides for an adequately financed and politically insulated public
broadcasting information and opinion service.
155
F. Reaffirmation of Broadcasting Freedom in a "Dual
Broadcasting" Landscape
In recognizing the status quo, that its previous decisions had
taken hold and that private and public broadcasters were existing
(or in short order were going to exist) side by side, the
Constitutional Court's Fourth Decision acknowledged for the first
time what it called a "dual broadcasting order" (duale
Rundfunkordnung), a system in which public non-commercial
providers and commercial broadcasters coexisted.1 56 Even as it
moved into this terra incognita, however, the Court restated its
previous rulings, tying the constitutional guarantee of "freedom of
reporting by broadcast" to broadcasting's central role in a modern
democracy: "Broadcasting freedom serves the same purpose as the
other guarantees of Article 5 paragraph 1: it protects free individual
and public opinion-building." 157
Before the Court could resolve how these concepts related to
the new mixed landscape, it had to address whether a constitutional
category for broadcasting separate and apart from general speech
154. Id. 216-17 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 218 ("[O]nly when public-law broadcasting is successful at this task
[fulfilling its 'classic mission' of opinion- and will-building], and can survive in the
journalistic competition with private broadcasters, is the dual system in its present
form, in which less strict demands are placed on privately financed programs than
on the public-law programming, consistent with Article 5.").
156. 73 BVerfGE at 118. The first words of the first of the Court's headnotes
announce this new order: "In the dual order of broadcasting, as it is presently
found in the majority of German States on the basis of their media laws, the basic
provision of information and opinion is the province of the public-law broadcasters
157. Id. at 152.
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rights was still necessary and useful in a multi-channel world,
indeed whether a distinction between broadcasting and the press
was still lawful. The proliferation of new broadcasters arguably
undercut the rationale that a frequency shortage (Frequenzmangel) or
"special situation" (Sondersituation) required legislative action to
preserve broadcasting freedom. 158 The opening paragraphs of the
Court's Fourth Decision squarely addressed this issue:
In [the Court's early broadcasting] Decisions, the Court accorded
importance to the "special situation" of broadcasting in
comparison with that of the press. The "special situation" arose
from the scarcity of available frequencies and the extraordinarily
high financial investment required for the production of broadcast
programs. This situation has not disappeared in recent years; it
has however changed. 159
Because the Constitutional Court regularly considers the
"concrete factual situation of [contemporary] life" in its application
of constitutional standards to an evolving society, 160 the Court
examined the factual particulars of the then-current situation: (1) it
acknowledged the existence of the "new media," cable and satellite
television, but noted that there are still substantial segments of
society which obtained their broadcast signal over "terrestrial
frequencies," and that there remained a shortage of such
frequencies; (2) it noted that an extraordinary high investment
remained a barrier to entry, regardless of the technology chosen; not
everyone who wanted to broadcast could do so; and (3) it worried
about the effect of a new "European broadcast market" (brought on
by satellite technology) on the constitutionally required balance in
domestic programming.161
Against this background, the Constitutional Court recast
broadcasting's special situation in terms of market failure,162 and
also of the inherent "ubiquity, actuality, and suggestivity" of the
medium, 163 thus effectively positioning broadcast freedom for the
158. Witternan, supra note 2, at 156-57.
159. 73 BVerfGE at 121.
160. Id. at 154.
161. Id. at 121-24, 154-55.
162. 73 BVerfGE at 118 passim; see also preceding section.
163. 90 BVerfGE at 87; 114 BVerfGE at 387-88 ("Breitenwirkung, Aktualitdt und
Suggestivkraft"). This argument was in the air and implicit in the Court's first
decisions. See also Witteman, supra note 2, at 174 (citing early expressions of
broadcasting's unique immediacy at 31 BVerfGE at 338 (dissent), and 57 BVerfGE at
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information age. The Court did three things to move the process
along. It articulated the quid pro quo for the dismantling of public
service broadcasting's monopoly ("If the legislature decides for a
dual system, then it must secure all the prerequisites for the delivery
of [the basic service] in every regard, including financial."164); it
defined more closely what "basic service" on the public-law track
was to look like (the Court christened this service Grundversorgung,
as discussed in the next section); and it set out minimum parameters
for German broadcasting as a whole, including both its public and
private "pillars." This "dual system"has to satisfy these criteria:
* it has to deliver a total package of domestic
programming that corresponds in an essential way to
the existing diversity in German society;
* it has to be free from control by any person, entity,
or collection of private parties or social groups; and
" it has to promote the ability of all relevant social
groups to express themselves through the
broadcasting medium. 65
As in past decisions, the Fourth Decision gave the State
legislatures discretion to decide how these criteria are to be met.
The legislature can choose to impose an "internally pluralistic"
governance structure ("'binnenpluralistische' Struktur der
Veranstalter") on the broadcasting entities, in which the influence of
the socially relevant groups is felt internally, through the
broadcasting council, board of directors or other organ of the
broadcasting entity.166 Alternatively, the legislature could choose a
more market-oriented "externally pluralistic" model, which
achieves diversity though a variety of different broadcasting
entities.167 In either case, the lawgiver retained the duty to provide a
legal structure insuring diversity and balance. 168 As we will see, the
system that emerged over time was one that used the internally
320.
164. 87 BVerfGE at 199 (citing 73 BVerfGE at 158; 83 BVerfGE at 298.
165. 73 BverfGE at 153.
166. Id. at 153.
167. Id at 152.
168. Id. Although to American eyes the Court's Fourth Decision seems a ringing
endorsement of the primacy of public service broadcasting, some German
commentators saw in it the final opening of the floodgates to forces favoring
privatization, were subjecting public television to death by a thousand cuts. See,
e.g., Hoffmann-Riem, Rundfinkrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht, supra note 59.
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pluralistic model for public broadcasting, and relied on a regulated
market competition (external pluralism) to produce diversity in the
commercial sector.
In its Fifth Decision, the Court expanded on the notion of a dual
broadcast system, positing a "competition" between public and
private law broadcasters, through which diversity of opinion as a
whole would be strengthened. 169 The Court, however, made clear
that it meant a journalistic competition, a competition of information
and opinion, rather than a market competition. The Court rejected
as irrelevant the state's argument that its broadcasting law was
merely an attempt to create equal market chances for private
broadcasters, stating that "market chances belong to the realm of
economics, not of freedom of opinion." 170
In other words, when it comes to a collision of economic and
speech freedoms, speech freedom wins.171 The Court thus implicitly
rejects the concept that a free economic marketplace will produce a
free speech and information marketplace, and that economic
enforcement tools such as antitrust laws can alone create or protect a
diverse information offering. At best, antitrust enforcement is seen
as supplemental to the ex ante provisions of a positive broadcasting
order in guarding against one-sided opinion-making power in
broadcasting.172
The state legislatures responded to the Court's admonishments
by creating and ratifying first an Inter-State Treaty for Media in
1987, and then the Inter-State Treaty for Broadcasting in 1991.173
Both provided for the continued existence of public law television,
as well as the licensing of private broadcasters - not by a state
169. 74 BVerfGE at 333.
170. Id at 335 ("Marktchancen kdnnen eine Frage wirtschaftlicher, nicht aber der
Meinungsfreiheit sein.").
171. The Court's September 2007 decision called for an "uncoupling" of public
broadcasting from the economic market ("Abkoppelung vom 6konomischen Markt").
119 BVerfGE 181, passim; see also infra text accompanying note 215.
172. 73 BVerfGE at 173-74 (stating that despite availability of ex post facto anti-
competitive enforcement, legislature remains responsible for ex ante prevention of
dominant opinion power or Meinungsmacht by any commercial operator or group
of same); see also discussion below in section 111(J) regarding antitrust enforcement
and related topics.
173. See Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25. This Treaty was preceded by the Inter-
State Treaty for Media (Medienstaatsvertrag zur Neuordnung des Rundfunkwesens),
which remained in effect from 1987 until 1991 when a new treaty was required to
incorporate broadcasting in the former East Germany.
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agency but by an independent administrative board which was an
internally pluralistic public law entity much like the public-law
broadcasters themselves.174 Although the Court has talked tough
about the continuing "trustee" responsibilities of private
broadcasters, the regulation of private broadcasters has in fact
proven to be rather light, except in the antitrust area where the
German authorities have been more rigorous. 175 The result is a
"dual system in which public-law and private programmers
compete with one another," although operating with different
agendas and goals.176
G. An Existence Guarantee for Public Broadcasting - the
Allocation to Public Law Stations of the Duty to Provide a
Basic Information Service
In its Fourth Decision, the Constitutional Court for the first
time used a term that would echo down through its succeeding
broadcast decisions: Grundversorgung, translated here as "the basic
provision of information and opinion" or "basic information
service," a function the Court assigned to public broadcasters as a
constitutional mandate under Article 5 of the Basic Law:
In this [dual] system, the basic provision of information and
opinion is the unavoidable concern of public-law broadcasting
institutions, which are in a position to provide this service because
174. Supra notes 19 and 27. See also infra discussion of regulation of commercial
broadcasters by Independent Media Authorities in section III(I).
175. Id.; see also infra discussion in section III(J) regarding application of antitrust
law (Kartellrecht) to broadcasting.
176. 83 BVerfGE at 316; see also HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 17, at 315:
([The] dual broadcasting system builds on the different structures of
private market-driven broadcasting on the one hand and public law
broadcasting on the other. The combination of these two worlds
promotes broadcasting freedom, in that these structures anchor different
program orientations and compensate for the disadvantages of one
system with the advantages of the other. (Some refer to this as the idea of
structural diversification). The most important structural difference is
that between market-orientation (Privatwirtschaftlichkeit) and community-
orientation (Gemeinwirtschaftlichkeit). These columns compete with each
other, but this is a journalistic and not an economic competition.
Id. at Thesis 2, translated and edited by the author; see also 114 BVerfGE at 387-88
("In the dual order, with its juxtaposition of public-law and private-market
broadcasting, broadcasting freedom is served, in that differently structured
broadcasting producers make possible different program orientations which as a
whole contribute to the breadth and diversity of the program offering.").
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their terrestrial programs reach almost the entire population, and
because they are not reliant in the way private broadcasters are on
high ratings, and can thus provide a comprehensive program
offering3 77
German legal scholars trace the use of Grundversorgung to a
1975 treatise on television and radio, which used the term as an
amalgam of Basic Law principles of democracy and social state, and
imagined a sort of continual broadcasting program, available to all
citizens, constantly measuring social conditions against the
mandates and goals set out in the Basic Law.178 In intervening years,
the term has been given different accents by different commentators.
Some saw it as referring to a temporary task of the public law
stations during the transition to an externally pluralistic
broadcasting market, lasting only until cable television or satellite
technologies provided a sufficiently large number of frequencies to
"establish that diversity in private broadcasting necessary to make
effective the principles of plurality and equal access"
(Chancengerechtigkeit).179 Others saw it as continuing even in an
externally pluralistic market, as a "Kontrastprogramm," offering a
cultured and refined alternative to the mass programming of the
private stations.180 Since its adoption in 1986, the German Court has
portrayed Grundversorgung as an essential input into the process of
"formation of opinion and political will," as well as the creation of a
national cultural identity. 181 For example, in the Fourth Decision:
The task [of Grundversorgung or a basic information service]
includes the essential functions for broadcasting within a
democratic order as well as for the cultural life of the country. As
privately produced and European programming becomes
177. 73 BVerfGE at 157.
178. Christian Starck, "Grundversorgung" und Rundfunkfreiheit 51 NJW 3527 (1992)
(citing HERMANN, FERNSEHEN UND HORFUNK IN DER VERFASSUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND 322, 332, 346, 378 (1975)).
179. Starck, supra note 178 (citing H. H. KLEIN, supra note 79, at 79 et seq.).
180. Id. (citing and quoting BULLINGER, KOMMUNIKATIONSFREIHEIT IM
STRUKTURWANDEL DER TELEKOMMUNIKATION 94 et seq. (1980)).
181. 73 BVerfGE at 157-58. Because so many strands of meaning are united in
the word Grundversorgung, it is a difficult word to translate. On one level it means
basic supply, or basic service. But, as the Court points out, this does not mean
minimal supply or service. It is more in the sense of an essential supply or service,
and of an undistorted neutral clearinghouse. For present purposes, then, it should
be understood as referring to an essential and neutral clearinghouse and supplier of
a full spectrum of information and opinions.
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widespread, it is important to guarantee fulfillment of... a
cultural responsibility along with broadcasting's role for opinion-
and political will-building, entertainment, and ongoing news
coverage.
182
The Fifth Decision added three essential attributes for this
essential information and opinion service (a distillate of the
requirements for the overall dual broadcasting system, as described
above): (1) programs for all in the audience; (2) that "inform in a
comprehensive way"; and (3) "protect diversity of opinion." 18 3
The Court has also defined Grundversorgung in terms of what it
is not: it is not a minimum provision of information and opinion, nor
is it a free-pass to commercial broadcasters, absolving them of any
duties to cover a diversity of opinion and viewpoints, or a limit to
which public broadcasters are confined; nor should it be construed
as a "dividing line between the duties of public and private law
broadcasters, in such a way that there are programs or broadcasts
that belong to the basic service, and thus to public broadcasters, and
everything else is the province of private broadcasters"18 4; nor does
it occur "only in news programs, political commentary, or series
about the problems of the past, the present or the future, but also in
radio and television plays, musical offerings, and entertainment
broadcasts."18S
While not a free pass to private broadcasters, the
constitutionally required information and opinion service is
primarily identified with public law broadcasters, and indeed has
become a guarantee of the existence and development of public law
broadcasting. The Fourth Decision held that "in view of its function
as a basic information and opinion service," public law broadcasting
had to be guaranteed "the technical, organizational, personnel, and
financial requirements" necessary to provide that service.1 8 6 The
182. Id.
183. 74 BVerfGE at 325.
184. Id. at 325-26. The Court's Seventh Decision elaborated further: "Basic
service means neither a minimum provision [of information and opinion] nor is it
limited to the informational and educational part of the program." 87 BVerfGE at
199 (citing 73 BVerfGE at 158 (role of broadcasting in building of public opinion
and political will)), 74 BVerfGE at 324-25 (emphasizing importance of balanced
diversity).
185. 73 BVerfGE at 152.
186. 73 BVerfGE at 158; see also 74 BVerfGE at 324-25 (assigning the "ineluctable
'basic service'" to public law stations).
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Sixth Decision found this "general existence and development
guarantee" (allgemeine Bestands- und Entwicklungsgarantie) for public
television to be "constitutionally mandated, as long as private
broadcasters are incapable of fulfilling the classic role and duty of
broadcasting." 87 Some commentators see the "as long as" clause as
surplussage because "no one seriously suggests subjecting private
broadcasters to stricter requirements, [as] such measures could well
mean the demise and disappearance of private broadcasters."
188
The Court noted that the term "Grundversorgung is tied solely to
the function that broadcasting plays in the communication process
protected by Article 5," and that the role of public broadcasters is
therefore "substantively and temporally open and dynamic."
189
This definitional openness has particular ramifications for the future
of broadcasting freedom in the online world, as discussed in section
III(K).
The definition of Grundversorgung has also become implicated
in proceedings instituted by the European Commission examining
whether Germany's broadcast fees amount to an unfair and illegal
subsidy of German public broadcasting. Although beyond the
scope of this article, the issue becomes whether the fees are spent on
bona fide public services, making them exempt from European
Community rules against government subsidies that unfairly
advantage one country's industries over another's.1 90
187. 83 BVerfGE at 299 ("Gegen eine solche Garantie . . . bestehen keine
verfassungsrechtlichen Bedenken. Sie ist im Gegenteil im dualen Rundfunksystem
verfassungsrechtlich geboten, solange die privaten Veranstalter den klassischen
Rundfunkauftrag ... nicht in vollem Umfang erfrfllen."). Parties to the fifth Decision
had bandied about the concept of an existence guarantee - ARD in favor; the
Federal Government and the State of Baden-Wurtenburg against, see 74 BVerfGE at
311, 312, 316 - but the Sixth Decision marked the first time the Court had adopted
the phrase as its own. See also September 2007 Decision, 119 BVerfGE at 218 et seq.
(tying the "existence and development guarantee" to a reliable, de-politicized
funding stream).
188. MAUNz-DUERIG-HERZOG, GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 79, Art. 5 (2005)
("Constitutionally, there are two ways in which the relationship between public
and private broadcasters can be structured: either the [duty of providing a] basic
information and opinion service remains with the former, or the latter are subject to
stricter requirements."). The author of this part of the KOMMENTAR is the Hon.
Roman Herzog, who signed the Sixth Decision as a Justice of the Constitutional
Court in 1991.
189. 83 BverfGE at 299 (emphasis added).
190. See, e.g., European Commission, Decision of 24 April 2007, supra note 18,
216-18. The Commission is the administrative arm for the European Community
or Union; the nomenclature of Community and Union is not always consistent, and
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H. Financing of Public Law Television
From the beginning, the Constitutional Court realized that
public broadcasting would need a sound financial footing, insulated
from both political manipulation and market pressures, in order to
fulfill its constitutional mandate. To this end, the Court has favored
financing through listener/viewer fees:
The financing of public-law broadcasting through fee-revenue
should enable its thorough uncoupling from the economic
marketplace, and thereby assure that the [public service]
broadcasting program orients itself towards journalistic [and not
economic] goals, particularly the goal of diversity, independent
from viewer quotas and advertising contracts. 191
"Financing primarily from advertising," the Court has held, would
not be suitable to the task of public broadcasting because it is
precisely advertising that creates program- and diversity-limiting
pressure, as one can observe in commercial television. 192 The Court
is careful to say that it does not fully exclude advertising revenue
from the mix of financing (indeed, the two largest public networks
do have advertising during a short window every evening), and
notes that multiple sources of revenue can contribute to the
independence of the public broadcaster from any specific source of
revenue. Still, "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to
allow advertising in public broadcasting," and indeed there is a
growing chorus calling for a complete ban on advertising in German
public television.193
With its second Bavarian Fee Decision, the Court turned its
depends also in part on whether the Treaty of Lisbon is finally adopted by the
Europeans, all topics beyond the scope of this article.
191. 119 BVerfGE at 219.
192. 87 BVerfGE at 199.
193. Id. at 200. The Court ruled that the legislature can either limit advertising as
to time, duration or frequency, or eliminate it altogether "in favor of program
planning that is free from ratings or popularity concerns, and orients itself toward
the recipient who is solely interested in programming selected from a journalistic
[as opposed to a standpoint." Id. Voices from across the political spectrum -
including the leftist Linkspartei, the centrist FDP, and the social-democratic SPD -
agree that advertising-free public broadcasting would "increase the credibility of
the public law broadcaster and allow it to more clearly distinguish itself from
commercial broadcasters." Auch die FDP fordert Werbeverzicht von ARD und
ZDF, 2008:4 epd medien [epd] at 8-9 (January 16, 2008) (EPD is the acronym for
Evangelische Presse Dienst or Lutheran Press Service, which publishes a weekly
newsletter on media).
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attention from sources to permissible uses of the broadcast fee. The
State of Bavaria's Independent Media Authority had authorized a
surcharge on all cable television subscribers in order to subsidize
small regional programs. The complainant (Beschwerdefihrer) before
the Constitutional Court alleged that his broadcasting fees were
being misused to subsidize privately produced local and regional
programming. The Court agreed that insufficient mechanisms were
in place to insure that publicly funded programming was indeed
public service broadcasting.194
Once it clarified the source and purposes of public fee
financing, the obvious next question was amount. The Court has
admitted that "an exact determination of what is financially
necessary to guarantee the function of public broadcasting causes
[it] substantial difficulty." 195 The best the Court could do was to
hold that total revenues must be enough to fund a constitutionally
sufficient information and opinion service.196
These threshold principles were subsequently incorporated as
amendments to the Inter-State Treaty on Broadcasting.
Public service broadcasting shall be funded in such a way that it is
able to meet its constitutional and statutory responsibilities; in
particular the funding shall be sufficient to safeguard the
existence and development of public service broadcasting. 197
Public service broadcasting shall finance itself through television
and radio license fees, income from television and radio
advertising and other income; the main source of income shall be
the television and radio license fee.' 98
194. 114 BVerfGE at 392ff (Bavarian Media Law failed to insure "that programs
of the subsidized producers .. .would express the existing diversity of opinion in
an evenly weighted manner."). The Court's primary holding was that the
mandatory fee worked an unconstitutional intrusion on the subscriber's freedom of
contract under Article 2 of the Basic Law, one that was not justified under Article 5
broadcasting freedom in light of the absence of any requirement for balanced or
diverse programming for those who obtained the subsidies, or internally pluralistic
governance obligation, or safeguards against dominant opinion power in the small
markets where the beneficiaries of this program operated. See further discussion of
this case at note 66 supra and accompanying text.
195. 73 BVerfGE at 203.
196. The Constitutional Court here recapitulated its jurisprudence of
Grundversorgung within the dual broadcasting system. 87 BVerfGE at 197-204; for
Grundversorgung, see discussion in section III(G) above.
197. Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, Article 12(1).
198. Id., Article 13(1).
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The thorniest questions regarding financing are who decides
the amount of the fee, and how the procedure for such a decision is
shaped. In its Seventh Decision, the Court held that the situation-
specific decisions as to what a constitutionally adequate basic
information service would entail, and what level of revenue would
be necessary for such a service, lie in the first instance with the
broadcasting entity itself, although this did not mean a blank check
for the public broadcaster. 199 After the broadcaster determined its
needs according to what it believed "necessary in terms of
[programming] content and form, as well as time and scope" to
provide a basic information and opinion service, the state legislature
would act as a check and balance, determining what level of
payment the viewing public could reasonably tolerate.200
The Eighth Decision found that this process still left too much
discretion in the hands of the legislature. In the Cable Penny case, a
new element was thus introduced into the process: a non-state panel
of experts inserted between the broadcasting institutions and the
state legislatures called the KEF, or Commission on the
Determination of the Financial Need of Broadcasters. 201 The crux of
the Eighth Decision was about how to make this panel into an
effective, neutral, and politically insulated arbiter of the financial
needs of the public broadcasting institutions.
While ultimately rejecting the challenge to the "cable penny"
part of the broadcasting fee,202 the Court nevertheless found that the
199. While upholding the public broadcaster's primacy in defining its own
needs, the court ultimately ruled against this public broadcaster, as it had failed to
convince the court of its rationale for further revenue. 87 BVerfGE at 182-83, 204.
200. The court noted that broadcasting entities have the same "self-assertive and
expansion interests" as all institutions do. Id. at 201-02. Still, the broadcaster's
programming autonomy, "directed against any utilization [cooptation] of
broadcasting for non-journalistic goals," must be protected. Id. at 201. Essentially,
the court requires the legislator to balance the programming autonomy of the
broadcasting entity against the financial interests of the fee-paying viewer.
201. Bodies bearing the designation of KEF (Kommission zur Ermittlung des
Finanzbedarfs der Rundfunkanstalten) and vaguely dedicated to the task of arriving at
an appropriate broadcast fee had been on the scene since at least 1975 but were
apparently so insignificant in their ultimate effect that they were not even
mentioned in the court's Seventh Decision. Compare 90 BVerfGE at 63.
202. 90 BVerfGE at 105-06 (finding that the cable-related part of the fee was
sufficiently related to the basic public purposes for which it was imposed, even if
the "testing of new transmission techniques and program forms" could create an
opening for private television). See also supra note 65 and accompanying text. The
court's second Bavarian Fee Decision, described above, rejected as unconstitutional
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existing process did not pass constitutional muster because it was
overly exposed to political pressure and insufficiently bound by
objective criteria.2 3 The Court set some markers for future fee
decisions: (1) "General media-political decisions must be separated
from decisions as to the broadcasting fee" 204; (2) a definition of what
specifically is required for the fulfillment of public broadcasting's
function under current law cannot be imposed from the outside, but
is properly within the discretion of broadcasters 205; and (3) the
procedure must protect the economic interests of viewers.
20 6
These criteria amounted to a "procedural protection of
constitutional rights" ("prozeduraler Grundrechtschutz") in
broadcasting.207 Although the state legislators (i.e., the Conference
of Minister-Presidents) had rested their fee decision on the findings
of a form of KEF, the Court found this KEF was little more than an
instrumentality of the legislators.208  The States were free to
disregard the KEF's suggestions, and make a "purely political"
decision as to what the fee should be.209 The entire process lacked
the "high grade of objectivity... [and] sufficiently definite
substantive criteria for the fee decision." 21 In particular, the law
failed to provide any specifics for the "composition, tasks, and
procedures" of the KEF, and failed to give the KEF's
a similar surcharge allegedly benefitting private broadcasters, although in the
second Bavarian Fee Decision case the surcharge was paid directly to the private
broadcasters. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
203. 90 BVerfGE at 96 ("[D]en Grundrechtschutz in den Prozefi der
Entscheidungsfindung vorzuverlagern." ["Constitutional protection must be built into
the process of decisionmaking."]), 98 ("The fee decision process ... was not subject
to sufficiently specific substantive or procedural limitations."). Notwithstanding
these frailties, the court allowed the fee to stand because it was time limited, and
striking it might have had a more far-reaching, negative affect on Grundversorgung.
Id. at 105.
204. Id. at 94.
205. Id. at 95.
206. Id. at 94-95.
207. Id. at 96-97.
208. Id. at 98 ("blofles Hilfsinstrument").
209. Id. at 98, 100.
210. Id. Although factors such as "competitiveness" of public television (a
strange term, given the court's critique of the marketplace), its new technological
possibilities, its historic and current expenditures, as well as its current level of
advertising revenue were all properly embedded in the law, the process still
needed an objective arbiter. Id. at 99.
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recommendations any weight in the final process. 211 As a result of
the Eighth Decision, the German States adopted amendments to the
Inter-State Broadcasting Treaty that more clearly define the fee
setting mechanism and the role of the KEF. 212
The issue of the tripartite relationship between public
broadcaster, the KEF, and the State legislature, however, raised its
head again in the September 2007 Decision.21 3 Again, the Court was
stalwart in its defense of a clear, objective and neutral process for
setting a fee that would provide sufficient revenue for effective
public-service broadcasting without over-taxing broadcast
recipients.
In this politically charged case, both SPD and CDU joined forces
to defend the state legislators' Conference of Minister-Presidents
against allegations by the public broadcasters that the process had
been overly politicized.214 The Court sided with the broadcasters,
and found that the Minister-Presidents had exceeded their authority
by setting the fee at .28 E cents below the KEF's recommendation.
Because the Minister-Presidents (and the State legislatures that
ratified their agreement) had failed to go beyond platitudes and
generalities in justifying this downward departure from the KEF
recommendation, the Court rejected the legislature's justifications as
irrelevant, improper, and/or false. 215  The Court agreed that
211. The court essentially held that the fee-setting procedure could only be
constitutionalized if "the tasks, composition, and procedure of the body [were]
legally regulated and the independence of its members legally secured." Id. at 100-
03.
212. The process now occurs in three steps: First, the broadcasting institution
itself determines its need and conveys that to the KEF. Inter-State Broadcasting
Treaty, supra note 25 at art. 14(1). Then the KEF analyzes the need pursuant to
clearly stated criteria and makes a recommendation to the legislature. Id. And
finally, the legislature votes to accept or reject the recommendation, but solely on
the basis of whether the proposed fee represents a reasonable burden for the
viewer. Id.
213. 119 BVerfGE at 182 (The "procedure for setting a broadcasting fee was
reformed and placed on a legal basis by the [Eighth Decision and] Judgment of the
Federal Constitutional Court on February 22, 1994.").
214. Id. at 202-03.
215. The court underlined its point that politics, rather than a neutral assessment
of need, drove the legislators' decision, by providing a detailed history of the
negotiations (at least those on the public record) between the political parties and
between the political parties and the broadcasters with regard to the amount of the
fee. In these discussions, commercial broadcasters presented themselves as if on
the brink of insolvency while demanding a more restricted role for their public-law
colleagues, and politicians echoed these assertions. Id. at 186 (" [I]t does not seem to
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legislators could consider a "generally stressed economic situation,"
but only if its impact on ratepayers were in some way quantified
(by, for example, consideration of factors such as average income
and expenses of ratepayers, or necessity of across-the-board cuts in
public services).216 Other factors, such as potential savings through
voluntary measures by the public broadcasters and a switch to
digital technology, had either already been considered by KEF or
were unfounded.217
The Court's deepest concern, however, was directed at the
Minister-Presidents' coded assertion that increased competition in
the media sector - "current developments in the dual broadcasting
system and in the competition among media" - justified a
reduction in the fee. "This rationale does not describe how current
developments ... justify a departure from the KEF's assessment of
need, and whether media politics play a role in this assessment."218
Thus, the Court's bottom line: If the legislature wants to reform or
change the structure of competition between public service and
commercial broadcasters, it has to do so by separate legislation that
stands on its own, and not by using the broadcast fee as a means to
play media politics. 219
Reaction to the September 2007 Decision ranged from wonder
at the Court's consistency over forty-five years of broadcast
jurisprudence to skepticism at a perceived denial of reality.220 This
make sense to raise [public broadcasting] fees at a time when private broadcast
producers find themselves in the worst economic crisis of the post-war era.").
216. Id. at 231.
217. The court was especially acid in its dismissal of the legislators' claim that
changes in exemptions to the broadcast fee would bring more revenue to the
stations, when in fact a KEF study had shown just the opposite. Id. at 235-36. See
generally id. at 230-37.
218. Id. at 239.
219. Id. at 239-40 ("The members of State governments and parliaments are in
no way constitutionally hindered from advocating media-political structure
reforms and proceeding with their legal or other implementation; nor does
broadcasting freedom hinder them from considering the subsequent financial
consequences of such reforms. It is however incompatible with broadcasting
freedom to consider such consequences of planned structural reform in the fee
decision itself, without first passing into law the fundamental framework for such a
reform.").
220. Stephan Ory, Gebuhrenurteil 2.0 - Ein Update aus Karlsruhe, 5 ARCHIV FOR
PRESSERECHT (renamed ZEITSCHRIFT FOR MEDIEN-UND KOMMUNIKATIONSRECHT) (AflP)
401, 404 (2007) (suggesting "a development and existence guarantee for new
content, new formats, new genres, as well as new forms of transmission"; and that,
"even on new transmission paths," public-law entities may have a role in securing
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again reflects the split between social-democratic and market-
oriented views of broadcasting's role in society, a split that runs
through media thinking on both sides of the Atlantic but finds a
flashpoint in the German fee issue.
Historically, there has been a high degree of support among
Germans for public broadcasting, and consequently for the
broadcasting fee that makes it possible (which is not to say that the
average German never grumbles about the amount of the fee).221 In
the early 1970s, 87% of Bavarian electorate voted, in reaction to a
proposal to partially privatize Bavarian television, for a
constitutional amendment which was originally intended to
completely ban commercial broadcasting.222 This broad support is
"free individual- and public-opinion building"). See also infra discussion at Parts
III(K)(2), (3). But see Darnstadt & Hipp, Dreif3ig Jahre zuraick, supra note 28, at 126
(observing that the decision is a step "thirty years back"); Fassbender, Das jaingste
Rundfunkgebiihrenurteil, supra note 77 (observing that Der Spiegel, itself a media
competitor, may not be entirely neutral in its observations).
221. Darnstadt & Hipp, Dreissig Jahre zuraick, supra note 28, at 127. Forty percent
of survey respondents felt that the current E17 fee was "reasonable" ("angemessen"),
while fifty-eight percent felt it was "too high." Id. More tellingly, perhaps, sixty-
three percent of respondents said that they found public television to be "essential"
or "indispensable" ("unverzichtbar"). Id.
222. BAUSCH, RUNDFUNKPOLITIK NACH 1945, supra note 1, at 629-37. Bausch
recounts how a broad-based citizens' coalition, including labor organizations, the
Bavarian Catholic Bishops' Conference, and the Free Democrat and Social
Democrat parties, spoke out against the proposal to allow private broadcasting. A
proposed referendum would have completely banned private broadcasting, but
CSU-head Franz Josef Strauf. reformulated the proposal as it eventually went to the
voters: "Broadcasting will be carried out as a public responsibility and by public-
law carriers." Id. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (recounting that this
formulation has resulted in a system much like that found in other parts of
Germany, where a public-law Independent Media Agency is understood as the
"carrier" of the broadcasting program and in turn licenses that authority to private
broadcasters on a time-limited basis). See also HESSE, supra note 40, at 21-22
(regarding the Bavarian referendum); Sabine Rittner, Staatsfunk oder Kabelkommerz,
30 TENDENZ 30, 30-31 (2004) ("'[Plublic-law carriage' allows for more than public-
law broadcasting." (quoting HESSE, supra note 40, at 21-22)). Rittner recounts how,
in 1972,
the 'State Citizens' Committee for Broadcasting Freedom' collected over a
million signatures for a referendum against the planned change in the
broadcasting law [which would have given political parties and private
interests more influence over Bavarian broadcasting]. Christian Ude [later
mayor of Munich] described the Citizens' Committee's project as a fight
"against the transformation of public-law broadcasting into state
broadcasting, as well as a fight against the imminent privatization of public
broadcasting."
Rittner, supra, at 30-31.
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less remarkable in a European frame, given the near-universality of
public service broadcasting, supported by broadcasting fees,
throughout Europe.22 3
L Commercial Broadcasters: Licensing, (Re)Transmission,
Oversight, and Residual Duties of Balance and Diversity
Given the constitutional commitment to public broadcasting,
indeed the "existence and development guarantee" accorded it by
the Court, the question arose whether there remained any need to
impose public interest obligations on commercial broadcasters. In
the Fourth Decision, and consistently thereafter, the Court's answer
has been that broadcasting freedom applies to public and private
broadcasters alike, i.e., to the system as a whole, and the totality of
available programming.224 How, then, would German lawmakers
regulate private broadcasting to prevent it from overwhelming the
public-law stations and their primary mandate to "serve"
broadcasting freedom?
In the early 1980s, the individual German States enacted a series
of laws to open broadcasting to private investment, while applying
(or at least paying lip-service to) the standards of pluralism and
balanced diversity in the private broadcasting marketplace. It was
one of these laws, the Lower Saxony Broadcasting Law
(Landesrundfunkgesetz or LRG), which the Constitutional Court
addressed in its Fourth Decision. Although the Court characterized
this law as a "transition model," i.e., as a licensing and oversight
scheme for private broadcasters which would only be necessary
until market conditions allowed for full "external pluralism,"225 it
223. See, e.g., BARENDT, supra note 8, at 69-74.
224. 73 BVerfGE at 157 ("[C]onstitutionally guaranteed broadcasting freedom
applies to the entire broadcasting system... [which] must in its totality correspond
to the constitutional requirements within the framework of the possible."). See also
57 BVerfGE at 324; 83 BVerfGE at 296 passim. This follows from the requirement
under article 5 that a "positive order" be established to protect broadcasting as a
forum for the "broadest and most complete" diversity of opinion. 57 BVerfGE at
320; 73 BVerfGE at 163. See also HOFFMANN-RIEM, supra note 17, at 49 passim.
225. 73 BVerfGE at 160 (finding that the law would provide for a "continuous
and ordered development of broadcasting in private hands step-by-step from the
production of a small number of television programs to the condition whereby an
external [market] diversity is maintained over time"). The court here uses the term
"external diversity" ("externe Vielfalt"). Elsewhere it has adopted the term "external
pluralism" ("Aufienpluralismus") to draw the contrast between market-driven
diversity on the one hand and diversity institutionally anchored in the broadcasting
councils and Independent Media Authorities (i.e., internal pluralism or
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seized the opportunity to clarify how the constitutional guarantee of
broadcasting freedom would play out in this new dual broadcasting
world. In an eighty-seven-page, unanimous opinion, the Court
delved in detail into a multitude of licensing and oversight
provisions directed at commercial broadcasters.
The Court generally approved the LRG's regulatory scheme,
which gave to an independent, non-profit, pluralistically constituted
public-law oversight entity - later referred to as a
Landesmedienanstalt or Independent Media Authority - the task of
enforcing regulations designed to insure diversity within the private
marketplace, and to avoid any accretion of what the Court called
dominant opinion power (vorherrschende Meinungsmacht).
226
Even though an adequately functioning public broadcasting
system made it possible for private broadcasters to operate in a
more relaxed regulatory environment,22 7 the Court upheld the
Lower Saxony law requiring that private broadcasters observe
"basic standards of balanced diversity," meaning that all opinions,
especially minority opinions, should "have the possibility" of being
expressed. 228 At the same time, the Court was careful to preserve as
much as possible the operational freedom of commercial
broadcasters, declaring unconstitutional several clauses so
overbroad as to chill the broadcasters' speech.
229
Binnenpluralismus) on the other. See, e.g., 73 BVerfGE at 153; Thomas Vesting,
Fortbestand des Dualen Systems?, 2000 K&R 161, 162 (A legislator has "choice of
models, particularly the combination of public agency and market models, i.e., of
internal vs. external pluralism (as well as mixed forms)."). See also supra notes 21
and 126 and accompanying text.
226. 73 BVerfGE at 165 ("The Lower Saxony Broadcasting Law . . . directs
oversight functions to a legally autonomous organizational entity, independent of
the state. The Independent Media Authority is a legally competent agency of
public law. It exercises its authority within a legal framework .... "). See also supra
note 27 (regarding the role and translation of Landesmedienanstalt as Independent
Media Authority). For more on dominant opinion-making power, see infra Part
IIIJ)(1).
227. 73 BVerfGE at 159 (holding that the constitution does not place the same
high demands on private broadcasters). The Sixth Decision similarly held that
requirements of balance, breadth, and diversity could not place such "high
burdens" on private broadcasters that it would endanger their economic existence.
83 BVerfGE at 317.
228. Id. at 168 (finding that the "Grundstandard" of balanced diversity is difficult
to measure and thus represents only a goal towards which the oversight
commissions should strive, and concluding that the LRG's "concretization" of that
goal or standard was sufficiently specific to pass constitutional muster).
229. For example, the court found that LRG § 15, sentence 3 - requiring that
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The Court has also addressed market entry and licensing
provisions for commercial broadcasters, finding inter alia that some
aspects of the Lower Saxony licensing scheme were insufficiently
free of state control, i.e., that the law left too much discretion in a
state licensing authority. The Court's Fourth Decision in effect told
the legislature to move this discretion away from the state and into
an independent agency (i.e., Independent Media Authorities). 230
Later decisions endorsed this strategy: fact-finding and judgments
related to market entry and licensing would be left to independent,
non-governmental oversight bodies, while the state's discretion and
influence was to be strictly limited in these matters.231
"every program. . . must in itself satisfy the requirements of [balance and
diversity], unless such balance is secured in connection with other programs" -
was unconstitutionally vague. 73 BVerfGE at 163-64. The court noted, "The law
does not state or define when that is the case [that balance is secured through other
programs]. It is not clear how an individual private program producer [or
broadcaster] is supposed to know with sufficient certainty that all or some of the
programs available to a specific listener- or viewer-group provide sufficient balance
for the producer's program." Id. This uncertainty was unconstitutional because it
created a potentially chilling effect on speech. Id. The court pointed to an
analogous law in Schleswig-Holstein that established a presumption of balance when
there were at least four commercial "full-programs" operating alongside the public
service broadcasters, as a possible solution. Id. at 164.
230. 73 BVerfGE at 182-87. See also supra notes 27 and 226 and accompanying
text regarding Independent Media Authorities. The discussion in the Fourth
Decision is quite complicated as it involves two similarly named agencies: the State
Licensing Board (Erlaubnisbehdrde) and the State's Broadcasting Authority
(Landesrundfunkausschujf) (translated here as Independent Media Authority to avoid
confusion). The State Licensing Board was a part of the State bureaucracy; the
Broadcasting Authority (later Media Authority) was an independent body. See
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. The primary problem in the LRG law as
drafted was that it put too much discretion in the State agency and not enough in
the independent agency. LRG, supra note 225 § 5, 4, for instance, was deemed
unconstitutional because it required State Board to determine whether "facts justify
the assumption that petitioner's broadcast activity will violate the law," the kind of
evaluative judgment that should be made by the independent agency and not the
State Board. 73 BVerfGE at 184. "The influence given to the State Licensing Board
on the access of private producers does not exclude the possibility that disfavored
or disagreeable producers will not only be disciplined for their transgressions after
the fact, but will be prevented ex ante from speaking at all." Id.
231. 90 BVerfGE at 89-90 ("[Tihe State parliament may not have any influence on
the content or form of any [particular] broadcast producer's programming beyond
shaping the legal requirements for broadcast diversity."). Thus, any decisions
which touch on commercial program content (such as protection of minors) would
be moved away from the state, i.e., to a non-profit, internally pluralistic public law
body (much like the internally pluralistic governing boards of public broadcasters).
The legislature's role would stop once it has set up the structures for public-service
broadcasting; it would have no influence on the content or form of programming.
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The Sixth Decision affirmed the Court's approach to
commercial broadcasting, ruling on public interest obligations in the
North Rhine Westphalia state broadcasting law that applied to
private-law braodcasters.232  Again the Court held that all
broadcasters shared in the fundamental task of furthering
("serving") individual and public opinion building, independent of
any legislative choice between public and private broadcasting
models, and therefore the notion of "model consistency" (or "model
distinctions," i.e., that commercial broadcasters should have no
public interest obligations placed on them) urged by petitioners was
not applicable. The legislature could mix and match as required to
satisfy the requirements of Article 5.233
Up to this point, we have focused on the application of
constitutional norms at the level of the broadcasting entity -
insulated governance structures and financing for public
broadcasters, and licensing obligations and fairness rules for
commercial broadcasters. These entities were treated as "factors" in
public opinion-building. The Court's focus, however, has also
extended to the medium, i.e., the infrastructure, particularly in cases
where the number of potential broadcasters outstripped the
available frequency or capacity available (frequency shortage
redux234). The Court has in effect extended Article 5 broadcasting
freedom from the actor who speaks to the medium that carries the
speech, echoing the Constitutional Court's oft-repeated formula that
broadcasting is both a "factor" and a "medium" of public opinion-
building.235
Id. at 89.
232. At issue, inter alia, were provisions of that law which required private
broadcasters to "fulfill a public function," to provide "education" and "advice" as
well as entertainment, to cover public events, and - similar to our Fairness
Doctrine - to cover "controversial themes of general significance" and to give
room in its programming for the expression of a "diversity of opinions as broad
and complete as possible." 83 BVerfGE at 249 (citing §§ 11 and 12(3) of the North
Rhine Westphalia law). See also id. at 278-79 (relating to the CDU/CSU and FDP
challenge).
233. Id. at 316 ("The shaping freedom of the legislator does not exhaust itself in
the choice of one model over another, with some concomitant mandate of
consistency. To the contrary, the legislator can combine models as he sees fit, as
long as he does not lose sight of the goals of Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic
Law.").
234. Compare supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (relating to the alleged
disappearance of the frequency shortage, or broadcasting's "special situation").
235. See, e.g., 83 BVerfGE at 296 (citing 12 BVerfGE at 260).
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The extension of Article 5 protections to infrastructure dates
back to the First Decision in 1961, in which the Court declared that
transmission facilities "serve" broadcast freedom, and established a
primacy of state broadcasting law over federal telecommunications
law.236  In the Fourth Decision, the Court empowered the
Independent Media Authority to allow cable retransmission of
foreign programming, noting that such carriage may even have
been required by the guarantee, derived from Article 5 information
freedom, of access to "generally accessible" programming otherwise
receivable by antennae.237 In the Sixth Decision, the Court decided
that Article 5 broadcasting freedom required the allocation of
transmission capacity (primarily broadcast frequencies) between
public and private broadcasters be defined by clearly detailed law
and procedure, leaving little discretion in the hands of government
officials.23
8
Given the constitutional primacy of broadcasting content, the
network owner becomes a sort of common carrier in a
retransmission system the Germans sometimes characterize as
"must-carry." 239 The Independent Media Authority, rather than the
cable operator, would choose among program providers vying for
scarce transmission capacity based on a number of factors, including
how pluralistically constituted the program provider was, and how
much influence editorial staff had on program decisions (i.e.,
236. 12 BVerfGE at 227 passim. See also supra discussion at notes 31-37 and
accompanying text; infra discussion at Parts III(K)(3)(c), (d).
237. 73 BVerfGE at 197-98. Thus, retransmission may be required by both the
broadcasting and information freedom clauses. See BECK'SCHER KOMMENTAR ZUM
RUNDFUNKRECHT 914, 18 passim (Werner Hahn & Thomas Vesting eds., 2008)
[hereinafter BECK'SCHER KOMMENTAR] (Karola Wille et al., commenting on § 52)
("The retransmission of broadcasting programs, pursuant to dominant opinion, is
informed by the fundamental right of information freedom in Article 5, paragraph
1, sentence 1 of the Basic Law. Generally accessible sources of information...
include all domestic and foreign broadcasting programs, the reception of which is
possible in the Federal Republic of Germany."). In general, the court found the
retransmission requirements at issue to be constitutional, although it notes that the
legislature should be supplemented to require relevant, complete, and truthful
information to be transmitted, as is required for domestic programming, and to
provide a right of rebuttal. 73 BVerfGE at 199, 200. Finally, the court noted that the
Lower Saxony legislature should address the possibility, as other States had, that
German broadcasters might attempt to avoid the domestic requirements for balance
and diversity by presenting themselves as foreign broadcasters. Id. at 203.
238. 83 BVerfGE at 322-24.
239. See infra notes 350-52 and accompanying text for diverse uses of this term in
the United States and Germany.
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whether programming decisions were made on marketing or
journalistic bases).240  The placement of such discretion in an
independent non-state agency was constitutionally permissible,
indeed required, when competing claims of commercial
broadcasters to the same transmission facilities could not be
mediated.241 Even conservative critics acknowledge this
constitutionalizing of transmission capacity:
The legislator is not free in the shaping of the broadcast order.
This order can "only serve the securing of broadcasting freedom."
It especially may not be directed solely from an economic point of
view .... [T]he decision over access to transmission paths...
must serve solely the shaping of the broadcast order within its
constitutional parameters.
242
Until recently, the powers of the Independent Media
Authorities to determine cable carriage have been well nigh plenary,
extending in some cases to the totality of cable channels available.
As one lower court said, approving such a plan,
The legislature's decision, that the Independent Media Authority
is better suited than the cable operator to select the programs to be
carried on the cable system in order to affect the [constitutionally]
required program diversity, is not problematic. 243
240. 83 BVerfGE at 247, 318 passim. See also id. at 319 (noting that such statutes
were aimed at creating "internal broadcasting freedom" ["innere Rundfunkfreiheit"]).
241. Id. at 319-21 (concluding that such a "positive order" was preferable to
allowing transmission capacity to be assigned according to the "free play of
[market] forces" ["freie(s) Spiel der Krdfte"I (citing 57 BVerfGE at 327)).
242. CRISTOPH ENGEL, KABELFERNSEHEN 24-25 (1990) (quoting 74 BVerfGE at 334).
Engel believes, however, that the must-carry and retransmission rules violate this
objective constitutional order because transmission decisions are in fact often made
not on pristine constitutional grounds but rather on a calculation of what programs
bring more economic benefit to the individual State (Standortpolitik - see supra note
76 and accompanying text) and that the objective order gives short shrift to the
subjective constitutional rights of program producers, network operators, and
individual recipients. ENGEL, supra, at 21-27.
243. Oberverwaltungsgericht Bremen [OVG] [Court of Appeals] Sept. 14, 1999,
2000 K&R 43, 45 (rejecting challenges to the Bremen Independent Media
Authority's retransmission plan covering the totality of the operator's channel
capacity). The lower court noted that the "capacity of cable systems are regularly
insufficient" to carry all available cable programming. Id. In this case, there were
forty-one broadcast programmers who had applied to have their programs carried,
and only thirty-three channels available. The Media Authority devised a plan
whereby ten of the programs would share time on several of the channels,
vindicating the "subjective broadcast freedom of these producers" who would
otherwise not be carried. Id. at 44. The cable operator apparently asserted no
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The German Court's constitutionalization of transmission facilities
occurred, for the most part, prior to the 1994 Post Reform II (which
legislatively and constitutionally authorized the privatization of
telecommunications facilities).244 Post Reform II fundamentally
changed facts on the ground. The Court's September 2007 Decision
acknowledged the problematic context which resulted: Private
telecommunications companies replaced public entities in many
instances as carriers of Germany's broadcasting platform.245 The
September 2007 Decision did little to resolve the tensions between
private market economics and constitutionally protected
subjective speech or broadcasting rights of its own, as is common in the United
States, but instead argued that the Authority's decision amounted to an interference
with subscribers' access to information under the information freedom clause of
article 5. The court roundly rejected this argument:
The argument of complainant that [information freedom] prohibits any
exercise of sovereign [hoheitlich] program choice, while at the same time the
decision of a commercial enterprise would be unproblematic, because not
made by the state, does not do justice to the protections of information
freedom.
Id. at 45. The court also rejected challenges based on the property rights and
occupational freedom of the cable operator by invoking article 87 of the TKG,
which authorized the privatization of telecommunication facilities. Id. This did
not, the court found, amount to a "fundamental decision" for the allocation of cable
capacity according to market principles and on the free movement of services
provision of the EC Treaty. Id.
Not all lower courts have ruled this way; the allocation of cable
transmission capacity has been contentious. See ENGEL, supra note 242, at 48; HESSE,
supra note 40, at 280 (citing a number of cases where Independent Media
Authorities have been accused of abuse of discretion in their application of
retransmission rules).
244. Thus, what had been an explicit grant of federal-government authority in
Basic Law articles 73 and 87 to operate the postal and telecommunications systems
became as part of the reform package, with a new article 87f, a command to
privatize those systems. Article 87f reads in pertinent part:
Postal and telecommunications services within the meaning of paragraph
(1) of this Article shall be provided as a matter of private enterprise by the
firms succeeding to the special trust Deutsche Bundespost and by other
private providers. Sovereign functions in the area of posts and
telecommunications shall be discharged by federal administrative
authorities.
Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 87f. In its first paragraph, article 87f requires that the
federal government retain regulatory oversight to insure universally available
("fldchendeckend"), appropriate, and adequate postal and telecommunications
services. Id.
245. 119 BVerfGE at 216-17 (discussing "telecommunications companies.., as
operators of platforms for broadcast programming"). See also supra note 154 and
accompanying text for a translation and discussion of this passage.
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communications that followed in the wake of Post Reform II. In this
new environment, retransmission and must-carry rules have
become more controversial, engendering the jurisdictional clashes
described in sections III(K)(3)(c) and (d) below.
The Court's constitutional framework for commercial and
public broadcasting was incorporated in the 1991 Inter-State Treaty
on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, including its nine
amendments through 2007).246 Under that law, commercial
broadcasters are required to obtain a license from a "competent
independent media authority" ("IMA"), the non-profit public-law
organizations or Landesmedienanstalten in each of the German States
(Articles 20-24, 35). Transmission capacity is also reported to the
IMAs, which "decide on the use of the transmission capacities for
broadcasting purposes," be they traditional broadcast (Article 50),
satellite (Article 51) or cable facilities (Article 52).247 The IMA then
examines the broadcaster's license application for compliance with
the provisions for ensuring plurality of opinion under this Inter-
State Treaty, and refers every application to the Commission on
Concentration in the Media (KEK, described below) for a market
power analysis (Articles 35-38). The IMAs also enforce fairness
obligations (Article 25), ownership restrictions (Article 26), third
party access (Articles 31, 42), and advertising restrictions (Articles
44-46).
J. Combating Market Failure in Private Broadcasting: Ownership
Limits, Antitrust Enforcement, Window Programs, and Open
Access
1. Dominant Opinion Power and the Inter-State Treaty
In the foregoing section, a term was introduced that conveys
the overlapping concerns about free speech and free markets that
246. See Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, §§ 20-25, 35-38, 50-52. The Ninth
Amendment to the Treaty, effective March 1, 2007, renamed it the Inter-State Treaty
for Broadcasting and Telemedia, whereby "Telemedia" refers to all electronic
transmission services that are not strictly telecommunications under the TKG - for
instance, teletext and teleshopping services. Id. at art. 2(a). The provisions on
licensing are largely the same as in the preceding Treaty. See also supra note 27
(regarding Independent Media Authorities).
247. As discussed below, recent amendments to the Treaty have diminished the
IMA's plenary power over channel allocation and have given the operator of digital
cable services the opportunity to program more channels. See infra notes 353-54
and accompanying text (discussing Inter-State Treaty arts. 52(3), (4)).
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meet in the Court's broadcasting jurisprudence - "dominant
opinion power" or vorherrschende Meinungsmacht. The Court's
Fourth Decision, after setting out the legislature's duty to create a
framework for balanced diversity, also charged legislators with
monitoring the broadcasting marketplace to prevent a coming
together of economic and journalistic power that could produce this
dominant opinion power. 248 The Court suggested a two-pronged
approach to this problem: first, the legislature must provide the
framework necessary to create "the possibility for all opinions,
including those of minorities, to find expression in commercial
broadcasting"; and second, the legislator must be vigilant to prevent
"one-sided, or in large measure unbalanced, influence of individual
producers or programs on the development of public opinion, in
other words the deterrence of dominant opinion power." 249
The Court found that any private party that achieved such
dominant opinion power could effectively distort the public debate,
push disfavored facts and opinions to the periphery of public
discourse, and otherwise truncate the scope of public deliberation
and opinion building:
The basic standard of balanced diversity ... continues to
encompass these essential requirements: the possibility that all
opinions and tendencies - including those of minorities - find
expression in private broadcasting; and the exclusion of the
acutely unbalanced influence that individual broadcasters or
programs could have on the development of public opinion; in
other words, the prevention of the development of dominant
opinion power. If these requirements are not met, then there is in
any case a violation of [Basic Law] Article 5(1)(2) . . . . In
particular, it devolves upon the legislator to counter such [market]
concentration tendencies in as timely and effective a manner as
248. 73 BVerfGE at 172, 175 (The "constitutional guarantee of free opinion
building also requires that legal precautions be taken against dominant opinion
power that might arise from a combination of influence in broadcasting and the
press."), 180 (citing Spiegel Search Warrant, 20 BVerfGE at 175 passim, for the
proposition that "the development of opinion monopolies" poses dangers to a free
press).
249. 73 BVerfGE at 160. This develops the concept of "opinion power" or
Meinungsmacht first used by the court in the Third "FRAG" Decision. See 57
BVerfGE at 323-24 ("[P]articularly in a medium with the importance of
broadcasting, the possibilities of a concentration of opinion power [Meinungsmacht]
and the danger of the misuse [of such power] for purposes of one-sided influencing




possible, because faulty developments are particularly difficult to
reverse in this area.
250
The Court was especially concerned about the "danger of a double
monopoly," where commercial entities acquired significant market
power in both press and broadcasting.251 The Court's Sixth Decision
applied these principles to the prevention of dominant opinion-
making power in the local and regional media, where it often
occurred because of the "monopoly position of local newspaper
publishers."
252
Once again, it was left to the legislatures of the individual
German States to implement the Court's pronouncements. The
States developed a number of creative structural mechanisms to
prevent the growth of dominant opinion-making power, and to
preserve a free (i.e., uncaptured) broadcasting system. The main
innovations have been incorporated in a section of the Inter-State
Broadcasting Treaty devoted to "Ensuring Plurality of Opinion"2 53:
Adoption of ownership limits based on audience
share: no individual or company may control greater
than a 30% share of the broadcast audience, or 25%
where the individual or company has significant
250. 73 BVerfGE at 160. See also LAWRENCE LESSiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 162
(reprint ed. 2002) (2001) ("[Nlever in history of telecommunications has a network
voluntarily been opened after being closed.")
251. 73 BVerfGE at 177 ("Gefahr eines Doppelmonopols"). See also Kuibler, Die
Konzentration im Medienbereich und ihre Kontrolle, in MARKTMACHT UND
KONZENTRATIONSKONTROLLE AUF DEM FERNSEHMARKT 20 (Klaus Stern & Harms
Prutting eds., 1999) ("[B]ecause these media are generally seen as operating in
different markets pursuant to the well-grounded practice of the Federal Cartel
Agency, special rules will be needed, which will address conglomerated
concentration.").
252. The court held that,
At a fundamental level, the constitutional principles that apply to local
broadcasting are the same that apply nationally: the broadcasting system
must be designed to serve the constitutional goal of free individual and
public opinion building. In the local area this goal requires the same
balanced diversity of opinion within the total offering in the broadcast
area. This is the legislator's concern .... The legislator must take into
account the peculiarities of the local area, among which is often found the
monopoly position of the local newspaper publisher, which in turn
demands measures to prevent the development of a dominant multi-media
opinion power.
83 BVerfGE at 324.
253. Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, at §§25-34.
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market power in related media; 254
* Creation of the Commission on Concentration in the
Media (Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration
im Medienbereich), or KEK (not to be confused with
the KEF which has jurisdiction over financing), a
board of economists and legal scholars to enforce
these limits25 5;
* Provision to the KEK (through the associated State
independent media authorities) of wide-ranging
investigative tools, including subpoena and search
powers, mechanisms for ongoing determination of
audience share, and reporting requirements on
change in shareholder relationships (including
mergers and acquisitions) 2 6;
* Creation of regional "window" programs within the
two nationwide networks with the largest audience
share257;
254. Id. at § 26(2). This section provides:
If the programs attributable to one company achieve an average annual
audience share of 30 per cent it shall be assumed that it has a controlling
influence. The same shall apply to a company with a 25 per cent broadcast
audience share where the company holds a dominant position in a related
media market, or where an overall assessment of its activities in television
and in related media markets concludes that the influence obtained as a
result of those activities is equivalent to that of a company with a viewer
rating of 30 per cent. In calculating the relevant audience share pursuant
to sentence 2, two per cent credit will be given to those high audience-
share broadcasters who provide "window programs" pursuant to §25(4)
[of this Treaty], and a further 3 per cent credit to those who provide
broadcast time for unaffiliated third-parties pursuant to §26(5).
Id. at § 26(2). The Treaty also sets out fairly detailed criteria about when and how
audience shares will be counted and when affiliate-audience shares will be
attributed to a principal. Id. at §§ 27, 28. These provisions played a major role in
the media authorities' decision in the Singer/ProSiebenSat.1 case described in infra
Part J(2).
255. Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, §§ 26(4), 35(2)(1)(1).
256. Id. § 22(1) (relating to the power to examine witnesses and inspect
documents). See also id. §§ 22(2)-(8) (setting forth related powers), 23 (relating to
annual reporting requirements), 27 (relating to determination of audience share), 29
(relating to reporting of ownership changes).
257. Id. § 25(4) ("In the two largest [commercial] television full-programs there
shall be. . . window programs reflecting. . . the political, economic, social and
cultural life of the individual State .... The window program producer shall not be
an affiliate of main program producer.").
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* Provision of broadcast time for unaffiliated third
parties within private broadcasting programs258 ;
* Creation of advisory program councils to promote
diverse programming, which despite the moniker
"advisory" were in fact given powers approaching
those of internally-pluralistic public broadcasting
councils 259; and
* Specific provisions relating to broadcast time for
unaffiliated third parties in the case of national
elections.
260
Early versions of this statutory scheme were derided as little
more than "symbolic regulation,"261 entirely ineffective to block the
increasing concentration of ownership in the media.262 Even the
more fleshed out measures described here were criticized by some
as a "toothless tiger" and the "capitulation on the part of the policy
makers to Germany's most powerful media concerns Kirch and
Bertelsmann." 263 Part of the criticism was the assertion that the
25/30% audience share limits were ineffective to prevent de facto
collaboration among the largest broadcasters. 264
258. Id. §§ 30(1), 31.
259. Id. §§ 30(2), 32.
260. Id. § 42(2). Some may not consider this to be within the measures adopted
specifically in response to the Constitutional Court's concerns about dominant
opinion-making power, but the argument is easily made that the opinion-making
powers of the mass media are never more powerful than at election time.
261. Humphreys, supra note 21, at 535-36 (citing MURRAY EDELMAN, THE
SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-43 (1964)). Humphreys notes that Murray Edelman
was an American political scientist who "argued that business regulation was often
largely symbolic in function: serving to produce political quiescence," citing the
failure of Federal Trade Commission and U.S. antitrust law "rhetoric" to match the
reality of "monopoly, interlocking directorates, and so on." Id.
262. Professor Humphreys describes how the German States first addressed the
media concentration issue after the Constitutional Court's Fourth Decision in 1986.
Humphreys, supra note 21, at 534-35. These rules, found in the first Inter-State
Treaty on Broadcasting in 1987, focused on limiting ownership. Id. With the Third
Amendment to the State Treaty on Broadcasting in 1996, the law changed to focus
on "audience share" more than ownership relations, although ownership was still
part of the equation.If a company's affiliate owned more than twenty-five percent
of the stock in a separate media concern, that concern's audience share would be
counted in calculating the company's overall audience share. Id.
263. Id. at 545.
264. Id. (" [T]he 'insignificance threshold' had been raised from 10% to 25% in the
final stage of the political negotiations, [which] meant that the mighty Springer
press concern's direct stakes in the major 'generalist' channel SAT1 (20%) and the
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2. Rejection of the ProSiebenSat. I/Springer Merger
This criticism was dampened by the parallel and almost
simultaneous 2006 decisions of the KEK and the Federal Cartel
Office (Bundeskartellamt), disallowing the proposed acquisition of
Germany's second-largest private broadcaster, ProSiebenSat.1
Media AG, by its largest newspaper publisher, Springer - despite
significant political pressure to approve the transaction. 265 The
Federal Cartel Office based its rejection of the proposed merger
entirely on economic grounds, finding that the merger would
illegally consolidate the market for broadcast advertising.2 66 The
KEK, by contrast, rested its decision in large part on the rulings of
the Constitutional Court regarding "opinion power," determining
that the merger would likely give Springer predominant opinion-
making power in Germany, notwithstanding the fact that the post-
merger broadcast market share of the proposed entity was estimated
at only 22%, below the 25/30% statutory thresholds discussed
above.267
Instead, the KEK analyzed the "diagonal or conglomerated"
concentration that would result from newspaper/broadcasting
country's principal sports TV channel DSF (24.9%) counted for nothing.").
265. F.J. Sacker, Zur Ablehnung des Zusammenschlussvorhabens Axel Springer
AG/ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG durch KEK und Bundeskartellamt, 2006 K&R 49, 50.
266. Bundeskartellamt [Cartel Office] Jan 19, 2006, No. B6-92202-Fa-103/05, slip
op. § VI, at 22 passim (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
wDeutsch/ download/pdf/Fusion/Fusion06/B6-103-05.pdf?navid=66 (observing
that a merger would lead to market dominance in broadcast, newspaper, and
magazine advertising).
267. Beteiligunsveranderungen bei Tochtergesellschaften der ProSiebenSat.1
Media AG [KEK] Mar. 30, 2007, No. KEK 293-1 bis-5 (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.kek-online.de/cgi-bin/resi/v-ent/index.html (search 293), or
http://www.kek-online.de/kek/ verfahren/kek293prosieben-satl.pdf [hereinafter
ProSiebenSat.1]. Despite the existence of appellate and other remedies, Springer and
ProSiebenSat.1 decided to abandon the merger (valued at $3 billion to $5 billion)
rather than to engage in a protracted legal and political battle. See Andrew
Bulkeley, Saban Group to Keep ProSieben, DAILY DEAL/THE DEAL, Feb. 14, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 2322812 ("Axel Springer early this month threw in the
towel. . . the KEK Commission on Concentration in the Media in December ruled
against the deal on the grounds it would create a dominant opinion broker."). But
see Wolfgang Hess & Christine Jury-Fischer, Medienkartellrecht, 2006 AfP 541, 544
n.35 (describing that Springer had indeed let the merger plans drop but continued
with a legal challenge in view of potential future merger plans; Springer's appeal




cross-ownership, 268 and concluded that there was sufficient other
evidence that a dominant multi-media opinion power would
emerge in violation of the general prohibition of Section 26(1) of the
Inter-State Broadcasting Treaty. 269
In arriving at this conclusion, the KEK reconnected Section 26
with its constitutional roots in the Constitutional Court's
proclamation of the inviolability of the public opinion-making
process.270 The KEK referenced Constitutional Court Decisions in
which dominant opinion power was found: when a "multitude of
broadcasters melts down to one or a few large producers" 2 1; or
268. Such an analysis had long been in discussion. See Ktibler, supra note 251, at
7, 15-16 (anticipating the controversy). Professor Kubler is a member of the KEK.
269. ProSiebenSat.1, supra note 267, at § VI, slip op. at 108. Section 26(1) of the
Inter-State Treaty provides, "A company (natural or juridical person or association)
may itself or through companies attributable to it broadcast nationwide in the
Federal Republic of Germany an unlimited number of television programs, unless it
is thereby able to exercise a controlling influence in the manner consistent with the
following [presumptions]." In particular, the KEK looked at Springer's twenty-six-
percent audience share in the "related media market" of daily newspapers, as well
as its significant share in the news magazine and on-line service markets. The KEK
found - after discounting for the fact that these related media services had less
suggestive power, pervasiveness, or actuality than broadcasting - that Springer's
share of these non-broadcasting media markets was equivalent to a twenty-seven-
percent share of the broadcasting audience, which when added to ProSiebenSat.1's
twenty-two-pecent share, would yield a total post-merger audience share of forty-
nine percent.
270. The ProSiebenSat.1 decision stated,
With the factual standard of "dominant opinion power," Section 26, par. 1
of the Inter-State Treaty refers back to a constitutional concept that stems
from the constitutional command of opinion diversity in the media. This
in turn rests on the special importance of broadcasting as medium and
factor in the process of individual and public opinion-building, which is
ineluctable [unverzichtbar] for the development of the individual
personality and the securing of a free democracy .... [I]n the total offering
of commercial programs at least a substantial part of all social groups and
ideologies must have the actual chance to speak, so that a marketplace of
ideas is created .... [This mandate also includes] the prevention of one-
sided, or in large measure unbalanced, influence of individual producers
or programs on the development of public opinion, in other words the
deterrence of dominant opinion power.
ProSiebenSat.1, supra note 267, section 111(2), slip op. at 69 (citing 57 BVerfGE at 319
passim; 73 BVerfGE at 152 passim; 95 BVerfGE at 172). See also Kuibler, supra note
251, at 20 ("Control of media concentration... protects the political process from a
narrowing [and] strengthens the socio-cultural foundations of the democratic
order.").
271. ProSiebenSat.1, supra note 267, section 111(3.4), slip op. at 75 ("The same
affects can result, when one enterprise dominates one or more broadcasters through
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results "from a combination of influences in broadcasting and the
press" 272; or when "vertical connections... between television
producers and network operators, license holders, or owners of
program magazines" truncate public discourse in broadcasting. 273
Critics charged that both the KEK and the Cartel Office had
misjudged the actual extent of competition in the market,274 that the
rejection was bad for business and bad for Germany,2 75 and that it
opened up the possibility of foreign ownership of the broadcasting
outlets at issue.276 Supporters voiced satisfaction at the preservation
of a "non-monopolized local media" and the prevention of "an
emerging Berlusconi-like empire."277
Thus, although the Constitutional Court had warned that
broadcasting could not be seen or regulated solely as an economic
activity,278 the Court's concern about the ability of private parties to
legal or economic means, or otherwise exercises significant influence on the
shaping of their programs," citing 73 BVerfGE at 172).
272. ProSiebenSat.1, supra note 267, section 111(3.4), slip op. at 75 ("[O]pinion
power in the area of broadcasting combine[d] with opinion power in the area of the
press" poses a danger. (citing 73 BVerfGE at 175, 176)).
273. ProSiebenSat.1 supra note 267, section 111(3.4), slip op. at 76 (citing German
Sportstelevision case, 95 BVerfGE at 173).
274. See Andrew Bulkeley, Debating German Powerhouses, DAILY DEAL/THE DEAL,
Feb. 10, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 2322812. See also generally Sacker, supra note
265.
275. Bulkeley, supra note 274, at para. 6 (quoting CSU-head Edmund Stoiber's
statement that the merger "would have certainly been in the interest of Germany as
a location for business"). See also Ed Meza, Can Axel Grease Save $3 Billion German
Deal? VARIETY, Jan. 23, 2006, at 19, available at 2006 WLNR 1306852.
276. Meza, supra note 275 (quoting Roland Koch, premier of the State of Hesse,
alluding to the argument that the merger of German firms would fend off foreign
control, "In the hands of foreign owners, our particular media culture would be
threatened rather than promoted."). Invocation of a threat of foreign media
domination, however, was at best ironic in view of the fact that substantial parts of
German commercial television were already foreign owned, and offered resold U.S.
products. Id. ProSiebenSat.1's majority owner at the time of these statements, for
example, was an Egyptian-born resident of Los Angeles, and the ProSieben channel
specialized in re-transmitting American entertainment shows like "Desperate
Housewives." Id. Cf. Prosieben Spielfilm & Serie, http://www.prosieben.de/
spielfilm.serie/.
277. Bulkeley, supra note 274, at para. 15 (quoting Humboldt University Berlin
Economics Professor Michael Burda). See also Deborah Cole, Critics Fear
Conservative Stranglehold on German Media With Springer Deal, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 8, 2005, at 1 (quoting early fears by SPD chairwoman for the
parliamentary committee for culture and media, Monika Griefahn, who wanted to
"avoid a situation like the one in Italy").
278. See generally discussion supra at Part III(F).
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skew the public debate has in fact led to more robust antitrust
enforcement in the media sector, and to something akin to an alloy
of antitrust and broadcasting law.279
K. Extension of Broadcasting and Information Freedom to the
Internet?
As television content and audiences began to migrate to the
Internet, it seemed inevitable that the Article 5 issues relating to
broadcasting and information freedom would migrate with them.2 0
This chapter examines the issues raised by this phenomenon.
1. Broadcasting Freedom Extended to Services Ancillary or Similar to
Broadcasting
Over the last twenty years, the Court has held firm to a
functional view of broadcasting freedom, uncoupled from any
specific technology. In its Fifth Decision, the Constitutional Court
struck down limits on public law broadcasters' involvement with
"on-demand" (auf Abruj) information services.281 The Court held
279. The heightened scrutiny applied in speech markets might be reflected in the
relatively low (25-30%) threshold for presumption of market power in the
broadcasting sector, as opposed to the 33-35% market share under general German
antitrust law. Cf. WOLFGANG SCHULZ & THORSTEN HELD, DIE ZUKUNFT DER
KONTROLLE DER MEINUNGSMACHT 17-18, available at http://www.hans-bredow-
institut.de/forschung/recht/Medienkonzentrationskontrolle.htm.
280. See generally Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Gesetzliche Gewdhrleistung der
Freiheit der Kommunikation im Internet [Legal Guarantee of Freedom of Communication in
Internet], in INNOVATIONSOFFENE REGULIERUNG DES INTERNET 53 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur
ed., 2003). See also Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Rundfunk als Public Service,
Anmerkungen zur Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft 6ffentlich-rechtlichen
Rundfunks [Broadcasting as Public Service: Notes on the Past, Present, and Future of
Public-Law Broadcasting], 54 MEDIEN & KOMMUNIKATIONSWISSENSCHAFT (M&K) 95,
103 (2006). In this speech made on the fifty-year anniversary of North German
Broadcasting, Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem said,
For certain functions - for example, for information on social and political
events, particularly necessary for a democracy - the traditional media are
losing meaning for important population groups. This, however, does not
correspond to the spirit of the development guarantee formulated by the
Constitutional Court, and the efforts legislatively to limit public-law
broadcasting to only peripheral uses and annex services can therefore be
seen as a media-political mistake with foreseeable consequences.
Id.
281. 74 BVerfGE at 306, 350, 353 (finding § 45(2) of the State Media Law
unconstitutional because it allowed public-law broadcasters to provide on-demand
sound- and moving-picture services only "when specially permitted by law or
inter-state treaty").
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that broadcasting freedom could be extended to "communications
services similar to broadcasting":
The term "broadcasting" as used in Article 5, Paragraph 1,
Sentence 2 of the Basic Law cannot be fixed in one definition,
valid for all time. The content and scope of constitutional terms
and determinations depends on their area of application
(Normbereich); their meaning can change as conditions change ....
If broadcasting is to retain its normative effect in a changing
future, then it cannot be linked to outdated technologies .... To
protect free individual and public opinion-building, the above-
described [objective] protections of Article 5 must also apply to
"communication services similar to broadcasting." 282
In 1991, the Court's Sixth Decision developed this theme,
holding that the constitutional guarantee of a basic information
service (Grundversorgung) and the concept of broadcasting freedom
were sufficiently dynamic that they could apply to new forms of
broadcasting transmission.283 Grundversorgung is a concept that is
"substantively and temporally open and dynamic," tied only to the
function of broadcasting in society.284 On this basis, the Court
rejected petitioners' challenge to a clause of the West German
Broadcasting Company ("WDR") law that allowed WDR to develop
new services and technologies, holding that "the constitutional
definition of broadcasting cannot be conclusively defined. Its
content can change as facts change in the social arena protected by
Article 5, par. 1, sent. 2,"285 as "new communication services similar
to broadcasting... overtake the functions of traditional
broadcasting." 286
The second Bavarian Fee Decision again ruled that the function
of broadcasting freedom trumped the technological specifics,
282. Id. at 350-51 (citing 74 BVerfGE at 323; 73 BVerfGE at 154). See also 83
BVerfGE at 299, 302 ("If broadcasting freedom is to keep its meaning in the face of
rapid technological change, then the definition of broadcasting cannot be tied to a
specific existing technology. Otherwise the constitutional protection would not
extend to areas functionally similar to broadcasting, but accomplished with new
means.").
283. 83 BVerfGE at 302 passim ("[Ajufneue Uebertragungstechnik angewendet.").
284. Id. at 299. For more on Grundversorgung, see section III(G) above.
285. Id. at 302 (stopping short of explicitly placing the new communication
services within the constitutional protection of Grundversorgung, or basic service, as
"the importance of such new services for opinion building is at this time [1991]
relatively small").
286. Id. at 302-03.
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rejecting the argument that digital television and increased
transmission capacities (fiber to the home, satellite television, etc.)
would so increase transmission capacity that an explosion of new
program offerings, even at the local and regional level, would occur,
and thus the market - and not broadcasting-specific legislation -
would satisfy Article 5 diversity requirements. 28
7
The latest turn in the development of "broadcasting" as a
functional rather than a technical term came in the Court's
September 2007 Decision, which announced in its opening headnote
that changes in communication technology do not change the basic
requirements of Article 5,288 and hinted throughout that those
requirements could well apply to the new technologies. The Court
acknowledged that telecommunications providers are playing an
increasing role as the "operators of platforms for broadcast
programming."289  It approved en passant the imposition of a
broadcast fee under certain conditions on "new types of broadcast
reception devices, including computers that can play broadcasting
programs exclusively from offerings on the Internet." 290 It returned
to the function of public broadcasting, which remains dynamic and
not limited to the "current state of programmatic, financial, and
technical development." 291 On this logic, the way seems open for
the extension of Article 5 broadcasting freedom to new platforms,
such as cell phones and Internet-based media, if these can be shown
to have taken on the functions of traditional broadcasting in the
287. 114 BVerfGE at 388 (Increased capacity will not insure that local and
regional programming, or programming for less demographically desirable
consumers, will be "financially tenable and [journalistically] competitive, [or] that
[such programming] will lead to journalistic diversity.").
288. "The requirements posited by the Federal Constitutional Court for the legal
organization of broadcasting, to secure broadcast freedom in the sense of Art. 5,
par. 1, sentence 2, are not rendered moot by the development of communications
technologies and media markets." 119 BVerfGE at 181, headnote 1. (The
Constitutional Court publishes its own headnotes.)
289. Id. 118. See also infra discussion at Parts III(K)(c), (d) (regarding the
telecommunications/broadcasting divide).
290. 119 BVerfGE at 219 (citing Inter-State Treaty on Broadcasting Fees
(Rundfunkgebiihrenstaatsvertrag), § 5, 3, which provides for imposition of a
broadcast fee on computers which are the exclusive device for receiving broadcast
programming in any given residence or property). See infra discussion at Part
III(K)(3)(e).
291. Id. 124 (adding that the "program offerings [of public broadcasting] must
remain open for new content, formats and genres as well as transmission forms").
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public discourse.292
2. Information Freedom and the Internet
The jurisprudence of "information freedom," both in
conjunction with broadcasting freedom and as a separate
constitutional right, becomes increasingly important as information
becomes the coin of the realm. Can information freedom, i.e., a
"recipient-oriented protection of mass media communication," 293 be
used as an independent basis to protect opinion-building
communication on the Internet?
a. Information Freedom as Part of Broadcasting Freedom
On several occasions, the Constitutional Court has described
the relationship between information and broadcasting freedom. In
the Third (or FRAG) Broadcasting Decision,294 the Court stated that
"[flreedom of broadcasting serves the same purpose as do all of the
guarantees of Article 5: free individual and public opinion
building."295 Its Fifth and Sixth Decisions elaborate on this common
purpose:
Free opinion building takes place in a process of communication.
On the one hand, it requires the freedom to express, distribute
and publish opinions; on the other hand, [it requires] the freedom
to hear the opinion of others, to inform one's self. Inasmuch as
Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law protects the human rights
of freedom of expression, freedom of publication, and freedom of
information, it attempts to protect the process of
communication. 296
292. One notes the continuity of the court's broadcasting freedom jurisprudence,
even as cable and satellite transmission technologies supplanted over-the-air
broadcasting as a primary means of transmission. See infra note 343 (discussing 73
BVerfGE at 121-22). See also 119 BVerfGE at 214-17 (holding that the importance of
broadcasting as a transfer point for the "variety of information, experiences, values
and behaviors in a society" remains central focus of broadcasting freedom).
293. See also infra discussion at Part III(K)(2)(c). See generally SAJUNTZ, supra note
3.
294. See generally Witteman, supra note 2, at 168-88.
295. 57 BVerfGE at 319, 321 (identifying broadcasting freedom as the point
where "different constitutional rights positions meet, and may even collide," and
observing that "[t]o the legislator belongs the duty of mediating such collisions").
See also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
296. Fifth Decision, 74 BVerfGE at 323. See also Sixth Decision, 83 BVerfGE at
295-96 (using almost identical language); Ninth Decision, 114 BVerfGE at 387
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In its 1998 "Short Reporting" opinion, requiring that
broadcasting of matters of general interest such as championship
football games and major cultural and political events not be
"privatized," i.e., that exclusive reporting rights not be sold to
private broadcasters so as to exclude reporting by others, the Court
offered new language emphasizing the importance of broadcasting's
information-transfer function:
The securing of free informational activities and free information
access constitute an important concern of the Basic Law.
Television is not the only medium that offers information about
events of general importance. It is, however, the only medium
that is capable of reporting simultaneously with sound and
picture. Because of this appearance of authenticity and
eyewitness experience, as well as its comfortable availability,
broadcasting has become the medium from which the largest
segment of the population fills its information needs.
There is thus a public welfare aspect to the prevention of
information monopolies and the securing of a plurality of
viewpoints and offerings . . . . [Free individual and public
opinion-building] can only occur under the conditions of
comprehensive and truthful information. Information contributes
to education and to the testing of opinions. For that reason,
Article 5, paragraph 1, sentence 2 of the Basic Law demands that
the informational requirements of opinion-building be satisfied in
this leading medium of broadcasting. 297
As we shall see, "comprehensive" access to information and
opinion takes on new constitutional significance as digital
technology reshapes communication.
b. Information Freedom as a Separate and Independent Right
In the seminal 1969 Leipzig Newspaper Decision, the
Constitutional Court found the government's attempts to restrict the
distribution of newspapers from East Germany to be an
unconstitutional infringement on information freedom:
Information freedom stands in the constitutional order as co-equal
with freedom of opinion and freedom of the press. It is not
merely a component part of the right freely to express and
disseminate opinion... [but] also itself a prerequisite of the
(same).
297. 97 BVerfGE at 256-57
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opinion building which precedes the expression of that opinion.
Only comprehensive information, fed by sufficiently broad
sources, makes possible the free opinion building and expression
of the individual as well as the community.
298
The Court provided a short history of information freedom:
Until 1945, German constitutional history did not recognize an
autonomous right to inform oneself from public sources without
hindrance. This notion of information freedom first found
expression after the Second World War in the constitutions of the
individual German States [citations omitted], and then finally in
the Basic Law. The recognition of such an independent
constitutional guarantee was prompted by the National-Socialist
practice of government limitations on access to information, state
control over opinion, and prohibitions on the reception of foreign
radio broadcasts and selected literary and artistic works.
299
The Court noted that the United Nations' Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948 had also protected the ability to "obtain
and receive reporting and ideas through any form of transmission
and independent of borders," and that the European Convention on
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms had
adopted a similar protection two years later.300
298. 27 BVerfGE at 81 ("Die Informationsfreiheit steht in der grundgesetzlichen
Ordnung gleichwertig neben der Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit .... "). (The English
translation of this language follows in part the translations cited supra note 6.) The
court went on to cite the Spiegel Search Warrant case, which emphasized the
connection between information freedom and the democratic process:
If a citizen is to make a political decision, he must be comprehensively
informed, and also know and be able to weigh the opinions that others
have developed. The press keeps this constant discussion going; it gathers
information, takes positions, and functions as an orienting force in public
discussions. Public opinion articulates itself in the press; arguments are
clarified in speech and counter-speech, they accrue clear contours and
make it easier for the citizen to reach a judgment and decision. In a
representative democracy, the press is both a constant connection- and
control-organ between the people and their elected representatives in
parliament and the government. The press grasps and reports
[zusammenfasst] the constantly evolving opinions and demands in society
and its constituent groups, puts these up for discussion, and transmits
them to the politically accountable state organs, and allows them in this
way to base [government] decisions on individual questions of
contemporary politics on the opinions actually represented in society.
20 BVerfGE at 174-75.
299. 27 BVerfGE at 80. (The translation is again indebted to the sources cited
supra note 6.)
300. Id. at 82 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res.
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The validation of this subjective right in Leipzig Newspaper took
the form of an injunction against the government's interference with
West German citizen access to the East German press, but it created
no positive duty of the legislature to insure citizen access to that
information.
c. Information Freedom as a Guarantor of "Information Justice"?
Can a government role in securing what has been called
"information justice" (Informationsgerechtigkeit)301 be supported by an
understanding of information freedom as an objective constitutional
value, operating (like broadcasting freedom) as a command to the
legislature to guarantee the conditions for a neutral and open
electronic information platform?
302
The Short Reporting case described above suggests that the
Constitutional Court might recognize such an objective right to
information freedom. The Court came close to doing so in the
Parabola Antenna case, where it upheld the Drittwirkung or
"radiating effect" of the constitutional right of information freedom
on the private-law relationship between a renter and a landlord.
30 3
In that case, the Court sustained the right of a Turkish citizen in
Germany to attach a parabola antenna to the exterior of his
apartment, notwithstanding an absence of any contractual right to
217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948);
1950 European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222).
301. Michael Kloepfer, Verfassungsrechtliche Grundlagen des Zugangs zu Medien-
und Telekommunikationseinrichtungen [Constitutional Bases for Access to Media and
Telecommunications Facilities], in PROBLEME DES ZUGANGS ZU DEN MEDIEN UND
TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSEINRICHTUNGEN 7, 7 (2003). Professor Kloepfer asserts that,
The Basic Law constitutes the Federal Republic of Germany as a free
Information society. Under the directing power of informational justice,
the guarantee of a free information flow belongs to the essential core
content of an information society... free information flow is as a rule also
open information flow. The overall concept directs itself not just at the
content side (freedom from prejudice, tolerance, taboos), but also towards
the opening and keeping open of communication processes. In particular,
no one should be excluded from the mass communication channels so
important for public opinion building.
Id.
302. See discussion in Part III(C) above, regarding "Institutional Freedom,
Objective and Subjective Rights, and Radiating Effect of Communication
Freedoms."
303. 90 BVerfGE at 30, 39. See supra Part III(C)(1) (discussing the "radiating
effect" of a basic right).
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do so, the objections of the landlord, and contrary considerations in
the Civil Code.304 The Court agreed with the argument that "[tihe
constitutional right of information freedom affects the legal
relationship between renter and landlord," and must be considered
"in the interpretation and application of the Civil Code." 305 Such a
constitutionally based limitation on the right of a property owner to
narrow the flow of information transported to or over his property,
to recipients desiring the information, has potentially wide-ranging
implications for network neutrality and related open network
issues.
In the 2001 Courtroom Television II decision, however, one
detects a reluctance to push information freedom too far in the
objective law direction. The Constitutional Court found that,
although news outlets could assert a subjective right of information
freedom to support their desire to have cameras in the courtroom,
that right could be outweighed by countervailing considerations
(such as the accused's interest in a fair and orderly trial).306 The
majority opinion cast information freedom as a "defensive right."307
A concurring minority of three justices, however, taking note of the
growing importance of the electronic media and a concomitant
transformation of the public sphere, would have found that "the
legislator is required by objective constitutional law to make
possible something more than a [simple] open courtroom, as long as
there are not countervailing interests at stake."308
304. Id. at 33-34.
305. Id. at 30, 38 (holding that the Civil Code required the court to take note of
the property owner's objections to the visual blight of such an antenna, and arguing
that there was no right in the rental contract to have such an auxiliary source of
television since the building was already wired to receive certain channels).
306. 103 BVerfGE at 60-63 (2001) (upholding the lower court's determination that
there were compelling legal reasons for, and interest in, excluding recording
equipment from the hearing room).
307. Id. at 59-60.
308. Id. at 72 (Kuihling, J., Hohmann-Dennhardt, J., & Hoffmann-Riem, J.,
concurring) ("Der Gesetzgeber ist aber kraft objektiven Verfassungsrechts verpflichtet, eine
fiber die Saaldffentlichkeit hinausgehende Medienffentlichkeit zu ermdglichen, soweit dem
keine gegenlidufigen Belange entgegenstehen."). These Justices cite (in subsection 2) a
structural transformation in both in the social sphere as well as in technology in
arguing that there may be times when information and broadcasting freedom
would compel television access to the courtroom:
In the interim, democracy and the rule of law have developed further ....
Parallel to that, the public sphere itself has undergone a fundamental
functional transformation (see JUrgen Habermas, STRUCTURAL
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In the Leipzig Newspaper case described above, one German
commentator sees a further determination of the "material content
of information freedom," tied to some understanding of what
"comprehensive information" would be.309 This would go beyond
the "defensive quality" of information freedom:
The state's duty to act directly [in regard to information flow],
founded in the objective law elements of the Basic Law, could
only be directed at securing or increasing that degree of general
accessibility [of information] which reflects the totality of existing
information sources. 310
The notion of an outer perimeter of available information also
informs the holding in Leipzig Newspaper that an "ability to choose
among information" ("Aspekt des Auswdhlenkdnnens") is fundamental
to information freedom:
Art. 5(1) ... protects not only active steps to procure information
but also the receipt of information per se. The Basic Law seeks to
guarantee that the individual is informed as comprehensively as
possible. It is also possible that an individual will inform himself
from sources that make their way into his field of perception
without his active participation: only the possession of [or access
to] information enables an independent selection. This aspect of
being chosen then becomes a fundamental attribute
[Grundtatbestand] of every bit of information. If it were not
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE, 5th ed. 1996). Currently, we can
see new and lasting changes, which can be bundled together under the
term "information society" (see Federal Ministry of the Economy, Die
Informationsgesellschaft - The Information Economy, 2d Ed 1997, further
citation omitted). New electronic techniques, communication
infrastructures, and presentation forms, as well as new media content have
arisen. The media have become important companions of almost all
citizens. They shape large periods of our everyday life and have lasting
effect on the communication among citizens (citations omitted). At the
same time, citizens have developed new abilities in their interaction with
media ....
Id.
309. HELGE ROSSEN, FREIE MEINUNGSBILDUNG DURCH DEN RUNDFUNK 185 (1988)
("Das Gericht ... bemiiht sich alsbald um die Ermittlung eines eigenstdndigen materialen
Gehaltes der Informationsfreiheit. Im Begriff der 'umfassenden information' [27 BVerfGE
at 81] ... [e]s signalisiert schon hiermit einen in der Objektebene aujferordentlich weiten
Geltungsbereich des Grundrechts.").
310. Id. at 193-94 (first defining the defensive right as "requiring the state not to
hinder, disturb or forbid" information acquisition by interested individuals," and
then asserting that "information freedom realizes its democracy-constituting
function as an objective law state duty to concern itself with maintaining a measure
of general accessibility").
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guaranteed by freedom of information that sources of information
reach the individual, then he would also be prevented from
actively selecting among them.
311
The correlation of optimal democratic opinion-building and
decision-making with the comprehensive availability of information
does not mean, however, that the state should in any way make
substantive decisions as to what constitutes this totality of
information, as this would be inconsistent with the personal
autonomy at the root of information freedom.
312
Another German commentator approached the matter by
distinguishing between communicative and recipient freedoms:
Article 5 paragraph I addresses the role of communicator and of
recipient, and protects one-way as well as two-way
communication, including the reciprocal [wechselseitige] process of
communicating. In law, one must distinguish between two
different but interrelated poles of constitutional protection,
namely the free speech and publication freedom (communicator
freedom) as well as the information freedom (recipient
freedom). 3
13
This writer then posits an objective dimension to the recipients'
freedom:
The objective character of recipient freedom is derived from the
combination of the free speech right with constitutional principles
such as the legal, social, and democratic nature of the state ....
Although there is no right to receive particular or even
"traditionally open information sources," if access to information
relevant [to democratic processes] is threatened in a way that
[endangers] the fundamental elements of the constitutional order,
the programmatic content of this right can be directed to legal and
factual measures designed to secure the unconditional minimum
of access.
314
311. 27 BVerfGE at 83 ("Dieser Aspekt des Auswdhlenkdnnens ist der
Grundtatbestand jeder Information.").
312. See, e.g., ROSSEN, supra note 301, at 194 ("The scope and content of what the
citizen in his 'status constituens,' as well as in his 'private sphere,' determines is
necessary for the 'exercise of his personal and political tasks' is something that he
alone should determine." (citing 27 BVerfGE at 81)).
313. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Recht der freien Meinungsaeusserung, in
KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 422, 16
(Axel Azzola et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Hoffmann-Riem,
ALTERNATIVKOMMENTAR].
314. Id. at 467, 98.
[Vol. 33:1
Constitutionalizing Communications
While not compelling the state to open up new information
sources, an objective-law reading of information freedom can still
implicate the architecture of information choice:
The objective-legal elements of recipient freedom legitimate the
combating of one-sided "information power".... [T]he state's
protective responsibility is actualized when particular information
typically relevant to public opinion-building threatens to become
no longer available, for instance through operation of exclusive
contracts with sole-source information providers, or through high
financial hurdles, partitioning of information spaces, or access
filters, all of which run counter to the principle of equal
opportunity information access [chancengleicher
Informationsaufnahme .315
However, the Court has not yet embraced such a broad reading
of information freedom.
3. Current "Convergence" Issues in Germany
Convergence describes the fact that broadcasting, film, video,
audio, data, and telephony have all discovered a lingua franca:
Internet protocol (the "IP" in Voice over IP or VoIP, for instance),
which guides the transportation of information content over the
network conduit in the form of digitized information packets. In
Germany, as here, interconnected IP networks, under the rubric of
the Internet, and riding in large part on the infrastructure of the
legacy telephone networks, are becoming one all-purpose "next
generation network" ("NGN") on which telephony, video, email,
data transmission, television and radio are merely applications.
a. General Reevaluation of Broadcasting and Information Freedom in
a Multi-Channel, Multi-Media, Digital World
The question of what broadcasting and information freedom
mean in this era of multi-channel capacity and ubiquitous digital
("IP") content has been a central theme in the discussion of German
315. Id. at 468, 100 ("Die staatliche Schutzverantwortung wird aktualisiert, wenn
bestimmte, fir die Meinungsbildung typischerweise relevante Informationen nicht mehr
zugfinglich zu sein drohen .... "). On choice architecture as it relates to electronic
communications, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 167
(1999) ("[A]rchitecture of the Internet, as it is right now, is perhaps the most
important model of free speech since the founding."); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 81-
100 (2008) (describing elements of "choice architecture").
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media policy over the last ten years. Part of this discussion has been
driven by the privatization of the underlying transmission facilities,
and part by the European Commission which has demanded further
definition of German public broadcasting's mission in response to
complaints by commercial competitors. 316
There is recognition that broadcasting is moving onto the
Internet, and thus onto the telecommunications network: "In the
middle, namely as carrier... stands telecommunication." 317  The
tendency of owners of transmission capacity to prefer affiliated
traffic, and extract monopoly rents from all other customers, has
been widely noted in Germany:
Network operators can, for example, erect financial hurdles, or
use technical standards or access conditions of a technological or
contractual variety as filters, or build in structural advantages or
disadvantages to the marketing of certain products.
318
Issues at the nexus of conduit and content, sometimes
expressed in the United States under the rubric of network
neutrality, lead in Germany to calls for increased antitrust
enforcement, and for extension of broadcasting and information
freedoms into the online world.
319
Concerns are not limited to transmission facilities and the "last
mile" problem, however.320 There is also unease that the seemingly
316. As to the European Commission, see supra notes 78, 190. As to the
privatization of transmission facilities, see infra discussion at Parts III(K)(3)(c)-(d).
317. Ingwer Ebsen, Offentlich-rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen einer
Informationsordnung, 1997 DVB 1039, 1040.
318. Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem, Medienregulierung unter Viel-Kanal-Bedingungen,
in OFFENTLICHKEIT UNTER VIEL-KANAL BEDINGUNGEN 186-87 (Otfried Jarren &
Friedrich Krotz eds., 1998). See also, e.g., Martin Bullinger, Regulierung unter Viel-
Kanal-Bedingungen, in OFFENTLICHKEIT UNTER VIEL-KANAL BEDINGUNGEN, supra, at
178, 180 (The "owner of the transmission capacity will endeavor to increase its
share of Pay-TV value-creation by not transmitting external or third-party [fremde]
programming to the public, but rather by acquiring programming rights, creating
program packages, and offering them based on profitability concerns.").
319. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 318, at 186. See also id. at 188 (observing that it
is generally those with more economic power who opt for market-based regulation
and those with lesser social or economic power who question the sufficiency of
market management to deliver communicative equality).
320. See Wolfgang Schulz, Vertrauensbildung als dffentliche Aufgabe in der
Medienkonvergenz?, in INFORMATIONELLES VERTRAUEN FOR DIE
INFORMATIONSGESELLSCHAFT [TRUST IN INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY]




endless knowledge and information society of the future may be
curtailed by software, contractual, copyright, and investment
limitations affecting the information and opinion available to the
public. "Inasmuch as these factors influence the accretion and use
of communicative power, and have an effect on the way that the
opinion-building freedom of the recipient is realized, countervailing
legal measures may be justified."321 Apprehension is expressed that
network-based filter technology might lead to "reality construction
according to [the network operator's] own rules, which rules might
- under market conditions - have the tendency to distance
themselves from the older idea of participation in a democratic
discourse." 322
Along with its utopian possibilities, some see digital technology
leading to a fragmentation of the audience. Public opinion building
(dffentliche Meinungsbildung) presumes a single public (bffentlichkeit),
when in fact there are many, increasingly fragmented publics in the
new online digital world. The flip-side of convergence is
divergence, the fragmentation of the audience, a problem that Cass
Sunstein addresses in his book republic.com. 323 In Germany, this
situation has led to the call that public broadcasting fill an expanded
role as an "integration factor" in knitting these disparate publics
into a larger electoral public.324 Public law broadcasters might
become "islands of trust and credibility" on the Internet sea.
325
321. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 318, at 187.
322. Id. at 189.
323. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 30 passim (2001); Wolfgang Schulz &
Thorsten Held, Verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen einer dienstspezifisch
diverzierten Informationsordnung, in VON DER DUALEN RUNDFUNKORDNUNG ZUR
DIENSTSPEZIFISCH DIVERSIFIZIERTEN INFORMATIONSORDNUNG [FROM THE DUAL
BROADCAST ORDER TO A SERVICE-SPECIFIC DIVERSIFIED INFORMATION ORDER] 131
(Manfred Kops et. al. eds., 2001) ("[D]isintegration of the public sphere into partial
public spheres. . . is coincident with the diversification of offerings and the
individualization of demand.").
324. Schulz & Held, supra note 323. See also supra note 128 (discussing
integration function).
325. Christoph Degenhart, Funktionsauftrag und "dritte Programmsdule" des
dffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks, 2001 K&R 329, 330-31. See also Hoffmann-Riem,
Gesetzliche Gewdhrleistung, supra note 280, at 82, thesis 9 ("The logic of the Internet is
not contradicted when the state helps support those who offer content which
otherwise is disadvantaged by the structures of the Internet.").
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b. Extension of German Public-Law Broadcasters' Activities onto the
Internet and other Digital Platforms, and Ensuing Controversy
German public-law broadcasters have shown particular interest
in making their content available online, and in expanding into
services such as search, online newspapers, webcasting/IPTV, and
even television transmission to wireless phones and other devices, 326
on the theory that as public broadcasters they are uniquely situated
to offer "transparency and orientation.., credibility and
dependability" to citizens of the online world. 327
The movement of German public service broadcasters onto the
Internet has generated enormous controversy, both at the national
and European level, driven primarily by commercial press and
broadcasting industry resistance to what it views as publicly
financed competition, and further articulated by scholars concerned
about the limits of constitutional and statutory authority for such a
move.
3 28
The critics of public broadcasting's Internet presence point to a
shift in editorial control brought by the digital transformation, from
traditional broadcasting, where the editor had a privileged position,
to the Internet where editorial control has largely shifted from the
broadcaster/ programmer to the computer user:
The [Internet] user has the possibility of determining, by theme
and desired depth of information, the content of his or her
choosing... the danger found in broadcasting of a diversity-
narrowing opinion power does not exist with online-services ....
The Internet stands de facto and de jure open to everyone, and thus
constitutes the "perfect example of a functioning system of
external pluralism." 329
326. THORSTEN HELD, RUNDFUNK UND NEUE DIENSTE, ANALYSE IM AUFTRAG DER
FRIEDRICH-EBERT STIFTUNG 5 (2006), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
stabsabteilung/04290.pdf.
327. Degenhart, supra note 325, at 330-31, 334 (offering "transparency and
orientation" to on-line citizens). See also Schulz, supra note 320, at 146 n.ll (citing
BERNT HOLZNAGEL, DER SPEZIFISCHE FUNKTIONSAUFTRAG DES ZWEITEN DEUTSCHEN
FERNSEHENS 119 (1999); Carl-Eugen Eberle, Betdtigung des ZDF im Online-Bereich,
1998 AFP 272)).
328. See, e.g., CHRISTOPH DEGENHART, ONLINE-ANGEBOTE OFFENTLICH-RECHTLICHER
RUNDFUNKANSTALTEN 35 passim (1999).
329. See, e.g., Johannes Kreile & Stefan Neuenhahn, Online-Angebote 5ffentlich-




In this new many-to-many media environment, these pundits ask
where the threat to communications freedom might lay, i.e., what
the constitutional justification for the extension of public-law
broadcasters' activities to the Internet might be.330 They wonder
how both the frequency shortage, which was the original
justification for broadcasting's special situation, and the now
asserted "abundance of offerings and possibilities" in cyberspace,
could "lead to the exact same result," the constitutional necessity of
a complementary role for public broadcasting.331
Such critics take particular umbrage at public broadcasting
entities that present themselves as Internet portals, such as Bavarian
Broadcasting advertising itself as a "Portal for Bavaria" or West
German Broadcasting ("WDR") as a "Portal for North Rhine-
Westphalia":
When wdr.de acts as a portal for the North Rhine-Westphalia
area, if not for the entire global information market, this means
that it is going beyond its own programming, or programming for
which it takes responsibility, and acting as a broker for everything
on the Internet related in any way to North Rhine-Westphalia ....
By way of hyperlinks, access is provided to the offerings of third
parties.332
Public broadcasting proponents counter that the "existence and
development guarantee" found by the Constitutional Court as an
adjunct to Grundversorgung empowers public broadcasters to follow
the general audience onto whatever the platform de jour is. 333
Audiences now expect multi-media offerings, and to a certain extent
there has been a "substitution" of online-services for what was
earlier "classic broadcasting." 334  If, for example, a significant
portion of the under-thirty population segment were found to
obtain its news primarily over the Internet, the functional aspect of
broadcasting freedom would be implicated and a legislative duty to
reach this "public" would be triggered. 335
330. Degenhart, supra note 325, at 335.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 329.
333. See HELD, supra note 326, at 29. See also BECK'SCHER KOMMENTAR, supra note
237, at 104 n.43 (Schulz, commenting on § 2) ("[B]roadcasting only occurs when,
through the transmission, the public is actually reached.").
334. HELD, supra note 326, at 18, 29.
335. Id. ("[T]he existence and development guarantee demands that [public]
broadcasters be able to take part in this development" of multimedia, Internet
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All parties (except perhaps the transmission owners) agree that
broadcasters should be able to avail themselves of commonly used
transmission facilities - whether they are terrestrial broadcast,
satellite, cable, or IP - to reach their public with traditional, fixed-
time offerings.336  Whether the owners of those transmission
facilities will allow such use, and on what terms, remains to be
seen.337 Some fear that the plans of the European Commission and
the German Federal Network Agency to allocate frequencies and
other transmission paths by market mechanisms (such as auctions)
could result in transmission becoming a bigger part of public
broadcasting budgets, interfering with its constitutional mandate
and primacy.338
The more immediate controversy between public broadcasters
and their commercial counterparts seems to have focused on the
issue of whether the public entities should be able to create new
content specifically designed for the Internet, and how and how
long public broadcasting content should be available online. In
arguing over the scope of online public broadcasting activities,
critics turn by way of reference to available legal definitions of
broadcasting, particularly those found in the Inter-State Treaty.
Article 2(1) formerly provided:
Broadcasting is the production and dissemination for the general
public of presentations of all kinds of speech, sound and picture
using electronic media ("electromagnetic wavelengths"), with or
without the use of a wire connection. 339
offerings.).
336. Degenhart, supra note 325, at 337 (" [T]he simple broadening of the technical
platform is not at issue ... [but] Internet-specific offerings [is].").
337. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
338. See supra discussion at Parts III(K)(3)(c)-(d). See also Gersdorf, supra note 78,
at 104, 105 (describing the conflicts unleashed by the Federal Network Agency's
consideration of spectrum auctions). Gersdoft states that,
A sharpening of the economic conditions for broadcasting is not in the
interests of the individual States responsible for upholding broadcasting's
[constitutional guarantee]. Higher transmission costs require higher
revenues. For public broadcasters, this will be translated into a fee
increase. It is not in the interests of the States to contribute by way of a
broadcasting fee increase to the rehabilitation of the Federal budget.
Id.
339. Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, § 2, 1("Rundfunk ist [eine Veranstaltung]
... unter Benutzung elektromagnetischer Schwingungen ohne Verbindungsleitung oder
langs oder mittels eines Leiters"), Compare October-2008 amendment to this article
cited at note 346, infra.
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Opponents of an expanded role for public broadcasters argue
that many of the planned Internet offerings of public broadcasting
entities are not a "designed construction and distillation
[Zusammenfassungl of individual content into a... total program,"
i.e., not a "dissemination to the general public," and therefore not
broadcasting in either the statutory or constitutional sense. 340
For proponents of a robust online role for public broadcasting,
this play with statutory definitions is largely irrelevant. They tend
to view any electronically transmitted programming intended for
the general public as within the opinion-building protection of
Article 5 broadcasting freedom. 341 On this view, the Internet is a
game-changer, and those who remain locked into the polarity of
categorizing it either as broadcasting or telemedia, a "substitute" or
"complement" to traditional broadcasting, "linear" or "non-linear,"
are missing the boat.342
For its part, the Constitutional Court does not seem overly
preoccupied with the specifics of various electronic technologies,
having extended the protection of Article 5 broadcasting freedom
first to FM frequencies, then to "broadband cable networks," and
satellite television almost without comment.343  The essential
characteristics from a constitutional viewpoint seem to be the
electronic transmission of program content with sufficient "breadth,
actuality and suggestive power" to become a substantial "medium
and factor" in the public opinion-building process. 344
340. Degenhart, supra note 325, at 332. Rather than presenting "diverse
information in an editorially selected and shaped program," the broadcaster as
Internet portal becomes more of a conduit for the content of others (even if those
"others" may include public broadcasting producers). Id.
341. HELD, supra note 326, at 17 ("[A]s long as the new services are electronically
transmitted and directed to the general public, they satisfy the elements of the
constitutional definition of broadcasting."). Whether such content is transmitted as
a complete program which can be received by viewers at specific times is not
important; it only matters that it is an electronically transmitted information
designed for multiple, unidentified individuals. Id.
342. Id. at 18 (observing that Internet creates new "possibilities of public and
individual opinion-building"). See note 346 and accompanying text for definition
of broadcasting in terms of "linear" services.
343. 73 BVerfGE at 121-22 (discussing the availability of FM ["UKW"],
"broadband cable networks," and satellite transmission media, none of which were
commercially deployed in 1949 when the Basic Law was drafted). But see
Degenhart, supra note 325, at 331 ("Internet... in any event is not broadcasting as
originally understood.").
344. See HELD, supra note 326, at 17-18 (rejecting the attempts of Degenhart and
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The issues attending public broadcasting's role on the Internet,
and the related controversy about its funding, were somewhat
clarified by the April 2009 adoption of the Twelfth Amendment to
the Inter-State Treaty, which carved out a more-defined role for
public broadcasters on the Internet. In particular, the definition of
broadcasting was amended (additions in italics):
Broadcasting is a linear information and communication service; it is
the production and dissemination [transmission] for simultaneous
transmission to the general public of presentations in moving
pictures or sound according to a program schedule and using
electronic media.345
In addition to "linear" broadcasting, public broadcasting entities are
allowed to offer "non-linear" Internet services, or "telemedia,"
consisting of allowing access to their broadcast programming
available (in most cases) for seven days after broadcast, and of
developing online archives of indefinite duration for "historical and
others to "load up" the constitutional definition of broadcasting by adding
superfluous elements to the core concept of a journalistic presentation
("Darbietung")).
345. Twelfth Amending Treaty, supra note 25, art. 2(1) ("Rundfunk ist ein linearer
Informations- und Kommunikationsdienst; er ist die ffir die Allgemeinheit und zum
zeitgleichen Empfang bestimmte Veranstaltung und Verbreitung von Angeboten in
Bewegtbild oder Ton entlang eines Sendeplans unter Benutzung elektromagnetischer
Schwingungen."). For further citation to the Twelfth Amending Treaty, the
integrated Inter-State Treaty as of November 2008, and related documents, see
supra note 25. A new English translation of this article is available at
http:/ /www.alm.de/fileadmin/Download/Gesetze/12-RStV-englisch.pdf.
Neither the Twelfth Amending Treaty nor the integrated Inter-State Treaty
contains a definition of linear or non-linear communications media. The terms are,
however, used in common parlance in discussions of German media policy since
they were defined in article 1 of the European Union's December 11, 2007, Directive
on Audio-Visual Services:
(e) "television broadcasting" or "television broadcast" (i.e. a linear
audiovisual media service) means an audiovisual media service provided
by a media service provider for simultaneous viewing of programmes on
the basis of a programme schedule;
(g) "on-demand audiovisual media service" (i.e. a non-linear audiovisual
media service) means an audiovisual media service provided by a media
service provider for the viewing of programmes at the moment chosen by
the user and at his individual request on the basis of a catalogue of
programmes selected by the media service provider.




cultural" content.346 Such telemedia and other online activities of
the public broadcasting entities will be subject to a three-stage test
(3-Stufen Test) in order to determine whether they are in fact
sufficiently related to the public broadcasters' constitutional
mission, a process that gives the stations some flexibility in light of
rapidly changing technologies and modes of distribution, while
setting bounds on their activities in response to commercial press
and broadcaster complaints.347
c. Broadcast Media in a Telecommunications World - Conflict
between State and Federal Government
As discussed above, the privatization of broadcast transmission,
along with the increasing deregulation of telecommunications
driven by the European Union, have set up potential conflicts
between State jurisdiction over broadcasting and Federal
jurisdiction over transmission,348 and "conflict[s] between the
346. Twelfth Amending Treaty, supra note 25, art. 11(d)(2). For distinctions
between "linear" and "non-linear" content, see supra note 345. The seven-day
limitation was in fact controversial. See, e.g., Weiter Streit fiber Sieben-Tage Regelung
ffir Abruffernsehen [Further Battles Around Seven-Day Limitation for Television on
Demand], 36 EPD 7, 15 (2008) (noting that ARD-ZDF demanded a longer period, and
quoting one public broadcaster as saying, "If we have to throw away our reporting
on Olympic protests and Tibet after seven days, we are not operating in the
interests of those who pay user fees.").
347. Twelfth Amending Treaty, supra note 25, §§ 11(d)-(e).
348. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text; Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem et
al., Anforderungen an die .IKM-Regulierung angesichts der Konvergenz - eine
Strukturierung des Problemfelds [Challenges for the Information-Communication-Media
[IKM] Regulation in Light of Convergence - Structuring the Problem], in GLOBAL @
HOME, JAHRBUCH TELEKOMMUNIKATION uND GESELLSCHAFT 323, 328 (Herbert
Kubicek et al. eds., 2000) ("In capacity management one can see examples of the
problems which occur when economically-oriented Federal Law and
journalistically-oriented State law meet."). The authors continue:
The shaping of the transmission network and the distribution of its
capacity fall constitutionally - inasmuch as there remains government
influence [after deregulation of these markets] - within the jurisdiction of
the Federal Government pursuant to its authority over telecommunications
under Basic Law, Article 73(7). Because, especially with regard to the
allocation of transmission capacity, decisions are made about the types and
possibilities of individual and mass communications on the network, there
is an interdependence between these areas [of telecommunications and
broadcasting]. In the area of broadcasting, the Federal Constitutional
Court has introduced the principle of a "serving function" [for
telecommunications facilities necessary to broadcasting].
Id. at 328 (citing 57 BVerfGE at 319 passim; 12 BVerfGE at 227). See also BERLINER
KOMMENTAR, supra note 33, § 48 n.8 (Schmits, commenting that jurisdictional issues
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economic interests of the network operators and the [constitutional]
command of diversity."349 When the Constitutional Court approved
the co-existence of public and private broadcasters in a "dual
broadcasting system," it did so with the understanding that the
individual German States would create a legal framework for
insuring a balanced and diverse total broadcasting offering,
overseen and enforced by Independent Media Authorities in the
individual States. 350 This framework legislation often includes the
retransmission and "must-carry" rules, described above, for cable
networks (now the primary form of broadcasting transmission into
German households).351
Where, however, the United States cable operator is only
required to carry local commercial broadcast and non-commercial
public and educational stations, 352 the German (analog) cable
operator was initially required to carry all stations that the
Independent Media Authority may find necessary to insure a
at the nexus of content and conduit are "problematic and disputed").
349. Kloepfer, supra note 301, at 19.
350. The court has made it clear that the States' Independent Media Authorities
(as described at supra note 27) remain responsible for insuring an overall balance
and diversity of programming in the private sector, whether through a
retransmission consent regimen or allocation of frequencies and transmission
capacity. See 73 BVerfGE at 198-205 (relating to retransmission); 83 BVerfGE at 322-
24 (relating to the allocation of terrestrial frequencies). See also 73 BVerfGE at 157
("[C]onstitutionally guaranteed broadcasting freedom applies to the entire
broadcasting system...., [which] must in its totality correspond to the
constitutional requirements within the framework of the possible."), 172-74
(discussing further, throughout section 111(1) of the court's decision, the licensing,
oversight, and retransmission duties of private broadcasters).
351. Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, §§ 50-52. See also supra discussion Part III(I)
(discussing the regulation of commercial broadcasting); Kloepfer, supra note 301, at
20-23 (describing how state legislatures structure access to terrestrial frequencies,
satellite channels, and cable "frequencies" (channels)). The Germans tend to use
the word "Weiterverbreitung" ("retransmission") (per Inter-State Treaty article 52) in
referring to the obligations of analog cable systems, while reserving the term
"must-carry" (in English) for the more limited obligations of digital-network
providers (although "must-carry" does not appear in the Inter-State Treaty). See
2000 K&R at 43 (distinguishing between retransmission - the complete
Kabelbelegungsplan or cable allocation plan of the Bremer authorities - and the
more limited "must-carry" concept, which requires only that specified programs be
retransmitted); BECK'SCHE KOMMENTAR, supra note 237, at 925-29 (Wille et al.,
commenting on § 52). In a sense, retransmission and must-carry are two species of
the same regimen and will be so treated here, as they are in U.S. discourse. See infra
note 352.
352. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535; 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.56-76.64. See also Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 650 (1994), affid after remand, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
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pluralistic and diverse total media offering.353 With the advent of
digital cable, the cable operator has been granted the first
opportunity to create a diverse and balanced total program, with the
Independent Media Authority retaining oversight and enforcement
authority should the cable operator fail in this task.354 This softer
regulation of retransmission is premised on the hitherto untested
theory that there will be sufficient channels and/or transmission
capacity to accommodate all interested broadcasters.
Regardless of this relaxation, an underlying and unresolved
contradiction remains between the Independent Media Authorities
with jurisdiction over broadcasting structure and content, and the
Federal Network Agency with jurisdiction over
telecommunications, including cable and other broadband transport
services.
[Public] tasks are now performed by private service providers,
who are subject to the laws of commercial economics .... In cable
networks, the principles of commercial economics embedded in
the telecommunication law stand against the constitutional
serving function of telecommunications under [jurisprudence ofl
broadcasting freedom. This raises the question, in whom and to
what degree regulatory jurisdiction for cable lies, in light of
cable's use for broadcasting transmission.355
353. Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, § 52(1) ("State law regulations regarding
analog cable allocation are permitted, to the extent they are necessary to achieve
clearly defined goals of general interest. In particular, they may be directed at the
securing of a pluralistic and diverse media order.").
354. Digital cable providers obtain this initial discretion to fulfill constitutional
goals but must submit their planned cable offerings to the States' Independent
Media Authorities several months prior to any changes. Inter-State Treaty, supra
note 25, §§ 52(4)-(5). Under this system, cable operators are required to dedicate at
least a third of their digital transmission capacity to a "diverse program offering."
Id. § 52(4). A further one-third of their programming is reserved for (1) public-law
broadcasters, including public broadcasting "bouquets"; (2) any private program
carrying a "regional window"; and (3) the equivalent of at least one analog channel
to carry state-licensed regional and local programming as well as public access
channels, and - to the extent there is remaining carriage capacity - all other
channels designated by the State. Id. A final one-third is left wholly to the
discretion of the operator. Id. § 52(3)(1-3).
355. BECK'SCHER KOMMENTAR, supra note 237, at 916 n.21 (Wille et al.,
commenting on § 52 (citing 12 BVerfGE at 227)); Klaus Stem, Postreform zwischen
Privatisierung und Infrastrukturgewdhrleistung, 1997 DVB1. 309, 309 passim. See also
TKG, supra note 33, § 3(27) (providing that "telecommunication networks" include
fixed and mobile telephony, cable, broadcast, optical fiber, satellite networks,
powerlines, and other devices capable of transmitting electronic signals).
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This jurisdictional quandary is deepened because the Federal
Telecommunications Law ("TKG") and the Inter-State Treaty on
Broadcasting make only passing reference to each other. For
instance, section 59(9) of the TKG provides that " [i]f interests of the
individual States in the transmission of broadcasting are implicated,
then consensus [on the allocation of frequencies] is to be sought with
the individual States on the basis of the applicable [state]
broadcasting laws," without explaining how that consensus will
come to pass. Similarly, section 52 of the Inter-State Treaty on
Broadcasting charges state agencies with enforcing mandatory
carriage of programs to achieve the constitutional goals of a
pluralistic media structure, while providing that "compensation and
tariffs are to be shaped in the framework of the [Federal]
Telecommunications Law in such a way that regional and local
offerings can be transmitted under appropriate and equal-
opportunity conditions." 356 The TKG, however, has no provisions
relating to compensation and tariff conditions for "must-carry"
channels (nor does the Inter-State Treaty).
357
With the coming of digital cable, the attempts of Deutsche
Telekom and other telecommunications providers to provide IP
television over traditional telephone wirelines as well as wireless
handsets, and the growth of "non-linear" Internet television content
(available by streaming or download), it is no longer clear to many
German jurists how the "must-carry" provisions will apply.
35 8
356. The closest that the TKG comes to rate regulation for "must-carry" is at TKG
§ 27, which provides that the Federal Network Authority must inform the
responsible State Independent Media Authority of any rate regulation proceedings
instituted because the owners of transmission facilities were alleged to exercise
"significant market power" (betrfichtliche Marktmacht). TKG, supra note 33, § 27; see
also following footnote. Interviews with Independent Media Authority personnel
indicate that such proceedings are rare, if not non-existent. Interviews with
Personnel at IMAs in Hamburg Schleswig-Holstein and elsewhere (May and June,
2008).
357. TKG § 30 provides that there will be no ex ante rate regulation unless it can
be shown that a telecommunication provider has significant market power. TKG,
supra note 33, § 30. TKG § 27(3) provides for increased information exchange
between the IMAs and the Federal Network Agency, and also for application by the
IMAs to the Network Agency for review of rates charged by the communications
providers for must-carry stations. TKG, supra note 33, § 27(3). Compare 47 U.S.C. §
535(h) (U.S. cable operators must carry local broadcast channels for free, unless the
broadcaster refuses consent).
358. See Hoffmann-Riem et al., supra note 348, at 328-29:
In the area of cable networks, disputes exist as to the extent of the
regulatory regime of the TKG and with that the jurisdiction of the Federal
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The federal/state tension becomes more complicated still when
one adds a third gravitational pole, the European Union ("EU").
Under the European Community Treaty, Germany is required to
conform its telecommunications laws to EU directives. As a result,
there is great concern that the Federal Network Agency will follow
the lead of the EU in auctioning off newly available spectrum to the
highest bidder. 3 9 This results in what one commentator has called a
"further jurisdictional displacement 'from the bottom to the top' in
broadcast-related telecommunications jurisdiction, "from the
German States to the Federal Government, and from there to the
EU."360
There are constitutional values on all sides, as both European
integration and the privatization of telecommunications
infrastructure have been written into the Basic Law, although
perhaps not in the same privileged position as broadcasting
Regulatory Authority for Telephone and Post [now Federal Network
Agency]. The States ask the question, "When do [State] broadcasting-law
channel-assignment rules apply?" The State broadcast laws regulate the
allocation of television cable networks. [But] in view of digitalization and
convergence, it is asserted to be no longer clear what constitutes a
television cable network. The possibility that networks previously used
only for broadcast transmission can now provide other services, and vice
versa that other networks will now stand ready to transmit broadcast
programming, requires further clarification of the points of contact
[between broadcasting and telecommunications law].
Related questions arise as to whether conditional access systems, application-
programming interfaces, and set-top boxes might be used to block, narrow, or
channel access to constitutionally protected programming are addressed in the
"free access" ("Zugangsfreiheit") provisions of the Inter-State Treaty. See Inter-State
Treaty, supra note 25, § 32b.
359. Gersdorf, supra note 78, at 104. The TKG sets up a regime, administered by
the Federal Network Agency, for the allocation of radio frequencies, including
those necessary for broadcasting, and specifies that the Agency shall work within
the European Directives. TKG, supra note 33, §§ 52-65. See also Karola Wille,
Rechtsprobleme im Zusammenhang mit der Uberarbeitung des Rechtsrahmens ffir die
elektronische Kommunikaton (TK-Review) durch die Europfiische Kommission - aus Sicht
des dffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks [Legal Problems in Connection with the Revision of
the Legal Framework for Electronic Communication of the European Union - from the
Point of View of Public Broadcasting], 2 ZUM 89, 92 (2007) (describing increasing costs
of terrestrial frequencies and the European Commission's insistence that broadcast
frequencies be allocated pursuant to market rules - potentially eliminating the
privileged place that broadcasting, particularly public broadcasting, has had under
the German system).
360. Kloepfer, supra note 302, at 11 ("Kompetenzverlagerungen 'von unten nach oben'
(von den Ldndern zum Bund, aber auch vom Bund zur EU.")). See also BERLINER
KOMMENTAR, supra note 33, at 25-188 (Klotz & Nettesheim, commenting on the
"European Framework").
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freedom.361 On the other hand, both the constitutional principle of
"federal friendly conduct" and statutory telecommunications law
bind the Federal Network Agency to a process of consultation,
coordination and consensus with the States regarding frequency
planning and allocation.362 Indeed, the Telecommunications Law as
a whole is still understood to play a serving role vis a vis
broadcasting.363 The States, in turn, are bound to the constitutional
principle of broadcasting freedom, which requires that "the
allocation of scarce frequencies not be left to the 'free play of
[market] forces,'" as explained in sections III(E) and (I) above. The
primacy of constitutional communication freedoms in this welter of
conflicting jurisdictions and policies has yet to be fully clarified.
d. Separation of Conduit and Content: a German Network Neutrality
Problem?
In the retransmission must-carry conflicts described above,
triggered by the slow dissolution of the once clear separation
between conduit and content under German law, one glimpses an
incipient version of the network neutrality debate in the United
States. Until recently, the Germans have not had such a debate.364
There are several possible reasons for this. The German government
has continued to have a 40% share in the underlying telephone
network, even after this formerly state-owned communications
361. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 23 (relating to cooperation with the
European Union), 87(2) (relating to the privatization of telecommunications
facilities). See also id. at art. 87(1) (leaving the Federal Bund responsible for insuring
"universal, appropriate, and sufficient" telecommunications services).
362. 31 BVerfGE at 318, 354-55 (Bundestreue, bundesfreundlichen Verhaltens); TKG,
supra note 33, § 55(10) (relating to frequency allocation in consultation with German
States); Gersdorf, supra note 78, at 105 passim.
363. BERLINER KOMMENTAR, supra note 32, at 1196, 30 (Wegman, commenting
on TKG § 52 to the effect that, pursuant to Constitutional Court rulings,
telecommunications has a "serving" function vis a vis broadcasting).
364. Axel Witzki, Telekommunikation am Scheideweg, 6 FUNKSCHAU 26 (2007) ("The
net neutrality theme as imported from the USA... has met with little interest here
.... "). A number of recent conferences in Germany, however, have explored the
subject. See Archive of Conference Papers from Chancengleichheit fPr Content auf
Netzwerken und Plattformen? [Equal Opportunity for Content on Networks and
Platforms?], Seminar of the Hans Bredow Institut & Alcatel-Lucent Foundation,
June 4, 2008, http://www.hans-bredow-institut.de/de/veranstaltungkonferenz/
chancengleichheit-fuer-content-auf-netzwerken-plattformen; Archive of Conference




monopoly was sold to Deutsche Telekom AG.365 Broadband network
operators operate under a structural separation of content from
conduit, and are required to provide interconnection to all other
network operators.366 Those deemed to have market power may be
further required to observe non-discrimination, 67 transparency, 368
and unbundling requirements. 369 As a result, the "European fixed
broadband marketplace is far more robustly and diversely
competitive than that of the U.S."370 Moreover, the German
Telecommunications Law defines telecommunications quite
broadly, theoretically extending the law's reach to just about every
form of electronic transmission imaginable: broadband and digital,
as well as satellite and television transmission. 371
365. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. The terrestrial broadcast and
cable transmission facilities that were part of that spin-off have now been sold by
DTAG to wholly private entities, in some instances with majority participation by
investment funds. BERLINER KOMMENTAR, supra note 35.
366. TKG, supra note 33, §§ 7, 16.
367. Id. § 19.
368. Id. § 20 (providing that a network operator found to have market power can
be required to publish all information regarding technical specifications, network
characteristics, user requirements, and accounting practices, so as to allow efficient
interconnection and access to the operator's network).
369. Id. at § 21. The Federal Network Agency (as described in supra note 33)
enforces the non-discrimination and access provisions of the Telecommunications
law (as well as laws pertaining to energy and railroad networks). Id. § 116. See
BERLINER KOMMENTAR, supra note 33, at 1823-44, n.56 (opining, without further
discussion, that the dangers of "regulatory capture" have been largely avoided by a
cross-industry approach). Whether and how the Federal Network Agency, charged
with the enforcement of this statute, has been more successful than the FCC in
enforcing the unbundled-network-element ("UNE") provisions of the 1996
Telecommunications Act is an interesting question, necessarily beyond the scope of
this study, although it appears that the German authorities have been given
sufficient statutory tools to accomplish their regulatory goals. See, e.g., TKG, supra
note 33, §§ 19-20. Much of the progress they have made, however, has been given
up in the "regulatory holiday" granted to DTAG. See id. § 3(c).
370. J. Scott Marcus, Network Neutrality: The Roots of the Debate in the United States,
43 INTERECONOMIES 30, 37 (2008) (adding that "European regulators already have a
substantial palette of tools to apply to any problems that might emerge"). Marcus
also notes that the German legal system recognizes a "complementary applicability
of competition law - which is not a realistic option in the US." Id. (citing Trinko v.
Bell Atlantic, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)).
371. TKG, supra note 33, § 3(27) (defining "telecommunication network" as the
"totality of transmission systems and, where applicable, distribution and router
devices as well as other resources, which make possible the transmission of signals
over cable, broadcast, optical and other electro-magnetic equipment, including
satellite networks, wireline and mobile terrestrial networks, power line distribution
inasmuch as it is used for signal transmission, networks for radio and television as
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A second reason for optimism about the future of a neutral
network in Germany may be the legacy of broadcast and
information freedom which is the subject of this work. The
Constitutional Court has explicitly extended these constitutional
protections to the underlying network, as reflected in the provisions
of the Inter-State Treaty relating to transmission and set-top boxes
discussed above.372
Nevertheless, the forces set in motion by the
telecommunications market "liberalization" embodied in the Post
Reform II in 1994, as well as technological convergence, are creating
tensions along the faultlines between conduit and content,
telecommunications and broadcasting, and private property and
public service. The "serving" function of telecommunications is
placed in jeopardy, as network owners assert their rights to
economically exploit frequency rights expensively purchased at
auction, pitting property rights against broadcasting freedom,
threatening the once privileged place of broadcasting, and public
broadcasting in particular. 373
Retransmission and "must-carry" issues are particular
flashpoints on the front between commercial infrastructure and
constitutionally protected programming content.374  Newly
well as cable networks, all independent of the transmitted content").
372. See Inter-State Treaty, supra note 25, §§ 50-53. See also supra Part III(I) and
supra notes 353-55 (discussing Inter-State Treaty §§ 50-52); 90 BVerfGE at 93
(observing that both adequate financing and provision of transmission capacity are
"foundational requirements for the use or exercise of broadcasting freedom" as it
relates to the allocation of transmission capacity within the ambit of broadcasting
freedom (citing 73 BVerfGE at 182 passim; 83 BVerfGE at 322)).
373. Gersdorf, supra note 78, at 104 (finding that plans to "throw all frequencies
in one bowl" and make them available to users at market rates "means nothing
other than the loss of the privileged special regulation of broadcast frequencies");
Wille, supra note 360, at 89 passim. See also Claus Grewenig, Rechtsprobleme im
Zusammenhang mit der Uberarbeitung des Rechtsrahmens ffir die elektronische
Kommunikaton (TK-Review) durch die Europdische Kommission - aus Sicht des privaten
Rundfunks [Legal Problems in Connection with the Revision of the Legal Framework... -
from Point of View of Private Broadcasters], 2 ZUM 96 (2007). Compare 12 BVerfGE at
238-40 (relating to broadcasting's priority access to transmission facilities).
374. This clash between conduit and content is described by Wolfgang
Hoffmann-Riem:
Further problems of access present themselves in the wake of these
technological and economic developments. Of particular interest are the
presently observable attempts of infrastructure enterprises such as cable
companies to exchange their old role as neutral "public carrier" for one of a
multi-media business. Even Deutsche Telekom senses that this is a [new]
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privatized cable and other telecommunications operators oppose the
"serving" function assigned to technical transmission facilities by
the Constitutional Court.375 In this environment, a new element has
entered the calculus of lawmakers: the asserted contract and
property rights of network owners.376 This sets up conflicts not only
between cable owner/operators and public interest carriage
requirements, but also between cable owner/operators and
unaffiliated commercial program producers who hope to have their
programming carried by the network on reasonable terms and
field of business. The traditional principle of German telecommunication
and media law, concerning the separation of responsibility for content and
for the network, seems no longer to have purchase.
Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 280, at 54.
375. See discussion at supra Parts III(I)-J). See also Kloepfer, supra note 301, at 18
(noting a "fundamental paradigm change, in that the economic activity of the (by
now) privatized operators of transmission paths is now accompanied by the
economic freedoms of the Basic Law"); Gersdorf, supra note 78, at 106 (observing
that it is "well-established that the basic right of broadcasting freedom is a 'serving
freedom,'" and noting the growing "polarity between structures and ordering
principles of telecommunications and broadcasting law"); BECK'SCHER KOMMENTAR,
supra note 237, at 914-15 (citing must-carry litigation in OVG Bremen, 2000 ZUM
250, 252; OVG Berlin, 20 OVGE 212, 215). There have also been complaints at the
European Commission that German must-carry rules violate § 49 of the European
Community Treaty regarding free trade, a subject that is beyond the scope of this
article.
376. BECK'SCHE KOMMENTAR, supra note 237, at 915-16 nn.19-20 (Wille et al.,
commenting on § 52):
Private [cable] net operators can claim the protection of the economic
rights in the Constitution (Articles 12 and 14 of the Basic Law). The legal
[must-carry] rules limit the potential uses of the system by the cable
operator in such a way, that the operator cannot decide which programs
will be fed into and carried on the network .... The legislator must
balance the interests of the property owner and the public interest ....
Article 12(1) of the Basic Law provides in relevant part that "[a]ll Germans shall
have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work,
and their place of training." Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 12(1). Article 14(1)
provides in relevant part that "Property and the right of inheritance shall be
guaranteed." Id. at art. 14(1). Article 14(2), however, provides that "Property
entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good." Id. at art. 14(2).
Some German network owners are beginning to take a page from the
playbook of their U.S. counterparts, arguing their own speech rights instead of, or
in addition to, their property rights. Cf. ENGEL, supra note 242, at 26-27 (asserting
that the speech rights of cable operators had not yet been examined, and arguing
that their editorial function is actualized when they make choices about which
programs to retransmit). Compare City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm'ns, 476
U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986) (finding that a cable owner's putative First Amendment
rights trumped a municipality's attempt to extract public interest undertakings).
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conditions.377
In the wireless market, mobile telephone carriers similarly resist
plans of the Independent Media Authorities to set aside certain
frequencies for broadcasting content onto cell phones, plans that
would allow for public (and commercial) broadcasters to reach their
audiences over wireless telephone devices.378
The push of private network operators for vertical integration is
accompanied by what some Germans refer to as a change from a
"transport" to a "marketing" model.379 In this situation, it is not
377. Some observers report tension between cable operators and program
producers, such as the ongoing negotiations of Premiere, the leading purveyor of
entertainment television (largely U.S. reruns) and a provider of unaffiliated
program "bouquets" to cable-network operators. Cf. Press Release, Kabel
Deutschland and Premier to Continue Their Partnership 1 (May 7, 2008), available at
http://www.kabeldeutschland.com/uploads/tx..kdginews/080507 IRReleasePr
emiere_contract.pdf. According to interviews with Independent Media Authority
personnel, however, cable operators in recent years have resisted this purely leased
transport role and began negotiating with Premiere to take over marketing and
client relationships with Premiere's customers, as well as to exert further control
over Premiere's "bouquet." Interview with Personnel at Medienanstalt Hamburg &
Schleswig-Holstein, in Hamburg, Germany (May 30, 2008).
The Independent Media Authorities believe that multiple, diverse program
platforms are essential to the constitutional goals of diversity and equal access, and
that it is therefore critical to protect unaffiliated platform operators. Section 53 of
the Inter-State Treaty, which requires that the cable operator insure that the
"technology deployed [on its system] makes possible a diverse offering," Inter-State
Treaty, supra note 25, § 53, has not - in the opinion of some - been adequately
enforced. Interview with Personnel at Medienanstalt Hamburg & Schleswig-
Holstein, in Hamburg, Germany (May 30, 2008). Some Independent Media
Authorities also have regulations that require the cable operator to carry affiliated
and unaffiliated programming on equal or comparable terms. See, e.g., Indep.
Media Auth. for Hamburg & Schleswig Holstein, Regulations Relating to Free
Access to Digital Services Pursuant to Inter-State Treaty § 53, at T 14 (authorizing
IMA to require cable systems with "significant market power" to carry competing
platforms), available at http://www.ma-hsh.de/cms/upload/downloads/
Rechtsvorschriften/2.5_Zugangsfreiheit.pdf. Diversity could also be promoted by
enforcement of TKG §§ 19 and 21, which apply access requirements and
discrimination prohibitions to market-dominant transport systems. TKG, supra
note 33, §§ 19, 21.
378. The Media Authorities had together proposed a pilot project for the
extension of a package of public and private broadcast offerings onto mobile
telephones and to set aside specific frequencies in the "L-Band" for the project. The
project was challenged before the Administrative Court in Stuttgart, which rejected
the challenge. Carl-Eugen Eberle, Neue Verbreitungwege, neue Angebote - die Sicht des
offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks, 6 ZUM 439, 441 (2007) (observing that large wireless
phone companies, such as Vodafone, T-Mobile and 02, "were not prepared to
accept the parameters of the public service broadcasters relating to the project").
379. See, e.g., Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Rechtsproblem der Regulierung der Entgelte, der
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surprising that the Constitutional Court's focus is increasingly
turned to the underlying transport as an essential predicate of
broadcasting freedom. 380 The assumption among most German
jurists seems to be that constitutional mandates of broadcasting and
information freedom will trump the market-approach of the TKG
and the asserted property rights of network owners.
381
IV. Conclusion
This article has attempted to present some of the constitutional
principles and operational realities of a broadcasting and media
system different than ours in the United States. Although
surrounded (almost by definition, it seems) by controversy and
criticism, the German discourse illustrates how media issues are
foregrounded and constitutionalized under the Basic Law. Here is a
framework through which our own choices on media questions,
from public broadcasting to network management, can be
measured, described, and understood.
Paketbiindelung und der Vertragsgestaltung im digitalen Kabelfrensehen, 1 ZUM 1, 4
(2005) (describing a "change of 'business model"' from transport [Weiterleitung] to
marketing). See also discussion supra Part III(K)(3)(c) (regarding the deterioration of
the historical German separation between broadcast conduit and content).
380. See, e.g., 119 BVerfGE at 216-17 (dangers to broadcasting freedom posed by
the "engagement of telecommunications companies as operators of platforms for
broadcast programming" and the "process of horizontal and vertical integration of
media markets").
381. BERLINER KOMMENTAR, supra note 33, at 1149, § 48, n.10
("Telecommunications serves broadcasting and its journalistic function;
telecommunications [law] therefore has a subordinate importance."). See also
Hoffmann-Riem et al., supra note 348, at 328 ("According to widely-held opinion,
the concept that communications regulation does not limit the media-political
discretion of the States has not yet firmly established itself within regulatory
constructions of the Telecommunications Law. Clarity is needed in the area of
frequency distribution .. in order that the interests of the States and of the carriers
of broadcast freedom be considered.").
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